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Compute the Nash equilibria of the following location game. There are two people who simultaneously select numbers between zero and one. Suppose player 1 chooses \(s_{1}\) and player 2 chooses \(s_{2}\). If \(s_{i}

Short Answer

Expert verified
The Nash equilibria are when both players choose the same number, \(s_1 = s_2\), for any \(x\) between 0 and 1.

Step by step solution

01

Understand the Game Structure

The game involves two players who choose numbers between 0 and 1. Each player's payoff depends on the choices made. If one player's choice is less than the other's, they share the sum of their choices as their payoffs. If the choices are equal, they get a payoff of 1/2.
02

Analyze Case 1 - Equal Choices

When player 1 chooses \(s_1\) and player 2 chooses \(s_2\) such that \(s_1 = s_2\), both players receive a payoff of \(1/2\). This outcome is always a Nash equilibrium because none of the players can unilaterally improve their payoff by changing their choice.
03

Analyze Case 2 - Unequal Choices

Consider the situation where \(s_1 eq s_2\). If \(s_1 < s_2\), player 1 gets a payoff of \((s_1+s_2)/2\) and player 2 gets \(1-(s_1+s_2)/2\). The players will only be in equilibrium if neither can increase their payoff by choosing a number closer to the other's choice.
04

Identify Conditions for Nash Equilibrium

For unequal choices to be a Nash equilibrium, we must check if either player can improve their payoff by moving closer to the other's decision. Suppose player 1 chooses \(s_1 < s_2\). If player 1 moves closer to \(s_2\) or matches it, they could potentially improve their payoff.
05

Conclusion - Nash Equilibria Identification

Upon evaluating both cases, the Nash equilibria occur at points where both players choose identical strategies, \(s_1 = s_2 = x\) for any \(x\) in the interval [0, 1]. This is because any unilateral deviation does not yield better payoffs than 1/2.

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Key Concepts

These are the key concepts you need to understand to accurately answer the question.

Game Theory
Game Theory is an area in mathematics and economics that studies strategic interactions among rational decision-makers. It explores how individuals make choices when their outcomes depend not only on their own actions but also on the actions of others.

To understand game theory, it helps to consider each "game" as a model of real-life scenarios. Here, players (individuals, firms, nations) choose strategies to maximize their benefits or payoffs. These strategies are often chosen simultaneously, and the success depends on the strategies chosen by others.

In the context of a Nash Equilibrium—a core concept in game theory—each player's strategy is optimal given the strategy of the other player. No one can benefit by changing their strategy unilaterally while all others keep theirs unchanged.
Location Game
The Location Game is a special type of game in game theory where players choose locations along a "line" or "interval." The goal is typically to optimize their payoff, taking into account the position choices of others.

In our scenario, the location game involves two players selecting numbers between 0 and 1. The results depend on how their chosen numbers compare. It's an engaging exercise in strategy and forward-thinking because each player's payoff reflects both their position and that of their opponent.

This game's interesting feature is how players must balance their choice: being too aggressive or too conservative can disadvantage them if it doesn't anticipate the rival's position accurately. The challenge is understanding the strategic implications of every possible number they can pick.
Strategy
In any game, the strategy is the plan or method a player uses to reach their objectives. This plan considers the rules of the game and the likely responses of other players.

For the location game, each player's strategy is a choice of a number within the designated range (from 0 to 1). The chosen number represents a "position," optimizing which requires insight into the rival's likely choices.

The best strategy, in Nash Equilibrium terms, is one where neither player can profit by changing their number alone. This makes equal choices an optimal strategy because - If one player deviates, they don't improve since their payoff of 1/2 isn't exceeded.

Understanding player strategy in this framework helps anticipate moves and counter-moves, essential for mastering more complex strategic games.
Payoff Matrix
A payoff matrix is a useful tool in game theory to represent the outcomes for each combination of strategies that players choose. It helps clarify how different strategic choices lead to different results.

