Chapter 9: Problem 14
Heather and David (players 1 and 2 ) are partners in a handmade postcard business. They each put costly effort into the business, which then determines their profits. However, unless they each exert at least 1 unit of effort, there are no revenues at all. In particular, each player \(i\) chooses an effort level \(e_{i} \geq 0\). Player \(i\) 's payoff is \(u_{i}\left(e_{i}, e_{j}\right)= \begin{cases}-e_{i} & \text { if } e_{j}<1 \\\ e_{i}\left(e_{j}-1\right)^{2}+e_{i}-\frac{1}{2} e_{i}^{2} & \text { if } e_{j} \geq 1\end{cases}\) where \(j\) denotes the other player. (a) Prove that \((0,0)\) is a Nash equilibrium. (b) Graph the players' best responses as a function of each other's strategies. (c) Find all of the other Nash equilibria.
Short Answer
Step by step solution
Key Concepts
These are the key concepts you need to understand to accurately answer the question.