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Consider an industry in which two firms compete by simultaneously and independently selecting prices for their goods. Firm 1's product and firm 2's product are imperfect substitutes, so that an increase in one firm's price will lead to an increase in the quantity demanded of the other firm's product. In particular, each firm \(i\) faces the following demand curve: $$ q_{i}=\max \left\\{0,24-2 p_{i}+p_{j}\right\\} $$ Consider an industry in which two firms compete by simultaneously and independently selecting prices for their goods. Firm 1's product and firm 2's product are imperfect substitutes, so that an increase in one firm's price will lead to an increase in the quantity demanded of the other firm's product. In particular, each firm \(i\) faces the following demand curve: $$ q_{i}=\max \left\\{0,24-2 p_{i}+p_{j}\right\\} $$ where \(q_{i}\) is the quantity that firm \(i\) sells, \(p_{i}\) is firm \(i\) 's price, and \(p_{j}\) is the other firm's price. (The "maximum" operator is needed to ensure that quantity demanded is never negative.) Suppose that the maximum possible price is 20 and the minimum price is zero, so the strategy space for each firm \(i\) is \(S_{i}=[0,20]\). Both firms produce with no costs. (a) What is firm \(i\) 's profit as a function of the strategy profile \(\left(p_{1}, p_{2}\right)\) ? Let each firm's payoff be defined as its profit. (b) Show that for each firm \(i\), prices less than 6 and prices greater than 11 are dominated strategies, whereas prices from 6 to 11 are not dominated, so \(B_{i}=[6,11]\). (c) Consider a reduced game in which firms select prices between \(x\) and \(y\), where \(x

Short Answer

Expert verified
The profit is \( \pi_i = p_i \times \max \{0, 24 - 2p_i + p_j\} \). Prices less than 6 or greater than 11 are dominated. Between 6 and 11, strategies are undominated.

Step by step solution

01

Define the Profit Function

Each firm's profit function, given its price and the competitor's price, is defined by the profit from selling its product, since there are no costs. Thus, Firm i's profit can be expressed as \( \pi_i = p_i \times q_i \). Substitute the demand equation into the profit function: \( \pi_i = p_i \times \max \{0, 24 - 2p_i + p_j\} \). This is the profit function for both Firm 1 and Firm 2, with respective substitutions.
02

Analyze Dominated Strategies

A strategy is dominated if there's another strategy that guarantees a higher payoff regardless of the competitor's choice. Calculate profits for boundary cases: - If \( p_i < 6 \), then \( q_i = \max \{0, 24 - 2p_i + p_j\} \) approaches zero as prices drop.- If \( p_i > 11 \), \( q_i = 24 - 2p_i + p_j \) could become negative, hence unprofitable.Thus, these price ranges are dominated as they either provide lower profit or risk negative demands.
03

Confirm Undominated Strategies

For prices \( p_i \) between 6 and 11, the product remains substitute as demand stays positive and profits do not fall into zero or negative levels. These strategies are not dominated because no single alternative in the range offers universally higher profits.
04

Rationalizable Strategies in Reduced Game

If strategies are selected between \( x \) and \( y \) (\( x < y \)), mimic the thoughtful analysis from earlier steps: - Ensure \( 6 \leq x < y \leq 11 \). - The selected range must guarantee demand remains positive, and each firm cannot guarantee better payoff by shifting entirely outside of [6,11], given its reduced space overlap.
05

Compute Rationalizable Strategies in Original Game

Considering the results from the reduced game, rational strategies in the original game mirror the undominated range which ensures mutually positive profits for firms. Therefore, both firms naturally rationalize to stay between prices 6 and 11 to maximize their chances of positive and non-dominated profits.

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Key Concepts

These are the key concepts you need to understand to accurately answer the question.

Nash Equilibrium
Nash Equilibrium is a fundamental concept in game theory, where each player's strategy is optimal given the strategies of the other players. In the context of our exercise, it refers to the pricing strategies adopted by the two firms such that neither can benefit by unilaterally changing their strategy.

Let's break this down with an example from our scenario:
  • Each firm sets its price based on the competitor's price.
  • Given the demand functions provided, both firms aim to set a price that maximizes their quantity sold and thus maximizes their profit.
  • A Nash Equilibrium price strategy would be where Firm 1 and Firm 2 set prices between 6 and 11, after considering each other's potential pricing decisions.
In this range, neither firm has an incentive to deviate, as moving out of this bracket could lead to reduced profits. Thus, the firms have found a mutually stable strategy.
Dominated Strategies
Dominated strategies are choices that result in lower payoffs for a player, no matter what the other players do. They are essentially inferior strategies that can be disregarded in order to refine strategic decision-making.

