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Consider a version of the Cournot doupoly game (described in earlier exercises), where firms 1 and 2 simultaneously and independently select quantities to produce in a market. The quantity selected by firm \(i\) is denoted \(q_{i}\) and must be greater than or equal to zero, for \(i=1,2\). The market price is given by \(p=100-2 q_{1}-2 q_{2}\). Suppose that each firm produces at a cost of 20 per unit. Further, assume that each firm's payoff is defined as its profit. Is it ever a best response for player 1 to choose \(q_{1}=25 ?\) Suppose that player 1 has the belief that player 2 is equally likely to select each of the quantities 6,11 , and 13 . What is player 1 's best response?

Short Answer

Expert verified
No, choosing \(q_1 = 25\) is not a best response; choosing \(q_1 = 11\) is optimal for higher expected profit.

Step by step solution

01

Understand the payoff for Firm 1

Firm 1's payoff or profit can be calculated as revenue minus cost. The revenue is given by the market price multiplied by the quantity produced, i.e., \( R = p \times q_1 \), where \( p = 100 - 2q_1 - 2q_2 \). The cost is \( C = 20q_1 \). Thus, the profit for firm 1 is \( \pi_1 = (100 - 2q_1 - 2q_2)q_1 - 20q_1 \). Simplifying, the profit function for firm 1 is \( \pi_1 = 80q_1 - 2q_1^2 - 2q_1q_2 \).
02

Substitute different values for q2 and calculate profits

Player 1 believes that Player 2 could choose \(q_2 = 6, 11,\) or \(13\) with equal probability. We need to calculate the profit for each potential scenario considering \(q_1=25\). - For \( q_2 = 6 \), \( \pi_1 = 80(25) - 2(25)^2 - 2(25)(6) = 2000 - 1250 - 300 = 450 \).- For \( q_2 = 11 \), \( \pi_1 = 80(25) - 2(25)^2 - 2(25)(11) = 2000 - 1250 - 550 = 200 \).- For \( q_2 = 13 \), \( \pi_1 = 80(25) - 2(25)^2 - 2(25)(13) = 2000 - 1250 - 650 = 100 \).
03

Calculate expected profit when q1=25

The expected profit for Firm 1 when \( q_1 = 25 \) is calculated as the average of the profits from each scenario: \[ E(\pi_1) = \frac{450 + 200 + 100}{3} = 250. \]
04

Consider alternative values for q1 to determine the best response

Firm 1 should consider choosing quantities that yield higher profits. Evaluating alternative strategies:- For \( q_1 = 11 \), calculate: - If \( q_2 = 6 \), \( \pi_1 = 80(11) - 2(11)^2 - 2(11)(6) = 880 - 242 - 132 = 506 \). - If \( q_2 = 11 \), \( \pi_1 = 80(11) - 2(11)^2 - 2(11)(11) = 880 - 242 - 242 = 396 \). - If \( q_2 = 13 \), \( \pi_1 = 80(11) - 2(11)^2 - 2(11)(13) = 880 - 242 - 286 = 352 \).The expected profit for \( q_1 = 11 \) is:\[ E(\pi_1) = \frac{506 + 396 + 352}{3} = 418 \].
05

Identify the best response for Player 1

By comparing expected profits, the higher expected profit at \( q_1 = 11 \) makes this the better response compared to \( q_1 = 25 \). Firm 1 should choose a quantity that maximizes its expected profit given the potential responses of firm 2.

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Key Concepts

These are the key concepts you need to understand to accurately answer the question.

Cournot Duopoly
In a Cournot Duopoly, two firms compete in a market by simultaneously deciding on the quantity of a product to produce. Each firm's decision is made independently and aims to maximize its profit. The fundamental idea here is that each firm chooses its production quantity based on an anticipated response from its competitor.

In our example, firms 1 and 2 produce a product in a market where the price depends on the total quantity produced. The market price, in this case, is described by the formula: \( p = 100 - 2q_1 - 2q_2 \).Here, \( q_1 \) and \( q_2 \) represent the production quantities for firm 1 and firm 2, respectively.

Firms must consider their production costs, which in this scenario is set at 20 per unit. This added complexity requires strategic thinking as each firm's profit will depend not only on its own production quantity but also that of its competitor.
Best Response
Finding the best response in this scenario involves determining the optimal production quantity by taking into account the possible actions of the competitor. Essentially, the best response is the quantity that maximizes a firm's profit given the quantity the competitor might produce.

