Chapter 11: Problem 12
Consider a game with \(n\) players. Simultaneously and independently, the players choose between \(\mathrm{X}\) and \(\mathrm{Y}\). That is, the strategy space for each player \(i\) is \(S_{i}=\\{\mathrm{X}, \mathrm{Y}\\}\). The payoff of each player who selects \(\mathrm{X}\) is \(2 m_{x}-m_{x}^{2}+3\), where \(m_{x}\) is the number of players who choose X. The payoff of each player who selects \(\mathrm{Y}\) is \(4-m_{y}\), where \(m_{y}\) is the number of players who choose \(\mathrm{Y}\). Note that \(m_{x}+m_{y}=n\). (a) For the case of \(n=2\), represent this game in the normal form and find the pure-strategy Nash equilibria (if any). (b) Suppose that \(n=3\). How many Nash equilibria does this game have? (Note: you are looking for pure-strategy equilibria here.) If your answer is more than zero, describe a Nash equilibrium. (c) Continue to assume that \(n=3\). Determine whether this game has a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in which each player selects \(\mathrm{X}\) with probability \(p\). If you can find such an equilibrium, what is \(p\) ?
Short Answer
Step by step solution
Key Concepts
These are the key concepts you need to understand to accurately answer the question.