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Is the following statement true or false? If it is true, explain why. If it is false, provide a game that illustrates that it is false. "If a Nash equilibrium is not strict, then it is not efficient."

Short Answer

Expert verified
False; a non-strict Nash Equilibrium can be efficient, as shown in the provided example.

Step by step solution

01

Understand Nash Equilibrium

A Nash Equilibrium is a situation in a game where no player can benefit by unilaterally changing their strategy, given the other players' strategies remain unchanged. An equilibrium is 'strict' if each player's strategy is the unique best response to the other players' strategies.
02

Define Efficiency in Game Theory

In game theory, an outcome is considered 'efficient' if there is no other outcome that makes at least one player better off without making any other player worse off. This is often referred to as Pareto Efficiency.
03

Identify the Statement's Implication

The statement claims that if a Nash Equilibrium is not strict, it cannot be efficient. Hence, we need to establish whether a non-strict Nash Equilibrium can still be Pareto efficient.
04

Example of a Non-Strict Nash Equilibrium

Consider the game with the following payoff matrix:\[\begin{array}{c|c|c} & ext{Strategy A} & ext{Strategy B} \\hline ext{Strategy A} & (2,2) & (0,0) \\hline ext{Strategy B} & (0,0) & (2,2) \\end{array}\]Both (Strategy A, Strategy A) and (Strategy B, Strategy B) are Nash Equilibria. However, they are not strict because a player can switch strategies without becoming worse off.
05

Check Efficiency of the Example

In the given example, both Nash Equilibria (Strategy A, Strategy A) and (Strategy B, Strategy B) provide payoffs of (2,2), which are Pareto efficient. There are no alternative outcomes that improve one player's payoff without reducing the other's. Thus, these equilibria are efficient.
06

Conclusion of the Statement

The provided example demonstrates that a non-strict Nash Equilibrium can be efficient, since changing strategies does not improve the joint outcomes. Hence, the original statement is false.

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Key Concepts

These are the key concepts you need to understand to accurately answer the question.

Nash equilibrium
In game theory, a Nash equilibrium is a fundamental concept denoting a situation where no participant can gain by solely changing their own strategy. This assumes that the other players' strategies remain constant. Typically, a Nash equilibrium occurs when each player's chosen strategy is optimal, given the strategies of all other players. Imagine a simple game like rock-paper-scissors. Here, if each player chooses randomly, they reach a state of Nash equilibrium since deviating from randomness wouldn't benefit any player unless others also deviate.
  • Each player plays optimally, assuming others do not change.
  • Nash equilibrium doesn't always result in the best joint outcome.
  • It can sometimes lead to suboptimal outcomes for the group.
Understanding Nash equilibrium helps to predict stable outcomes of strategic interactions, even if those outcomes are not the absolute best for all involved. Both strict and non-strict equilibria exist, with 'strict' meaning there's a unique best response strategy for each player.
Pareto efficiency
Pareto efficiency, often referenced as Pareto optimality, is a key concept in economics and game theory where a situation is reached when no individual can be made better off without making someone else worse off. In simpler terms, it's about resource allocation where one cannot improve without someone else losing. This concept is critical when analyzing the results of strategic games.
  • Pareto efficiency doesn't imply fairness or equality.
  • An efficient outcome might not favor all participants equally.
  • There can be multiple Pareto efficient outcomes in a game.
A common misuse is assuming that Pareto efficiency is synonymous with societal welfare maximization, which is not always the case. In game theory, we strive to find strategies leading to these outcomes but understand that efficiency speaks only to the allocation aspect, not necessarily about the individual satisfaction of players.
strict equilibrium
A strict equilibrium refers to a scenario in game theory where each player's strategy is the uniquely best response to the others. This is a subset of Nash equilibrium where no player has anything to gain by changing only their own strategy, but with an additional condition that the selected strategy is the only one that yields the best results.
  • Strict equilibria are stable.
  • Players have an incentive to stick to their path.
  • These equilibria reduce strategy deviation.
For an example, think of a game where businesses decide on pricing strategies. If a particular price point yields the highest profit when others keep their prices constant, and any deviation leads to a loss, this pricing strategy forms a strict equilibrium. While beneficial in terms of predictability and stability, strict equilibria are not always present in every game and are generally less common than non-strict equilibria.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Consider a two-player game and suppose that \(s^{*}\) and \(t^{*}\) are Nash equilibrium strategy profiles in the game. Must it be the case that \(\left\\{s_{1}^{*}, t_{1}^{*}\right\\} \times\left\\{s_{2}^{*}, t_{2}^{*}\right\\}\) is a weakly congruous strategy set? Explain why or why not.

Consider the following \(n\)-player game. Simultaneously and independently, the players each select either X, Y, or Z. The payoffs are defined as follows. Each player who selects X obtains a payoff equal to \(\gamma\), where \(\gamma\) is the number of players who select Z. Each player who selects Y obtains a payoff of \(2 \alpha\), where \(\alpha\) is the number of players who select X. Each player who selects \(Z\) obtains a payoff of \(3 \beta\), where \(\beta\) is the number of players who select Y. Note that \(\alpha+\beta+\gamma=n\). (a) Suppose \(n=2\). Represent this game in the normal form by drawing the appropriate matrix. (b) In the case of \(n=2\), does this game have a Nash equilibrium? If so, describe it. (c) Suppose \(n=11\). Does this game have a Nash equilibrium? If so, describe an equilibrium and explain how many Nash equilibria there are.

Suppose you know the following for a particular three-player game: The space of strategy profiles \(S\) is finite. Also, for every \(s \in S\), it is the case that \(u_{2}(s)=3 u_{1}(s), u_{3}(s)=\left[u_{1}(s)\right]^{2}\), and \(u_{1}(s) \in[0,1] .\) (a) Must this game have a Nash equilibrium? Explain your answer. (b) Must this game have an efficient Nash equilibrium? Explain your answer. (c) Suppose that in addition to the information given above, you know that \(s^{*}\) is a Nash equilibrium of the game. Must \(s^{*}\) be an efficient strategy profile? Explain your answer; if you answer "no," then provide a counterexample.

Heather and David (players 1 and 2 ) are partners in a handmade postcard business. They each put costly effort into the business, which then determines their profits. However, unless they each exert at least 1 unit of effort, there are no revenues at all. In particular, each player \(i\) chooses an effort level \(e_{i} \geq 0\). Player \(i\) 's payoff is \(u_{i}\left(e_{i}, e_{j}\right)= \begin{cases}-e_{i} & \text { if } e_{j}<1 \\\ e_{i}\left(e_{j}-1\right)^{2}+e_{i}-\frac{1}{2} e_{i}^{2} & \text { if } e_{j} \geq 1\end{cases}\) where \(j\) denotes the other player. (a) Prove that \((0,0)\) is a Nash equilibrium. (b) Graph the players' best responses as a function of each other's strategies. (c) Find all of the other Nash equilibria.

Find the Nash equilibrium of the following normal-form game: \(S_{1}=[0,1], S_{2}=[0,1], u_{1}\left(s_{1}, s_{2}\right)=3 s_{1}-2 s_{1} s_{2}-2 s_{1}^{2}\), and \(u_{2}\left(s_{1}, s_{2}\right)=\) \(s_{2}+2 s_{1} s_{2}-2 s_{2}^{2}\). (The solution is interior, so you can use calculus.)

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