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Suppose a manager and a worker interact as follows. The manager decides whether to hire or not hire the worker. If the manager does not hire the worker, then the game ends. When hired, the worker chooses to exert either high effort or low effort. On observing the worker's effort, the manager chooses to retain or fire the worker. In this game, does "not hire" describe a strategy for the manager? Explain.

Short Answer

Expert verified
Yes, "not hire" is a strategy for the manager as it dictates a complete response in the game.

Step by step solution

01

Understanding the Game

The setup of the game involves a sequence of actions between a manager and a worker. The manager must initially decide whether to hire or not hire. If the worker is hired, they then choose their level of effort (high or low). Depending on the worker's effort, the manager decides to retain or fire the worker. The game ends if the manager decides not to hire the worker or after the retain/fire decision.
02

Defining Strategy Concept

In game theory, a strategy is a complete plan of actions a player will take given the set of circumstances they could face within the game. It includes all possible situations and appropriate responses.
03

Analyzing the Manager's Choice

When considering the manager's options, not hiring is one of the first decisions made. This choice effectively ends the game, preventing further interactions like the worker's effort decision or the manager's retention decision.
04

Conclusion about Not Hiring

Since the manager's decision to "not hire" explicitly defines a complete action in the context of the game — leading to the game ending — it qualifies as a strategy according to game theory definition. It dictates a full response to the situation presented to the manager (decide to hire or not) even though no further actions are consequent.

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Key Concepts

These are the key concepts you need to understand to accurately answer the question.

Strategy
In game theory, a strategy refers to a complete and detailed plan of action that a player will follow throughout the game. It encompasses every possible situation the player might encounter and specifies the actions to be taken in each scenario. The goal of a strategy is to anticipate outcomes that maximize a player's utility or benefits, considering the possible decisions of other players.
In the context of the manager-worker game, the manager's strategy includes the decision on whether to hire or not hire the worker. Even the choice "not hire" is a valid strategy because it encapsulates a specific and predetermined response to the game's starting situation. The choice foresees ending the interaction entirely if the hiring does not take place, thereby covering the full scope of potential outcomes inherent in that decision.
Decision-Making
Decision-making in game theory involves selecting optimal actions based on the expected actions of others. Each decision should consider both the current scenario and the possible future scenarios that each choice opens. This process is central to formulating a strategy.
For the manager, the initial decision to hire or not hire is crucial. It affects the immediate outcome and the continuation of the game. If the decision is to "not hire," the game concludes. On the other hand, hiring leads to subsequent decisions related to the worker's effort and the retention or firing choices by the manager. Every decision is inherently linked, requiring careful analysis of the potential consequences of each choice.
Manager-Worker Interaction
The interaction between the manager and the worker is a dynamic sequence of decisions that can significantly affect the outcome for both parties. Beginning with the manager's decision to hire, if followed through, the interaction develops further based on the worker's effort level.
This interaction highlights the intricate balance of accountability and expectations where the manager must predict and respond to the worker’s chosen effort level. The worker, in turn, must consider the manager's likely reaction to their effort. Thus, the interaction is characterized by dependency and strategic thinking on both sides, ensuring that each understands the potential influence their actions have on the entire process.
Effort Levels
Effort levels in this game signify the two choices available to the worker once hired: providing either high effort or low effort. This decision is essential as it directly impacts the manager's subsequent decision to retain or fire the worker.
If the worker chooses a high effort level, they may increase their chances of retention, expecting that the manager will perceive the high effort positively. Conversely, low effort might increase the risk of getting fired, assuming the manager reacts unfavorably to poor performance. As such, the worker's selection of effort level is a strategic choice that profoundly influences the manager's eventual reaction and the overall outcomes of the game. Therefore, effort levels are a critical component in evaluating the worker's strategy within this interactive decision-making process.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Consider the following strategic setting involving a cat named Baker, a mouse named Cheezy, and a dog named Spike. Baker's objective is to catch Cheezy while avoiding Spike; Cheezy wants to tease Baker but avoid getting caught; Spike wants to rest and is unhappy when he is disturbed. In the morning, Baker and Cheezy simultaneously decide what activity to engage in. Baker can either nap \((\mathrm{N})\) or hunt \((\mathrm{H})\), where hunting involves moving Spike's bone. Cheezy can either hide (h) or play (p). If nap and hide are chosen, then the game ends. The game also will end immediately if hunt and play are chosen, in which case Baker captures Cheezy. On the other hand, if nap and play are chosen, then Cheezy observes that Baker is napping and must decide whether to move Spike's bone \((\mathrm{m})\) or not \((\mathrm{n})\). If he chooses to not move the bone, then the game ends. Finally, in the event that Spike's bone was moved (either by Baker choosing to hunt or by Cheezy moving it later), then Spike learns that his bone was moved but does not observe who moved it; in this contingency, Spike must choose whether to punish Baker (B) or punish Cheezy (J). After Spike moves, the game ends. In this game, how many information sets are there for Cheezy? How many strategy profiles are there in this game?

Consider a version of the Cournot duopoly game, which will be thoroughly analyzed in Chapter 10 . Two firms (1 and 2) compete in a homogeneous goods market, where the firms produce exactly the same good. The firms simultaneously and independently select quantities to produce. The quantity selected by firm \(i\) is denoted \(q_{i}\) and must be greater than or equal to zero, for \(i=1,2\). The market price is given by \(p=2-q_{1}-q_{2}\). For simplicity, assume that the cost to firm \(i\) of producing any quantity is zero. Further, assume that each firm's payoff is defined as its profit. That is, firm \(i\) 's payoff is \(p q_{i}\), where \(j\) denotes firm \(i\) 's opponent in the game. Describe the normal form of this game by expressing the strategy spaces and writing the payoffs as functions of the strategies.

Consider a variation of the Cournot duopoly game in which the firms move sequentially rather than simultaneously. Suppose that firm 1 selects its quantity first. After observing firm l's selection, firm 2 chooses its quantity. This is called the von Stackelberg duopoly model. For this game, describe what a strategy of firm 2 must specify. An exercise in Chapter 16 asks you to analyze this game.

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