Warning: foreach() argument must be of type array|object, bool given in /var/www/html/web/app/themes/studypress-core-theme/template-parts/header/mobile-offcanvas.php on line 20

Recall that "human capital" refers to skills and expertise that workers develop. General human capital is that which makes a worker highly productive in potential jobs with many different employers. Specific human capital is that which makes a worker highly productive with only a single employer. What kind of investment in human capital should you make to increase your bargaining power with an employer, general or specific? Why? Do valuable outside options enhance or diminish your bargaining power?

Short Answer

Expert verified
Invest in general human capital to increase bargaining power. Valuable outside options enhance bargaining power.

Step by step solution

01

Understanding the Types of Human Capital

General human capital includes skills and knowledge that are transferable and useful to a wide range of employers. Examples include communication skills, certifications in widely-used software, or advanced education. Specific human capital refers to skills and knowledge particularly valuable to a specific employer, like knowledge of proprietary systems or specialized training relevant only to that company.
02

Determining the Impact on Bargaining Power

To increase bargaining power, an employee would benefit more from investing in general human capital. This type of human capital provides flexibility and options, as it allows an employee to be productive with multiple employers. If one employer does not meet the employee's needs, they can potentially find another employer who will.
03

Evaluating the Role of Outside Options

Having valuable outside options generally enhances an employee's bargaining power. When an employee can demonstrate that their skills are in demand elsewhere, they can negotiate better terms within their current employment. This is because the employer must offer competitive conditions to retain the employee.

Unlock Step-by-Step Solutions & Ace Your Exams!

  • Full Textbook Solutions

    Get detailed explanations and key concepts

  • Unlimited Al creation

    Al flashcards, explanations, exams and more...

  • Ads-free access

    To over 500 millions flashcards

  • Money-back guarantee

    We refund you if you fail your exam.

Over 30 million students worldwide already upgrade their learning with Vaia!

Key Concepts

These are the key concepts you need to understand to accurately answer the question.

Bargaining Power
Bargaining power is the leverage an employee holds in negotiations with their employer. It determines how effectively one can negotiate salaries, benefits, and working conditions. The strength of bargaining power largely depends on how replaceable the worker is and what alternatives they have available.

Employees with high bargaining power typically have valuable skills and options outside of their current role. This makes them indispensable or hard to replace, pushing employers to make better offers to retain them.
Bargaining power isn't static and shifts according to market demand, the individual's skills, and their career choices.
General Human Capital
General human capital encompasses skills and knowledge that enhance an individual's productivity, regardless of the employer. Think of skills like project management, proficiency with widely-used software, or strong analytical abilities.

These skills increase an employee's value across many contexts and companies, providing flexibility in career choices. General human capital expands job opportunities and builds a strong foundation for career growth.
  • Increases employability in diverse fields.
  • Offers the ability to switch industries or career paths.
  • Builds a broad network of potential employers.
Specific Human Capital
While general human capital is broad, specific human capital is focused. It consists of skills and knowledge that pertain to a specific company or role. For instance, learning the ins and outs of a company's internal software or mastering a unique manufacturing process.

Investments in specific human capital can make a worker invaluable to one particular employer. However, while expertise in specific systems can increase immediate job security, it often limits future job mobility, as these skills may not be transferable.
  • Enhances role-specific productivity.
  • Bolsters short-term job security within the company.
  • Losens opportunities for switching jobs or industries.
Skills and Expertise
Skills and expertise form the foundation of a worker's human capital, influencing both their general and specific human capital. Skills can range from technical abilities like coding to soft skills like leadership and communication. Expertise is often cultivated over time, through education, training, and practice.

Possessing a blend of these skills makes an individual versatile and attractive to employers.
  • Fosters innovation and problem-solving.
  • Supports career advancement and higher salaries.
  • Acts as a differentiator in competitive job markets.
Outside Options
Outside options refer to the alternative career opportunities available to a worker. These can significantly enhance an individual's bargaining power.
When an employee has credible job offers from other companies, they hold a stronger position in negotiations. Employers are more inclined to offer better terms to retain valuable employees who have attractive outside options.
  • Increase an employee's negotiating leverage.
  • Encourage employers to match offers from competitors.
  • Mitigate the risks of being tied to a single employer's terms.

