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Consider a simple simultaneous-bid poker game. First, nature selects numbers x1 and x2. Assume that these numbers are independently and uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. Player 1 observes x1 and player 2 observes x2, but neither player observes the number given to the other player. Simultaneously and independently, the players choose either to fold or to bid. If both players fold, then they both get the payoff 1. If only one player folds, then he obtains 1 while the other player gets 1 . If both players elected to bid, then each player receives 2 if his number is at least as large as the other player's number; otherwise, he gets 2. Compute the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game. (Hint: Look for a symmetric equilibrium in which a player bids if and only if his number is greater than some constant α. Your analysis will reveal the equilibrium value of α.)

Short Answer

Expert verified
The Bayesian Nash equilibrium is for each player to bid if their number is greater than 4/9.

Step by step solution

01

Understand the Payoffs in the Game

In this simultaneous-bid poker game, each player can either fold or bid. The payoff matrix is as follows: if both fold, each gets 1; if one folds and the other bids, the bidder gets 1 and the folder gets 1; if both bid, they each get 2 if their number is higher or equal to their opponent's number, otherwise 2.
02

Define the Strategy

We consider a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy where each player bids if their number xi is greater than a certain threshold α. We need to determine this value α.
03

Calculate Expected Payoffs

For each player observing xi and following the strategy 'bid if xi>α', we must calculate expected payoffs. If player 1 bids, with x1>α, player 1's payoff depends on whether x1 is greater or lesser than x2. If x1=x2, player 1 receives 2. If x1>x2, player 1 also receives 2; if x1<x2, they receive 2.
04

Calculate the Expected Payoff for Folding

If a player folds, their payoff is always 1 regardless of the value of xi because no other actions are taken by the player.
05

Equilibrium Condition

In equilibrium, the expected payoff from bidding should equal the payoff from folding 1. Therefore, calculate E[u(bid)]=2P(xixi|xi>α)2P(xi<xi|xi>α). Using uniform distribution properties, the decision to bid will result in α=4/9 as it makes the folding and bidding payoff equal.
06

Determine Value of α

With E[u(bid)]=1, solve for α. Integrating the expectations P(xixi)=α1(1x)dx, which is the area where player 1 bids and wins, and P(xi<xi)=α1xdx, which is the area where player 1 bids and loses, yields α=4/9.

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Key Concepts

These are the key concepts you need to understand to accurately answer the question.

Game Theory
Game theory is a fascinating mathematical framework designed to analyze strategic interactions among rational decision-makers. In our simultaneous-bid poker game, game theory helps us understand the strategic choices each player might make to maximize their payoffs—whether to fold or to bid. At the core of game theory, players aim to find their best-response strategies, considering the possible actions of others. In this scenario, each player's choice depends on predictions about the other player's actions, considering the lack of knowledge about their opponent's number.
  • This poker game represents a class of games where players make decisions based on probabilities and potential outcomes.
  • The essence of game theory lies in predicting opponent actions and maximizing potential gains.
  • Finding the equilibrium in such games often leads to solutions referred to as Nash Equilibria, where each player has adopted the best strategy given the opponents' strategies.
Game theory's application in this poker scenario captures the crux of competitive strategies under uncertainty.
Simultaneous-move Games
Simultaneous-move games are a category of strategic games where all players make their decisions at the same time, without knowing the others' actions. This is exactly the situation our poker players face—they decide to fold or bid simultaneously. The lack of information about the opponent's choice adds a layer of complexity to these games.
  • In simultaneous games, timing is crucial because decisions are made at the same instant.
  • Players must rely on expectations and forecasts about others' decisions.
  • These games typically do not allow for reconsideration or retraction of moves.
This structure requires players to carefully weigh their options and anticipate their opponents' choices, emphasizing the importance of strategic depth in decision-making.
Decision Making Under Uncertainty
Decision making under uncertainty is a critical skill in strategic games like our poker example. Here, each player lacks full information about the other's hand or intentions, making the decision process inherently uncertain. This uncertainty is due to the imperfect information—players know their number but not the opponent's.
  • Players need to gauge the risk and reward of each possible choice under uncertain conditions.
  • Decision-making strategies often rely on probabilities and payoff expectations.
  • Risk management becomes essential where payoffs can vary significantly, as seen in the possible outcomes from folding or bidding.
In practice, players might use thresholds like α to decide their actions, optimizing based on expected outcomes weighed against the risks of uncertainty.
Payoff Matrix Analysis
Payoff matrix analysis allows players to visualize all possible outcomes and their respective payoffs, given the choices they and their opponents might make. In our poker game, the matrix helps both players contemplate the implications of folding or bidding. It considers all potential outcomes based on combinations of actions, quickly summarizing who wins what based on their strategies.
  • The matrix outlines scenarios: both fold, one folds and one bids, or both bid, offering payouts for each.
  • This helps players understand the potential rewards and penalties tied to each decision.
  • Using this analysis, players can strategically decide whether to pursue aggressive or conservative strategies.
Analyzing with a payoff matrix can illuminate inherent risks and probable results, assisting players in calculating the most favorable path to follow based on expected payoffs.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Two players simultaneously and independently have to decide how much to contribute to a public good. If player 1 contributes x1 and player 2 contributes x2, then the value of the public good is 2(x1+x2+x1x2), which they each receive. Assume that x1 and x2 are positive numbers. Player 1 must pay a cost x12 of contributing; thus, player l's payoff in the game is u1=2(x1+x2+x1x2)x12. Player 2 pays the cost tx22 so that player 2 's payoff is u2=2(x1+x2+x1x2)tx22. The number t is private information to player 2 ; player 1 knows that t equals 2 with probability 1/2 and it equals 3 with probability 1/2. Compute the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game.