In relation to our problem, the firms have distinctly defined dominated strategies:
  • Prices less than 6 are dominated because they tend to yield very low or even zero demand, translating to low profits.
  • Prices higher than 11 have the potential of resulting in negative demand values, which is sensibly unprofitable.
As a result, these inferior price strategies can be dismissed from consideration, allowing the firms to focus on more viable options.
Rationalizable Strategies
Rationalizable strategies are those strategies that remain plausible when players think about what everyone else might do. This concept looks at what strategies can withstand methodical and logical analysis by the players.

In our original exercise:
  • The rationalizable strategies encompass the undominated range from prices 6 to 11.
  • This range reflects prices that do not threaten zero or negative demand, so firms can rationalize these strategies as sensible choices.
  • Both firms realize that by choosing a price within this interval, they are maximizing their strategic efficacy and ensuring viable profits.
Through logical reasoning, each firm identifies this pricing range as the best way to ensure competitive yet profitable interactions within the market.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Consider a location game like the one discussed in this chapter. Suppose that instead of the nine regions located in a straight line, the nine regions form a box with three rows and three columns. Two vendors simultaneously and independently select on which of the nine regions to locate. Suppose that there are two consumers in each region; each consumer will walk to the nearest vendor and purchase a soda, generating a \(\$ 1.00\) profit for the vendor. Consumers cannot walk diagonally. For example, to get from the top-left region to the middle region, a consumer has to walk through either the top-center region or the middle-left region. (This means that the middle region is the same distance from top-left as top-right is from top-left.) Assume that if some consumers are the same distance from the two vendors, then these consumers are split equally between the vendors. Determine the set of rationalizable strategies for the vendors.

Consider a game in which, simultaneously, player 1 selects a number \(x \in[2,8]\) and player 2 selects a number \(y \in[2,8]\). The payoffs are given by: $$ \begin{aligned} &u_{1}(x, y)=2 x y-x^{2} \\ &u_{2}(x, y)=4 x y-y^{2} \end{aligned} $$ Calculate the rationalizable strategy profiles for this game.

Consider a duopoly game in which two firms simultaneously and independently select prices. Assume that the prices are required to be greater than or equal to zero. Denote firm 1's price as \(p_{1}\) and firm 2's price as \(p_{2}\). The firms' products are differentiated. After the prices are set, consumers demand \(10-p_{1}+p_{2}\) units of the good that firm 1 produces. Consumers demand \(10-p_{2}+p_{1}\) units of the good that firm 2 produces. Assume that each firm must supply the number of units demanded. Also assume that each firm produces at zero cost. The payoff for each firm is equal to the firm's profit. (a) Write the payoff functions of the firms (as a function of their strategies \(p_{1}\) and \(p_{2}\) ). (b) Compute firm 2's best-response function (as a function of \(p_{1}\) ). (c) Can you determine the rationalizable strategies in this game by inspecting the graph of the best-response functions? What are the rationalizable strategies?

Consider a location game with five regions on the beach in which a vendor can locate. The regions are arranged on a straight line, as in the original game discussed in the text. Instead of there being two vendors, as with the original game, suppose there are three vendors who simultaneously and independently select on which of the five regions to locate. There are thirty consumers in each of the five regions; each consumer will walk to the nearest vendor and purchase a soda, generating a \(\$ 1.00\) profit for the vendor. Assume that if some consumers are the same distance from the two or three nearest vendors, then these consumers are split equally between these vendors. (a) Can you rationalize the strategy of locating in region 1 ? (b) If your answer to part (a) is "yes," describe a belief that makes locating at region 1 a best response. If your answer is "no," find a strategy that strictly dominates playing strategy 1 .

Consider our nine-region location game to be a model of competition between two political candidates. Fifty voters are located in each of the nine regions of the political spectrum; each voter will vote for the closest candidate. Voters in regions equidistant from the two candidates will split evenly between them. (a) Assume that each candidate wants to maximize the number of votes he or she receives. Are the candidates' preferences the same as those modeled in the basic location game? Discuss how this setting differs from the setting in which candidates want to maximize the probability of winning (with the rule that the candidate with the most votes wins the election and, in case of a tie, each candidate is awarded the office with probability \(1 / 2\) ). (b) Suppose, contrary to the basic location model, that voters are not uniformly distributed across the nine regions. Instead, whereas regions \(1,2,3,4,5,8\), and 9 each contains fifty voters, regions 6 and 7 each contains \(x\) voters. Analyze the candidate location game for the case in which \(x=75\). In a rationalizable outcome, can one of the candidates win with probability 1 ? (c) What happens if \(x>75\) or \(x<75\) ?

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