One App. One Place for Learning.

All the tools & learning materials you need for study success - in one app.

Get started for free

Most popular questions from this chapter

Suppose that you work for a large corporation and that your job entails many hours of working with a computer. If you treat the computer with care, it will not break down. But if you abuse the computer (a convenience for you), then the computer will frequently need costly service. Describe conditions under which it is best that you, rather than your employer, own the computer. Discuss verifiability and incentives in your answer.

A bicycle manufacturer (the "buyer," abbreviated B) wishes to procure a new robotic system for the production of mountain-bike frames. The firm contracts with a supplier (S), who will design and construct the robot. The contractual relationship is modeled by the following game: The parties first negotiate a contract specifying an externally enforced price that the buyer must pay. The price is contingent on whether the buyer later accepts delivery of the robot (A) or rejects delivery (R), which is the only event that is verifiable to the court. Specifically, if the buyer accepts delivery, then he must pay \(p_{1}\); if he rejects delivery, then he pays \(p_{0}\). After the contract is made, the seller decides whether to invest at a high level (H) or at a low level (L). High investment indicates that the seller has worked diligently to create a high-quality robot-one that meets the buyer's specifications. High investment costs the seller 10. The buyer observes the seller's investment and then decides whether to accept delivery. If the seller selected \(\mathrm{H}\) and the buyer accepts delivery, then the robot is worth 20 units of revenue to the buyer. If the seller selected \(\mathrm{L}\) and the buyer accepts delivery, then the robot is only worth 5 to the buyer. If the buyer rejects delivery, then the robot gives him no value. (a) What is the efficient outcome of this game? (b) Suppose the parties wish to write a "specific-performance" contract, which mandates that the buyer accept delivery at price \(p_{1}\). How can \(p_{0}\) be set so that the buyer has the incentive to accept delivery regardless of the seller's investment? Would the seller choose H in this case? (c) Under what conditions of \(p_{0}\) and \(p_{1}\) would the buyer have the incentive to accept delivery if and only if the seller selects H? Show that the efficient outcome can be obtained through the use of such an "option contract." (d) Fully describe the negotiation equilibrium of the game, under the assumption that the parties have equal bargaining weights.

Suppose that an entrepreneur is deciding whether or not to build a new highspeed railroad on the West Coast. Building the railroad will require an initial sunk \(\operatorname{cost} F\). If operated, the new railroad will generate revenue \(R\). Operating the railroad will cost \(M\) in fuel and \(n w\) in wages, where \(n\) is the number of full-time jobs needed to operate the new railroad and \(w\) is the career wage per worker. If a rail worker does not work on the new railroad, then he can get a wage of \(\bar{w}\) at some other job. Assume that \(R>M+F+n \bar{w}\), so it would be profitable to build and operate the new railroad even if rail workers had to be paid somewhat more than the going rate \(\bar{w}\). The entrepreneur, however, must decide whether to invest the initial sunk cost \(F\) before knowing the wages she must pay. (a) Suppose that if the railroad is built, after \(F\) is invested, the local rail workers' union can make a "take it or leave it" wage demand \(w\) to the entrepreneur. That is, the entrepreneur can only choose to accept and pay the wage demand \(w\) or to shut down. If the railroad shuts down, each worker receives \(\bar{w}\). Will the railroad be built? Why? (b) Next suppose that the wage is jointly selected by the union and the entrepreneur, where the union has bargaining weight \(\pi_{\mathrm{U}}\) and the entrepreneur has bargaining weight \(\pi_{\mathrm{E}}=1-\pi_{\mathrm{U}}\). Use the concept of negotiation equilibrium to state the conditions under which the railroad will be built. (c) Explain the nature of the hold-up problem in this example. Discuss why the hold-up problem disappears when the entrepreneur has all of the bargaining power. Finally, describe ways in which people try to avoid the hold-up problem in practice.