Player 1, or Firm 1, forms expectations about how Firm 2 will act. In this task, Firm 1 believes Firm 2 might choose quantities of 6, 11, or 13. The best response would be the quantity at which the expected profit is highest across these potential scenarios.

Calculating this involves determining the profit for each potential scenario and evaluating the expected profits for different quantities of \( q_1 \). This helps the firm to decide the optimal production quantity. By comparing these, Firm 1 can identify the best response that yields the greatest expected profit.
Payoff Calculation
The payoff calculation for each firm involves evaluating its profit, which is the difference between total revenue and total cost.

For Firm 1, the total revenue is determined by multiplying the market price \( p \) by the quantity \( q_1 \). The market price decreases as the combined quantity \( q_1 + q_2 \) rises. Therefore, the revenue is given by:\[ R = (100 - 2q_1 - 2q_2)q_1 \].

The total cost for each firm focusing on production costs is:\[ C = 20q_1 \].

Overall, Firm 1's payoff or profit is defined as:\[ \pi_1 = R - C = (100 - 2q_1 - 2q_2)q_1 - 20q_1 \],which simplifies to:\[ 80q_1 - 2q_1^2 - 2q_1q_2 \].

Calculating payoffs for different values of \( q_2 \) allows Firm 1 to identify which quantity maximizes its profit considering the possible choices of Firm 2.
Expected Profit
Expected profit refers to the average profit a firm anticipates given the probability of different potential actions by its competitor. In this scenario, Firm 1 faces a situation where Firm 2 could select different quantities with equal likelihood.

The formula to calculate expected profit is the sum of probability-weighted profits from all scenarios. For Firm 1, these scenarios involve Firm 2 choosing quantities of 6, 11, or 13. If each quantity is chosen with equal probability, then Firm 1's expected profit when producing 25 units is:\[ E(\pi_1) = \frac{450 + 200 + 100}{3} = 250 \].

By calculating expected profits for alternative production quantities, such as \( q_1 = 11 \), Firm 1 can make an informed decision. The goal is to select the quantity that provides the highest expected profit, ensuring an optimal strategy in competitive situations.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Two medieval city-states, Simancas and Toro, are located near each other. Each city-state is controlled by a totalitarian prince, so each can be represented as a single player. Call the prince of Simancas player 1 , and let the prince of Toro be called player 2 . The land surrounding each city-state can be divided among two uses: forested land for deer hunting, and cleared land for growing wheat. Each city-state has five units of land. At the outset, all of the land is forested. Each city-state \(i\) (where \(i=1,2\) ) must make two decisions: how much land to clear for growing wheat, \(g_{i} \in[0,5]\), and how many hounds to raise for hunting deer, \(h_{i} \in[0, \infty)\). All decisions are made simultaneously. Payoffs depend on the total quantity of forested land in both city-states (deer roam freely across borders) and the number of hounds raised in both city-states. The deer harvest for city-state \(i\) is increasing in its own number of hounds but decreasing in the other city-state's number of hounds. Specifically, the deer harvest in city-state \(i\) is \(\max \left\\{0,2 h_{i}-h_{j}\right\\}\left(10-g_{i}-g_{j}\right)\), where \(j\) denotes the other city-state. Here, the "maximum" operator is needed to ensure that the harvest is never negative. The wheat-growing results for each city-state, on the other hand, depend only on its own quantity of cleared land. Specifically, the wheat harvest in city-state \(i\) is \(6 g_{i}\). Raising hounds and clearing land are both costly. Suppose the cost to citystate \(i\) is \(g_{i}^{2}+2 h_{i}^{2}\). Summing up, the payoff for city-state 1 is \(u_{1}\left(g_{1}, h_{1}, g_{2}, h_{2}\right)=\max \left\\{0,2 h_{1}-h_{2}\right\\}\left(10-g_{1}-g_{2}\right)+6 g_{1}-g_{1}^{2}-2 h_{1}^{2}\), and the payoff for city-state 2 is $$ u_{2}\left(g_{1}, h_{1}, g_{2}, h_{2}\right)=\max \left\\{0,2 h_{2}-h_{1}\right\\}\left(10-g_{2}-g_{1}\right)+6 g_{2}-g_{2}^{2}-2 h_{2}^{2} . $$ (a) Show that the strategy \(\left(g_{i}, h_{i}\right)=(0,0)\) is dominated for each city-state \(i\). (b) Show that any strategy with \(h_{i}>5\) is dominated for each city-state \(i\). (c) Show that \(\left(g_{1}, h_{1}\right)=\left(g_{2}, h_{2}\right)=(1,4)\) is not efficient.

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