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In the years 2000 and 2001 , the bubble burst for many Internet and computer firms. As they closed shop, some of the firms had to liquidate sizable assets, such as inventories of products. Suppose eToys is going out of business and the company seeks a buyer for a truckload of Elmo dolls in its warehouse. Imagine that eToys holds an auction on eBay to sell the dolls and that two retailers (players 1 and 2 ) will bid for them. The rules of the auction are as follows: the retailers simultaneously and independently submit sealed bids and then eToys gives the merchandise to the highest bidder, who must pay his bid. It is common knowledge that the retailer who obtains the load of dolls can resell the load for a total of \(\$ 15,000\). Thus, if player \(i\) wins the auction with bid \(b_{i}\), then player \(i\) 's payoff is \(\$ 15,000-b_{i}\). The losing retailer gets a payoff of \(\$ 0\). If the retailers make the same bids \(\left(b_{1}=b_{2}\right)\), then eToys declares each player the winner with probability \(1 / 2\), in which case player \(i\) obtains an expected payoff of \((1 / 2)\left(15,000-b_{i}\right)\). What will be the winning bid in the Nash equilibrium of this auction game? If you can, describe the equilibrium strategies and briefly explain why this is an equilibrium. (Hint: This is similar to the Bertrand game.)

Short Answer

Expert verified
Both bid $15,000, ensuring zero profit margin, in a Bertrand-like equilibrium.

Step by step solution

01

Understand the Auction Setup

In this auction setup, retailers (players) 1 and 2 independently submit sealed bids to obtain a truckload of Elmo dolls, resalable for $15,000. The winner of the auction is the highest bidder who pays their bid. If bids are equal, each has a 50% chance of winning and pays their bid.
02

Define the Payoff Function

If retailer \(i\) wins with a bid \(b_i\), their payoff is \(15,000 - b_i\). If they lose, the payoff is \(0\). If both bid the same amount, \(b_1 = b_2\), each expects a payoff of \(\frac{1}{2}(15,000 - b_i)\).
03

Set Up the Nash Equilibrium Conditions

A Nash Equilibrium in this context means that neither player can improve their payoff by changing their bid, given the bid of the other player. Each player's strategy should be their best response given the expected actions of the other.
04

Consider Possible Bidding Strategies

Retailers will avoid bidding their maximum value of $15,000 since any higher bid would result in zero profit. They may also consider bidding slightly less than the competitor to secure the win.
05

Analyze Bidding Below Maximum Value

Bidding even a penny below $15,000 gives a positive payoff (e.g., $15,000 - 14,999 = 1$) and ensures winning unless the other player also bids $14,999. However, this line of reasoning suggests that bids could potentially go lower.
06

Consider the Equilibrium Bid Resembling Bertrand Game

In a Bertrand-like equilibrium, both retailers have an incentive to marginally undercut each other until profit margins reduce to zero. Hence, the Nash Equilibrium occurs when both players bid $15,000.

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Key Concepts

These are the key concepts you need to understand to accurately answer the question.

Nash Equilibrium
The concept of Nash Equilibrium is fundamental in game theory, where it represents a situation in which no player can benefit by changing their strategy while the other players keep theirs unchanged. In the context of the auction described, finding the Nash Equilibrium involves determining the optimal bid for each player, such that neither player can increase their payoff by changing their bid given the opponent's bid.

In this auction, players 1 and 2 are aware that a bid of $15,000 or higher yields zero profit, as it's equal to or more than the resale value of the dolls. Therefore, they need to find the optimal bid below $15,000 that cannot be improved upon without making a loss or getting zero payoff. This dynamic often leads to the bids gradually decreasing until a stable point — the equilibrium — is reached, where both players are satisfied that any deviation from their current bid would worsen their outcome.
Auction Theory
Auction theory examines the strategic behavior of participants in an auction setting, exploring how different auction designs and bid strategies can affect the outcome. In this particular setup on eBay, known as a sealed-bid auction, each player submits a bid without seeing the other’s bid. Then, the highest bidder wins the auction and pays the amount they bid.

