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Discuss some examples of jobs about which you know, highlighting the relation between risk, risk aversion, and the use of bonuses.

Short Answer

Expert verified
High-risk jobs may use bonuses to compensate risk-averse workers. Examples include finance, sales, and startups. Bonuses can align with employees' risk tolerance.

Step by step solution

01

Understanding Risk in Jobs

Risk in a job often refers to the uncertainty or potential for loss associated with it. For example, a stockbroker faces high risk due to market volatility. Similarly, firefighters and police officers face physical risks. These risks can impact their decision-making and job satisfaction.
02

Defining Risk Aversion

Risk aversion refers to the degree to which an individual is willing to avoid risk. People who are highly risk-averse tend to prefer jobs with stable outcomes, such as accounting or teaching, since these positions typically have lower variability in income or personal safety.
03

The Role of Bonuses

Bonuses are often used as a financial incentive to compensate employees for taking on additional risk. In high-risk professions, such as finance or sales, bonuses may be linked to performance metrics, encouraging employees to take calculated risks to achieve higher rewards.
04

Examining Examples of Jobs

In investment banking, employees often receive performance-based bonuses, which supplement high base salaries to entice workers to accept the risk associated with market fluctuations. In contrast, office-based administrative jobs typically offer fewer bonus opportunities, as they involve less risk.
05

Analyzing the Interrelationship

In risky professions such as technology startups, employees might accept stock options as a form of compensation, which are speculative and increase with the success or failure of the company. This demonstrates how risk, risk aversion, and bonuses are interconnected, as employees gauge their willingness to accept risk against potential financial rewards.

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Key Concepts

These are the key concepts you need to understand to accurately answer the question.

Risk Aversion
Risk aversion is an important psychological trait that influences career choices. People with high risk aversion prefer safety and predictability. They seek roles where their income and work conditions are stable.
For example, accountants or teachers often fit this preference. These jobs typically offer steady salaries and low physical danger. On the other hand, individuals with low risk aversion might gravitate towards more dynamic fields, like entrepreneurship or financial trading.
Understanding your own level of risk aversion can guide career decisions. It helps in selecting jobs that align with personal comfort levels regarding uncertainty and variability.
Bonuses in Risky Professions
In many high-risk professions, bonuses serve as an essential tool for employee motivation. These bonuses are designed to compensate for the uncertainties and potential dangers associated with the job.
Jobs in finance, sales, or technology firms often offer significant bonuses tied to performance metrics or project outcomes. This compensation structure encourages employees to take calculated risks, with a chance of reaping substantial rewards.
Because of these bonuses, employees might be more willing to accept positions that involve uncertain market conditions or competitive pressure. Essentially, bonuses incentivize taking on more risk by offering higher potential earnings.
Financial Incentives
Financial incentives play a crucial role in influencing employee behavior. They are not limited to high-risk jobs but are commonly used to drive performance across various industries.
Incentives can take many forms, such as bonuses, stock options, or profit-sharing plans. They serve to align the interests of the employee with those of the organization. By setting financial goals connected to desirable employee behaviors or outcomes, companies can motivate staff to work towards these targets.
For example, in sales, meeting a quota might trigger a commission or bonus, encouraging employees to strive for higher sales figures. Thus, financial incentives effectively reward desired behaviors and outcomes.
Job Satisfaction and Risk
The relationship between job satisfaction and risk is complex. While high-risk jobs can be stressful, they can also provide a sense of accomplishment and excitement, which can be fulfilling for some employees.
Job satisfaction in high-risk roles often depends on the individual's risk tolerance and personal values. For those who enjoy challenges and thrive under pressure, risky professions can bring high job satisfaction. Conversely, individuals who prioritize stability might find such roles stressful and less satisfying.
Understanding personal risk tolerance and values is crucial for selecting a career that provides both satisfaction and purpose. It's about finding the right balance between personal risk preferences and professional aspirations.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

5\. Consider a game inspired by the long-running television program The Price Is Right. Three players have to guess the price \(x\) of an object. It is common knowledge that \(x\) is a random variable that is distributed uniformly over the integers \(1,2, \ldots, 9\). That is, with probability \(1 / 9\) the value of \(x\) is 1 , with probability \(1 / 9\) the value of \(x\) is 2 , and so on. Thus, each player guesses a number from the set \(\\{1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9\\}\). The game runs as follows: First, player 1 chooses a number \(n_{1} \in\\{1,2\), \(3,4,5,6,7,8,9\\}\), which the other players observe. Then player 2 chooses a number \(n_{2}\) that is observed by the other players. Player 2 is not allowed to select the number already chosen by player 1 ; that is, \(n_{2}\) must be different from \(n_{1}\). Player 3 then selects a number \(n_{3}\), where \(n_{3}\) must be different from \(n_{1}\) and \(n_{2}\). Finally, the number \(x\) is drawn and the player whose guess is closest to \(x\) without going over wins \(\$ 1000\); the other players get 0 . That is, the winner must have guessed \(x\) correctly or have guessed a lower number that is closest to \(x\). If all of the players' guesses are above \(x\), then everyone gets \(0 .\) (a) Suppose you are player 2 and you know that player 3 is sequentially rational. If player 1 selected \(n_{1}=1\), what number should you pick to maximize your expected payoff? (b) Again suppose you are player 2 and you know that player 3 is sequentially rational. If player 1 selected \(n_{1}=5\), what number should you pick to maximize your expected payoff? (c) Suppose you are player 1 and you know that the other two players are sequentially rational. What number should you pick to maximize your expected payoff?