In the location game example, although not explicitly laid out, one can imagine a conceptual payoff matrix where:
  • If both players select the same number: they each receive a payoff of 1/2.
  • If player 1 chooses a smaller number than player 2, then their payoff is \((s_1 + s_2)/2\)
  • Player 2's payoff becomes \((1 - (s_1 + s_2)/2)\)
The payoff matrix allows players to visualize potential outcomes clearly, assisting them in deciding optimal strategies. With this visualization, both can assess which situations would likely give them the best results based on their actions and those of their opponent.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

This exercise asks you to consider what happens when players choose their actions by a simple rule of thumb instead of by reasoning. Suppose that two players play a specific finite simultaneous-move game many times. The first time the game is played, each player selects a pure strategy at random. If player \(i\) has \(m_{i}\) strategies, then she plays each strategy \(s_{i}\) with probability \(1 / m_{i}\). At all subsequent times at which the game is played, however, each player \(i\) plays a best response to the pure strategy actually chosen by the other player the previous time the game was played. If player \(i\) has \(k\) strategies that are best responses, then she randomizes among them, playing each strategy with probability \(1 / k\). (a) Suppose that the game being played is a prisoners' dilemma. Explain what will happen over time. (b) Next suppose that the game being played is the battle of the sexes. In the long run, as the game is played over and over, does play always settle down to a Nash equilibrium? Explain. (c) What if, by chance, the players happen to play a strict Nash equilibrium the first time they play the game? What will be played in the future? Explain how the assumption of a strict Nash equilibrium, rather than a nonstrict Nash equilibrium, makes a difference here. (d) Suppose that, for the game being played, a particular strategy \(s_{i}\) is not rationalizable. Is it possible that this strategy would be played in the long run? Explain carefully.

Consider a game in which, simultaneously, player 1 selects any real number \(x\) and player 2 selects any real number \(y\). The payoffs are given by: $$ \begin{aligned} &u_{1}(x, y)=2 x-x^{2}+2 x y \\ &u_{2}(x, y)=10 y-2 x y-y^{2} \end{aligned} $$ (a) Calculate and graph each player's best-response function as a function of the opposing player's pure strategy. (b) Find and report the Nash equilibria of the game. (c) Determine the rationalizable strategy profiles for this game.

Consider the following \(n\)-player game. Simultaneously and independently, the players each select either X, Y, or Z. The payoffs are defined as follows. Each player who selects X obtains a payoff equal to \(\gamma\), where \(\gamma\) is the number of players who select Z. Each player who selects Y obtains a payoff of \(2 \alpha\), where \(\alpha\) is the number of players who select X. Each player who selects \(Z\) obtains a payoff of \(3 \beta\), where \(\beta\) is the number of players who select Y. Note that \(\alpha+\beta+\gamma=n\). (a) Suppose \(n=2\). Represent this game in the normal form by drawing the appropriate matrix. (b) In the case of \(n=2\), does this game have a Nash equilibrium? If so, describe it. (c) Suppose \(n=11\). Does this game have a Nash equilibrium? If so, describe an equilibrium and explain how many Nash equilibria there are.

Find the Nash equilibrium of the following normal-form game: \(S_{1}=[0,1], S_{2}=[0,1], u_{1}\left(s_{1}, s_{2}\right)=3 s_{1}-2 s_{1} s_{2}-2 s_{1}^{2}\), and \(u_{2}\left(s_{1}, s_{2}\right)=\) \(s_{2}+2 s_{1} s_{2}-2 s_{2}^{2}\). (The solution is interior, so you can use calculus.)

Consider a two-player game and suppose that \(s^{*}\) and \(t^{*}\) are Nash equilibrium strategy profiles in the game. Must it be the case that \(\left\\{s_{1}^{*}, t_{1}^{*}\right\\} \times\left\\{s_{2}^{*}, t_{2}^{*}\right\\}\) is a weakly congruous strategy set? Explain why or why not.

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