Key components relevant to this auction include:
  • The sealed bid process, which requires strategic thinking because each player's decision is made under uncertainty about the other's bid.
  • The common knowledge of the resale value of $15,000, which provides a ceiling for logical bids.
  • The possibility of a tie, resolved by an equal probability chance, adding a layer of risk and expected value calculation.
Auction theory thus helps frame the players' understanding of maximizing their payoff through strategic bidding considering these factors.
Payoff Function
The payoff function is a crucial tool in game theory to quantify the profit or loss a player experiences from a particular strategy or set of actions. In this auction scenario, the payoff for a retailer is defined based on whether they win or lose the auction and by how much they outbid the competitor.
  • If a player wins with a bid of \(b_i\), their payoff is the difference between the resale value and their bid: \(15,000 - b_i\).
  • If the player's bid loses, their payoff is \(0\) as they neither pay nor receive anything.
  • In the event of both players submitting the identical bid, each has an expected payoff of half the difference, expressed as \(\frac{1}{2}(15,000 - b_i)\).
Understanding and calculating this payoff allows players to decide how much risk to take when placing their bids.
Bertrand Competition
In economics, Bertrand competition refers to a market model where firms determine prices rather than quantities. This theory is relevant to the auction problem because it showcases a strategic interaction where participants try to undercut each other until they reach a point of zero economic profit.

In the given auction, this means both retailers will keep lowering their bids to just undercut their competition, leading to a scenario where both could bid down to the marginal cost, which in this case is zero profit with a pitch-perfect strategic play like in Bertrand.
  • The competition parallels this auction's setup, as each retailer aims to narrow their bid enough to win, yet not so low that they make a loss.
  • This results in increasing pressure for the bids to align closely to the theoretical value of $15,000.
Thus, the Nash Equilibrium here results in both players submitting high bids around their valuation ceiling or in a unique existence where both bid the full possible value, just as predicted by the Bertrand model.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Consider a more general Cournot model than the one presented in this chapter. Suppose there are \(n\) firms. The firms simultaneously and independently select quantities to bring to the market. Firm \(i\) 's quantity is denoted \(q_{i}\), which is constrained to be greater than or equal to zero. All of the units of the good are sold, but the prevailing market price depends on the total quantity in the industry, which is \(Q=\sum_{i=1}^{n} q_{i}\). Suppose the price is given by \(p=a-b Q\) and suppose each firm produces with marginal cost \(c\). There is no fixed cost for the firms. Assume \(a>c>0\) and \(b>0\). Note that firm \(i\) 's profit is given by \(u_{i}=p(Q) q_{i}-c q_{i}=(a-b Q) q_{i}-c q_{i}\). Defining \(Q_{-i}\) as the sum of the quantities produced by all firms except firm \(i\), we have \(u_{i}=\left(a-b q_{i}-b Q_{-i}\right) q_{i}-c q_{i}\). Each firm maximizes its own profit. (a) Represent this game in the normal form by describing the strategy spaces and payoff functions. (b) Find firm \(i\) 's best-response function as a function of \(Q_{-i}\). Graph this function. (c) Compute the Nash equilibrium of this game. Report the equilibrium quantities, price, and total output. (Hint: Summing the best-response functions over the different players will help.) What happens to the equilibrium price and the firm's profits as \(n\) becomes large? (d) Show that for the Cournot duopoly game \((n=2)\), the set of rationalizable strategies coincides with the Nash equilibrium.

Suppose that the speed limit is 70 miles per hour on the freeway and that \(n\) drivers simultaneously and independently choose speeds from 70 to 100 . Everyone prefers to go as fast as possible, other things equal, but the police ticket any driver whose speed is strictly faster than the speeds of a fraction \(x\) of the other drivers, where \(x\) is a parameter such that \(0 \leq x \leq 1\). More precisely, for a given driver, let \(m\) denote the number of drivers that choose strictly lower speeds; then, such a driver is ticketed if and only if \(m /(n-1)>x\). Note that by driving 70, a driver can be sure that he will not be ticketed. Suppose the cost of being ticketed outweighs any benefit of going faster. (a) Model this situation as a noncooperative game by describing the strategy space and payoff function of an individual player. (b) Identify the Nash equilibria as best you can. Are there any equilibria in which the drivers choose the same speed? Are there any equilibria in which the drivers choose different speeds? How does the set of Nash equilibria depend on \(x\) ? (c) What are the Nash equilibria under the assumption that the police do not ticket anyone? (d) What are the Nash equilibria under the assumption that the police ticket everyone who travels more than 70 ? (e) If the same drivers play this game repeatedly, observing the outcome after each play, and there is some noisiness in their choices of speed, how would you expect their speeds to change over time as they learn to predict each other's speeds when \(x\) is near 100 and when \(x\) is near 0 ? Explain your intuition.