8\. Here is a description of interaction between two players who are considering a possible business partnership. First the players simultaneously choose whether to make an investment. Investment entails a personal \(\cos t\) of 3 ; not investing costs nothing. The investment choices become common knowledge. Then the players jointly decide whether to form a partnership firm and, if so, how to divide the profit from the firm. If both players invested, then the firm's profit is 16 . If exactly one player invested or if neither invested, then the firm's profit is 12 . If the players decide not to form the firm, then each player \(i\) gets a default payoff of \(x-3\) if player \(i\) invested and zero if player \(i\) did not invest. The default payoff of \(x-3\) includes the cost of investment plus some value \(x\) that represents what player \(i\) can obtain by using his investment in other endeavors. Assume that the players divide surplus according to the standard bargaining solution with equal bargaining weights. (a) What outcome maximizes the joint value? That is, what are the efficient investment choices? (b) Describe conditions on \(x\) such that there is a negotiation equilibrium in which both players invest. Show that this is an equilibrium. (c) In light of your answers to parts (a) and (b), briefly provide some intuition for your answers in relation to the "hold-up" problem.

Estelle has an antique desk that she does not need, whereas Joel and his wife have a new house with no furniture. Estelle and Joel would like to arrange a trade, whereby Joel would get the desk at a price. In addition, the desk could use restoration work, which would enhance its value to Joel. Specifically, the desk is worth 0 to Estelle (its current owner), regardless of whether it is restored. An unrestored desk is worth \(\$ 100\) to Joel, whereas a restored desk is worth \(\$ 900\). Neither Joel nor Estelle has the skills to perform the restoration. Jerry, a professional actor and woodworker, can perform the restoration at a personal cost of \(\$ 500\). Jerry does not need a desk, so his value of owning the restored or unrestored desk is 0 . (a) Suppose Estelle, Jerry, and Joel can meet to negotiate a spot contract specifying transfer of the desk, restoration, and transfer of money. Model this as a three-player, joint-decision problem, and draw the appropriate extensive form. Calculate the outcome by using the standard bargaining solution, under the assumption that the players have equal bargaining weights \(\left(\pi_{\mathrm{E}}=\pi_{\text {Jerry }}=\pi_{\text {Joel }}=1 / 3\right)\). Does the desk get traded? Is the desk restored? Is this the efficient outcome? (b) Suppose spot contracting as in part (a) is not possible. Instead, the players interact in the following way. On Monday, Estelle and Jerry jointly decide whether to have Jerry restore the desk (and at what price to Estelle). If they choose to restore the desk, Jerry performs the work immediately. Then on Wednesday, regardless of what happened on Monday, Estelle and Joel jointly decide whether to trade the desk for money. Model this game by drawing the extensive form. (Hint: The extensive form only has joint-decision nodes.) Assume the parties have equal bargaining weights at all joint-decision nodes. Determine the negotiation equilibrium. Compare the outcome with that of part (a). (c) Now suppose the players interact in a different order. On Monday, Estelle and Joel jointly decide whether to trade the desk for money. Trade takes place immediately. On Wednesday, if Joel owns the desk, then he and Jerry jointly decide whether to have Jerry restore the desk (and at what price to Joel). If they choose to restore the desk, Jerry performs the work immediately. Model this game by drawing the extensive form. (Hint: Again, the extensive form only has joint-decision nodes.) Assume the parties have equal bargaining weights at all jointdecision nodes. Determine the negotiation equilibrium. Compare the outcome with that of parts (a) and (b). (d) Explain the nature of the hold-up problem in this example.

See all solutions

Recommended explanations on Economics Textbooks

View all explanations

What do you think about this solution?

We value your feedback to improve our textbook solutions.

Study anywhere. Anytime. Across all devices.

Sign-up for free