Chapter 26: Problem 10
Consider the Cournot duopoly game with incomplete information. First, nature chooses a number \(x\), which is equally likely to be 8 or 4 . This number represents whether demand is high \((x=8)\) or low \((x=4)\). Firm 1 observes \(x\) because this firm has performed market research and knows the demand curve. Firm 2 does not observe \(x\). Then the two firms simultaneously select quantities, \(q_{1}\) and \(q_{2}\), and the market price is determined by \(p=x-q_{1}-q_{2}\). Assume that the firms produce at zero cost. Thus, the payoff of firm 1 is \(\left(x-q_{1}-q_{2}\right) q_{1}\), and the payoff of firm 2 is \(\left(x-q_{1}-q_{2}\right) q_{2}\). (a) Note that there are two types of firm 1, the high type (observing \(x=8\) ) and the low type (observing \(x=4\) ). Let \(q_{1}^{\mathrm{H}}\) and \(q_{1}^{\mathrm{L}}\) denote the quantity choices of the high and low types of firm 1 . Calculate the players' bestresponse functions. (b) Find the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game. (c) Does firm l's information give it an advantage over firm 2 in this game? Quantify this.
Short Answer
Step by step solution
Key Concepts
These are the key concepts you need to understand to accurately answer the question.