A firm and worker interact as follows. First, the firm offers the worker a wage \(w\) and a job \(z ; z=0\) denotes the "safe" job and \(z=1\) denotes the "risky" job. After observing the firm's contract offer \((w, z)\), the worker accepts or rejects it. These are the only decisions made by the firm and worker in this game. If the worker rejects the contract, then he gets a payoff of 100 , which corresponds to his outside opportunities. If he accepts the job, then the worker cares about two things: his wage and his status. The worker's status depends on how he is rated by his peers, which is influenced by characteristics of his job as well as by random events. Specifically, his rating is given by \(x\), which is either 1 (poor), 2 (good), or 3 (excellent). If the worker has the safe job, then \(x=2\) for sure. In contrast, if the worker has the risky job, then \(x=3\) with probability \(q\) and \(x=1\) with probability \(1-q\). That is, with probability \(q\), the worker's peers think of him as excellent. When employed by this firm, the worker's payoff is \(w+v(x)\), where \(v(x)\) is the value of status \(x\). Assume that \(v(1)=0\) and \(v(3)=100\), and let \(y=v(2)\). The worker maximizes his expected payoff. The firm obtains a return of \(180-w\) when the worker is employed in the safe job. The firm gets a return of \(200-w\) when the worker has the risky job. If the worker rejects the firm's offer, then the firm obtains 0 . Compute the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game by answering the following questions.(a) How large must the wage offer be in order for the worker rationally to accept the safe job? What is the firm's maximal payoff in this case? The parameter \(y\) should be featured in your answer. (b) How large must the wage offer be in order for the worker rationally to accept the risky job? What is the firm's maximal payoff in this case? The parameter \(q\) should be featured in your answer. (c) What is the firm's optimal contract offer for the case in which \(q=1 / 2\) ? Your answer should include an inequality describing conditions under which \(z=1\) is optimal.

Consider a game in which two players take turns moving a coin along a strip of wood (with borders to keep the coin from falling off). The strip of wood is divided into five equally sized regions, called (in order) \(A, B, C, D\), and E. Player l's objective is to get the coin into region E (player 2 's end zone), whereas player 2's objective is to get the coin into region A (player l's end zone). If the coin enters region \(A\), then the game ends and player 2 is the winner. If the coin enters region E, then the game ends and player 1 is the winner. At each stage in the game, the player with the move must decide between "Push" and "Slap." If she chooses Push, then the coin moves one cell down the wood strip in the direction of the other player's end zone. For example, if the coin is in cell B and player 1 selects Push, then the coin is moved to cell C. If a player selects Slap, then the movement of the coin is random. With probability \(1 / 3\), the coin advances two cells in the direction of the other player's end zone, and with probability \(2 / 3\) the coin remains where it is. For example, suppose it is player 2 's turn and the coin is in cell C. If player 2 chooses Slap, then with probability \(1 / 3\) the coin moves to cell \(\mathrm{A}\) and with probability \(2 / 3\) the coin stays in cell \(\mathrm{C}\). The coin cannot go beyond an end zone. Thus, if player 1 selects Slap when the coin is in cell \(\mathrm{D}\), then the coin moves to cell \(\mathrm{E}\) with probability \(1 / 3\) and it remains in cell \(\mathrm{D}\) with probability \(2 / 3 .\) If a player wins, then he gets a payoff of 1 and the other player obtains zero. If the players go on endlessly with neither player winning, then they both get a payoff of \(1 / 2\). There is no discounting. The game begins with the coin in region B and player 1 moves first. (a) Are there any contingencies in the game from which the player with the move obviously should select Push? (b) In this game, an equilibrium is called Markov if the players' strategies depend only on the current position of the coin rather than on any other aspects of the history of play. In other words, each player's strategy specifies how to behave (whether to pick Push or Slap) when the coin is in cell B, how to behave when the coin is in cell C, and so on. For the player who has the move, let \(v^{k}\) denote the equilibrium continuation payoff from a point at which the coin is \(k\) cells away from this player's goal. Likewise, for the player who does not have the move, let \(w^{k}\) denote the equilibrium continuation payoff from a point at which the coin is \(k\) cells away from this player's goal. Find a Markov equilibrium in this game and report the strategies and continuation values. You can appeal to the one-deviation property.

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