Imagine that a zealous prosecutor (P) has accused a defendant (D) of committing a crime. Suppose that the trial involves evidence production by both parties and that by producing evidence, a litigant increases the probability of winning the trial. Specifically, suppose that the probability that the defendant wins is given by \(e_{\mathrm{D}} /\left(e_{\mathrm{D}}+e_{\mathrm{P}}\right)\), where \(e_{\mathrm{D}}\) is the expenditure on evidence production by the defendant and \(e_{\mathrm{P}}\) is the expenditure on evidence production by the prosecutor. Assume that \(e_{\mathrm{D}}\) and \(e_{\mathrm{P}}\) are greater than or equal to 0 . The defendant must pay 8 if he is found guilty, whereas he pays 0 if he is found innocent. The prosecutor receives 8 if she wins and 0 if she loses the case. (a) Represent this game in normal form. (b) Write the first-order condition and derive the best-response function for each player. (c) Find the Nash equilibrium of this game. What is the probability that the defendant wins in equilibrium. (d) Is this outcome efficient? Why?

Consider a game that has a continuum of players. In particular, the players are uniformly distributed on the interval \([0,1]\). (See Appendix A for the definition of uniform distribution.) Each \(x \in[0,1]\) represents an individual player; that is, we can identify a player by her location on the interval \([0,1]\). In the game, the players simultaneously and independently select either \(\mathrm{F}\) or G. The story is that each player is choosing a type of music software to buy, where \(\mathrm{F}\) and \(\mathrm{G}\) are the competing brands. The players have different values of the two brands; they also have a preference for buying what other people are buying (either because they want to be in fashion or they find it easier to exchange music with others who use the same software). The following payoff function represents these preferences. If player \(x\) selects \(\mathrm{G}\), then her payoff is the constant \(g\). If player \(x\) selects \(\mathrm{F}\), then her payoff is \(2 m-c x\), where \(c\) is a constant and \(m\) is the fraction of players who select F. Note that \(m\) is between 0 and 1 . (a) Consider the case in which \(g=1\) and \(c=0\). What are the rationalizable strategies for the players? Is there a symmetric Nash equilibrium, in which all of the players play the same strategy? If so, describe such an equilibrium. (b) Next, consider the case in which \(g=1\) and \(c=2\). Calculate the rationalizable strategy profiles and show your steps. (Hint: Let \(\bar{m}\) denote an upper bound on the fraction of players who rationally select \(\mathrm{F}\). Use this variable in your analysis.) (c) Describe the rationalizable strategy profiles for the case in which \(g=-1\) and \(c=4\). (Hint: Let \(\bar{m}\) denote an upper bound on the fraction of players who rationally select \(\mathrm{F}\) and let \(\underline{m}\) denote a lower bound on the fraction of players who rationally select F.)

Consider an asymmetric Cournot duopoly game, where the two firms have different costs of production. Firm 1 selects quantity \(q_{1}\) at a production cost of \(2 q_{1}\). Firm 2 selects quantity \(q_{2}\) and pays the production cost \(4 q_{2}\). The market price is given by \(p=12-q_{1}-q_{2}\). Thus, the payoff functions are \(u_{1}\left(q_{1}, q_{2}\right)=\left(12-q_{1}-q_{2}\right) q_{1}-2 q_{1}\) and \(u_{2}\left(q_{1}, q_{2}\right)=\left(12-q_{1}-q_{2}\right) q_{2}-4 q_{2}\). Calculate the firms' best-response functions \(B R_{1}\left(q_{2}\right)\) and \(B R_{2}\left(q_{1}\right)\), and find the Nash equilibrium of this game.

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