Chapter 8: Problem 3
Consider our nine-region location game to be a model of competition between two political candidates. Fifty voters are located in each of the nine regions of the political spectrum; each voter will vote for the closest candidate. Voters in regions equidistant from the two candidates will split evenly between them. (a) Assume that each candidate wants to maximize the number of votes he or she receives. Are the candidates' preferences the same as those modeled in the basic location game? Discuss how this setting differs from the setting in which candidates want to maximize the probability of winning (with the rule that the candidate with the most votes wins the election and, in case of a tie, each candidate is awarded the office with probability \(1 / 2\) ). (b) Suppose, contrary to the basic location model, that voters are not uniformly distributed across the nine regions. Instead, whereas regions \(1,2,3,4,5,8\), and 9 each contains fifty voters, regions 6 and 7 each contains \(x\) voters. Analyze the candidate location game for the case in which \(x=75\). In a rationalizable outcome, can one of the candidates win with probability 1 ? (c) What happens if \(x>75\) or \(x<75\) ?
Short Answer
Step by step solution
Key Concepts
These are the key concepts you need to understand to accurately answer the question.