Chapter 3: Problem 5
Consider a version of the Cournot duopoly game, which will be thoroughly analyzed in Chapter 10 . Two firms (1 and 2) compete in a homogeneous goods market, where the firms produce exactly the same good. The firms simultaneously and independently select quantities to produce. The quantity selected by firm \(i\) is denoted \(q_{i}\) and must be greater than or equal to zero, for \(i=1,2\). The market price is given by \(p=2-q_{1}-q_{2}\). For simplicity, assume that the cost to firm \(i\) of producing any quantity is zero. Further, assume that each firm's payoff is defined as its profit. That is, firm \(i\) 's payoff is \(p q_{i}\), where \(j\) denotes firm \(i\) 's opponent in the game. Describe the normal form of this game by expressing the strategy spaces and writing the payoffs as functions of the strategies.
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