Consider a differentiated duopoly market in which firms compete by selecting prices and produce to fill orders. Let p1 be the price chosen by firm 1 and let p2 be the price of firm 2 . Let q1 and q2 denote the quantities demanded (and produced) by the two firms. Suppose that the demand for firm 1 is given by q1=222p1+p2, and the demand for firm 2 is given by q2=222p2+p1. Firm 1 produces at a constant marginal cost of 10 and no fixed cost. Firm 2 produces at a constant marginal cost of c and no fixed cost. The payoffs are the firms' individual profits. (a) The firms' strategies are their prices. Represent the normal form by writing the firms' payoff functions. (b) Calculate the firms' best-response functions. (c) Suppose that c=10 so the firms are identical (the game is symmetric). Calculate the Nash equilibrium prices. (d) Now suppose that firm 1 does not know firm 2's marginal cost c. With probability 1/2 nature picks c=14, and with probability 1/2 nature picks c=6. Firm 2 knows its own cost (that is, it observes nature's move), but firm 1 only knows that firm 2's marginal cost is either 6 or 14 (with equal probabilities). Calculate the best-response functions of player 1 and the two types ( c=6 and c=14 ) of player 2 and calculate the Bayesian Nash equilibrium quantities.

Consider a version of the "social unrest" game analyzed in Chapter 8 (including Exercise 8) with incomplete information. Two people (players 1 and 2 ) have to simultaneously choose whether to protest (P) or stay home (H). A player who stays home gets a payoff of 0 . Player i ' s payoff of protesting is determined by this player's protest value xi and whether the other player also protests. Specifically, if player i decides to protest, then her payoff is xi13 if the other player also protests, whereas her payoff is xi23 if the other player stays home. Each player knows her own protest value but does not observe that of the other player. Thus, xi is player i 's type. Assume that x1 and x2 are independently drawn from the uniform distribution on [0,1]. (a) Calculate the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game. (Hint: Note that each player's strategy is a function from her type to P,H. Consider cutoff strategies, where player i will protest if and only if xiyi, for some constant yi.) Document your analysis and report the equilibrium cutoffs y1 and y2. (b) What is the set of rationalizable strategies in this game? Without providing mathematical details, try to give reasoning based on considering (i) a lower bound on the types that protest regardless of their beliefs and (ii) an upper bound on the types that stay home regardless of their beliefs. (c) Consider an n-player version of the game in which the payoff of protesting is xi13 if at least m of the other players also protests, and it is xi23 if fewer than m of the other players also protests. Can you find values of n and m for which this game has multiple Nash equilibria?

Consider the Cournot duopoly game with incomplete information. First, nature chooses a number x, which is equally likely to be 8 or 4 . This number represents whether demand is high (x=8) or low (x=4). Firm 1 observes x because this firm has performed market research and knows the demand curve. Firm 2 does not observe x. Then the two firms simultaneously select quantities, q1 and q2, and the market price is determined by p=xq1q2. Assume that the firms produce at zero cost. Thus, the payoff of firm 1 is (xq1q2)q1, and the payoff of firm 2 is (xq1q2)q2. (a) Note that there are two types of firm 1, the high type (observing x=8 ) and the low type (observing x=4 ). Let q1H and q1L denote the quantity choices of the high and low types of firm 1 . Calculate the players' bestresponse functions. (b) Find the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game. (c) Does firm l's information give it an advantage over firm 2 in this game? Quantify this.

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