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Suppose that in some two-player game, \(s_{1}\) is a rationalizable strategy for player 1 . If \(s_{2}\) is a best response to \(s_{1}\), is \(s_{2}\) a rationalizable strategy for player 2? Explain.

Short Answer

Expert verified
No, \(s_2\) being a best response to \(s_1\) does not necessarily make it rationalizable for player 2.

Step by step solution

01

Understanding Rationalizability

A strategy is rationalizable if it is the best response to some belief about the other player's strategies. In other words, a player believes the opponent will choose a strategy that leads to maximizing their own payoff.
02

Define Best Response

A best response is a strategy that yields the highest payoff for a player, given the strategies chosen by the opponent. Here, if player 2's strategy \(s_2\) is the best response to \(s_1\), it means that given player 1 plays \(s_1\), player 2 can do no better than \(s_2\) to maximize their payoff.
03

Rationalizability of \(s_{2}\)

To be a rationalizable strategy for player 2, \(s_2\) must be the best response to some belief about player 1's strategies. However, \(s_2\) being a best response to the single strategy \(s_1\), does not automatically imply it is rationalizable since rationalizability involves being the best response to potentially various beliefs.
04

Conclusion

While \(s_2\) is the best response to \(s_1\), it does not ensure \(s_2\) is rationalizable. For rationalizability, \(s_2\) must be the best response across possible beliefs about player 1's strategies, not just the specific instance of \(s_1\).

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Key Concepts

These are the key concepts you need to understand to accurately answer the question.

Rationalizable Strategy
In game theory, a rationalizable strategy is one that a player can consider as a reasonable choice based on their beliefs about the other player's possible actions. It's like being prepared for different plans your opponent might choose and ensuring your response is sensible under those circumstances. To be rationalizable, a strategy doesn't just work for a single prediction; it must be viable under various scenarios or beliefs.
This means that a player's strategy is rationalizable if it is the best response for conceivable strategies the opponent might pick, considering the player aims to maximize their benefit.
A rationalizable strategy is crucial because it moves beyond pure guesswork to methods that hold up under logical scrutiny and potential scenarios.
When approaching problems in game theory, always check if a strategy qualifies as rationalizable to ensure its effectiveness across the spectrum of possible opponent actions.
Best Response
The concept of a "best response" is pivotal in game theory. It refers to the idea that players choose strategies providing the highest payoff, given what their opponents do. It's like finding the winning move in chess, knowing your opponent's likely approach.
To determine the best response, a player evaluates all possible strategies of the opponent and then picks the one that offers them the most favorable outcome. This part of game theory emphasizes strategic thinking—anticipating other players' strategies and counteracting with optimal solutions.
Identifying a best response is essential because it ensures that a player is maximizing their utility based on available knowledge. It involves:
  • Analyzing an opponent's potential moves
  • Choosing a strategy that exploits these potential moves to the player's advantage
A key takeaway here is that a best response isn't just about picking a single best move; it's about aligning your moves with expected opponent behavior to secure the best payoffs.
Beliefs in Game Theory
Beliefs form the backbone of strategic decision-making in game theory. They represent the assumptions or expectations a player has about an opponent's strategy choices. Imagine being a detective trying to solve a mystery based on clues; beliefs are the clues guiding the choice of strategy.
Each player formulates beliefs about how their opponents might play the game, which influences their strategy choice. This concept is also closely connected to the idea of a "rationalizable strategy," as beliefs inform what a player considers rational to play.
It's important to understand that beliefs in game theory are not static or one-dimensional—they evolve as players acquire more information. This dynamic nature makes the study of beliefs integral to predicting and responding to other players’ actions effectively.
Understanding the role of beliefs allows players to:
  • Better anticipate opponent moves
  • Adapt strategies in response to observed behavior
Thus, beliefs are the lens through which players view potential paths, making them crucial for crafting informed and effective strategies.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Suppose that in some two-player game, \(s_{1}\) is a rationalizable strategy for player 1. If, in addition, you know that \(s_{1}\) is a best response to \(s_{2}\), can you conclude that \(s_{2}\) is a rationalizable strategy for player 2? Explain.

Consider the following game played between 100 people. Each person \(i\) chooses a number \(s_{i}\) between 20 and 60 (inclusive). Let \(a_{-i}\) be defined as the average selection of the players other than player \(i\); that is, \(a_{-i}=\left(\Sigma_{j \neq i} s_{j}\right) / 99\). Person i's payoff is \(u_{i}(s)=100-\left(s_{i}-\frac{3}{2} a_{-i}\right)^{2}\). For instance, if the average of the \(-i\) players' choices is 40 and player \(i\) chose 56 , then player \(i\) would receive a payoff of \(100-\left(56-\frac{3}{2} \cdot 40\right)^{2}=100-4^{2}=84\). (a) Find an expression for player \(i\) 's best response to her belief about the other players' strategies as a function of the expected value of \(a_{-i}\), which we can denote \(\bar{a}_{-i} .\) What is the best response to \(\bar{a}_{-i}=40\) ? (b) Use your answer to part (a) to determine the set of undominated strategies for each player. Note that dominated strategies are those that are not best responses (across all beliefs). (c) Find the set of rationalizable strategies. Show what strategies are removed in each round of the deletion procedure. (d) If there were just two players rather than 100 , but the definition of payoffs remained the same, would your answers to parts (a) and (b) change? (e) Suppose that instead of picking numbers between 20 and 60 , the players can select numbers between \(y\) and 60 , where \(y\) is a fixed parameter between 0 and 20 . Calculate the set of rationalizable strategies for any fixed \(y\). Note how the result depends on whether \(y>0\) or \(y=0\).

Consider a two-player simultaneous move game with \(S_{1}=S_{2}=[0,1]\). Suppose that, for \(i=1,2\), player \(i\) 's best response can be represented as a function of \(\bar{s}_{j}\), the expected value of \(s_{j}\) according to player \(i\) 's belief (where \(j=-i\) ). Specifically, player 1's best response function is given by \(B R_{1}\left(\bar{s}_{2}\right)=\bar{s}_{2}\), and player 2 's best response function is given by $$ B R_{2}\left(\bar{s}_{1}\right)=\min \left\\{\frac{1}{4}+\bar{s}_{1}, 1\right\\} . $$ To be clear about this functional form, if \(\frac{1}{4}+\bar{s}_{1}<1\), then player 2 's best response is \(\frac{1}{4}+\bar{s}_{1}\). Otherwise, player 2's best response is 1 . (a) Graph the best response functions for each player. (b) Find \(B_{1}\) and \(B_{2}\). Calculate the rationalizable strategy set and explain which strategies are removed in each round of the iterated dominance procedure.

Consider a guessing game with ten players, numbered 1 through \(10 .\) Simultaneously and independently, the players select integers between 0 and 10. Thus player \(i\) 's strategy space is \(S_{i}=\\{0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10\\}\), for \(i=1,2, \ldots, 10\). The payoffs are determined as follows: First, the average of the players' selections is calculated and denoted \(a\). That is, $$ a=\frac{s_{1}+s_{2}+\cdots+s_{10}}{10} $$ where \(s_{i}\) denotes player \(i\) 's selection, for \(i=1,2, \ldots, 10\). Then, player \(i\) 's payoff is given by \(u_{i}=(a-i-1) s_{i}\). What is the set of rationalizable strategies for each player in this game?

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