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Consider a game in which, simultaneously, player 1 selects a number \(x \in[0,6]\) and player 2 selects a number \(y \in[0,6]\). The payoffs are given by: $$ \begin{aligned} &u_{1}(x, y)=\frac{16 x}{y+2}-x^{2} \\ &u_{2}(x, y)=\frac{16 y}{x+2}-y^{2} \end{aligned} $$ (a) Calculate each player's best-response function as a function of the opposing player's pure strategy. (b) Find and report the Nash equilibrium of the game. (c) Suppose that there is no social institution to coordinate the players on an equilibrium. Suppose that each player knows that the other player is rational, but this is not common knowledge. What is the largest set of strategies for player 1 that is consistent with this assumption?

Short Answer

Expert verified
(a) Player 1's best-response: \( x = \frac{8}{y+2} \), Player 2's: \( y = \frac{8}{x+2} \). (b) Nash equilibrium: \((x, y) = (2, 2)\). (c) Largest strategy set for Player 1: \([0, 3]\).

Step by step solution

01

Understand the Payoff Functions

The given payoff functions are \( u_1(x, y) = \frac{16x}{y+2} - x^2 \) for player 1 and \( u_2(x, y) = \frac{16y}{x+2} - y^2 \) for player 2. These functions represent how a player's payoff depends on their own choice and the choice of the other player.
02

Setup First Order Conditions for Best Response

To find the best-response function, we differentiate each payoff function with respect to the player's own strategy. For player 1, we partially differentiate \( u_1(x, y) \) with respect to \( x \), yielding \( \frac{\partial u_1}{\partial x} = \frac{16}{y+2} - 2x \). Similarly, for player 2, differentiate \( u_2(x, y) \) with respect to \( y \), yielding \( \frac{\partial u_2}{\partial y} = \frac{16}{x+2} - 2y \).
03

Solve for Best Response Functions

Set the derivative from step 2 equal to 0 for optimization. For player 1, \( \frac{16}{y+2} = 2x \), solving gives player 1's best-response function: \( x = \frac{8}{y+2} \). For player 2, \( \frac{16}{x+2} = 2y \), solving gives player 2's best-response function: \( y = \frac{8}{x+2} \).
04

Find the Nash Equilibrium

To find the Nash equilibrium, set the best-response functions equal to each other: \( x = \frac{8}{y+2} \) and \( y = \frac{8}{x+2} \). Solving these simultaneously, assume \( x = y \). Substituting into either equation gives \( x = \frac{8}{x+2} \). Solving \( x(x+2) = 8 \), we expand and use the quadratic formula to find solutions. The solutions to the quadratic are \( x = 2 \) and \( x = -4 \). Given \( x \in [0,6] \), \( x = 2 \) and accordingly \( y = 2 \).
05

Discuss Strategy Space When Rationality is Not Common Knowledge

When rationality is known but not common knowledge, player 1 will assume player 2 will behave rationally but player 2 knows that player 1 has this assumption. The largest set of rational expectations consistent strategies for player 1 are those which consider player 2's perception of rationality, so \([0, 6]\) remains valid. However, player 1 might stick closer to perceived Nash strategies, leading to \([0, 3]\) based on best responses.

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Key Concepts

These are the key concepts you need to understand to accurately answer the question.

Game Theory
Game theory is an area of mathematics that explores strategic decision-making among different players. It enables us to analyze situations where the outcome for each participant depends not only on their own actions but also on the actions of others. Consider the exercise at hand where two players, player 1 and player 2, each simultaneously choose a number within the range 0 to 6. This scenario is a classic illustration of game theory involving strategic interactions.

In such games, each player's objective is to maximize their own payoff, and the decisions they make can be immensely complex, as they depend on what they believe the other player will do. Understanding how players can best respond to one another within this matrix of choices is pivotal in game theory.
  • This includes determining what strategies lead to optimal outcomes (also known as Nash Equilibrium).
  • Game theory applications range from economics to evolutionary biology, illustrating its versatility.
Best Response Function
A best response function defines the strategy that yields the highest payoff for a player, given the strategy chosen by the other player involved in the game. In our exercise, the players are looking for a best-response strategy to maximize their payoffs based on the other player's actions.

For example, if player 2 selects a strategy based on their expectation that player 1 picks a certain number, player 2's best-response function calculates the optimal choice. The exercise demonstrates this through the differentiation of payoff functions, resulting in clear functions like:
  • For player 1: their best-response function is given by \(x = \frac{8}{y+2}\).
  • For player 2: the response is \(y = \frac{8}{x+2}\).
These responses adjust dynamically to the strategies chosen by their opponent, offering a strategy that leads to the best possible outcome given the other's decision.
Rationality
Rationality in game theory refers to the assumption that players will strive to maximize their payoffs and make decisions based on this objective. Each player will choose the strategy that provides them with the highest possible payoff, assuming that the other player will do the same.

In the exercise, rationality plays a crucial role when determining optimal strategies, especially when considering the possibility of no external coordination. When players understand that the others are rational but don't have a mutual understanding of each other's rationality, the range of potential strategies broadens significantly. This scenario illustrates how rational thinking leads to strategic forecasts about the opponent's moves, narrowing down the most plausible set of strategies.
  • Rationality ensures that each choice logically relates to maximizing utility.
  • It doesn't just involve instantaneous gains but also considers future implications.
Payoff Function
A payoff function is a mathematical representation that assigns a numerical value to each possible outcome a player can experience in the game. This function reflects the utility or satisfaction a player derives from particular results.

In our example, player 1's payoff is represented as \(u_1(x, y) = \frac{16x}{y+2} - x^2\), while player 2's payoff is \(u_2(x, y) = \frac{16y}{x+2} - y^2\). These functions show how changes in their own and the other player's choices impact their payoff.
  • The payoff function guides players in selecting their strategy, aiming at outcomes that offer the highest payoff.
  • By modeling choices through payoffs, players can evaluate potential outcomes and make informed decisions.
These functions are vital, as they form the basis for calculating strategies like the Nash Equilibrium, allowing players to consider the most beneficial response given various scenarios by the opponent.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Consider a game in which, simultaneously, player 1 selects a number \(x \in[0,6]\) and player 2 selects a number \(y \in[0,6]\). The payoffs are given by: $$ \begin{aligned} &u_{1}(x, y)=\frac{16 x}{y+2}-x^{2} \\ &u_{2}(x, y)=\frac{16 y}{x+2}-y^{2} \end{aligned} $$ (a) Calculate each player's best-response function as a function of the opposing player's pure strategy. (b) Find and report the Nash equilibrium of the game. (c) Suppose that there is no social institution to coordinate the players on an equilibrium. Suppose that each player knows that the other player is rational, but this is not common knowledge. What is the largest set of strategies for player 1 that is consistent with this assumption?

Consider a more general Bertrand model than the one presented in this chapter. Suppose there are \(n\) firms that simultaneously and independently select their prices, \(p_{1}, p_{2}, \ldots, p_{n}\) in a market. These prices are greater than or equal to zero. The lowest price offered in the market is defined as \(p=\min \left\\{p_{1}, p_{2}, \ldots, p_{n}\right\\}\). Consumers observe these prices and purchase only from the firm (or firms) charging \(\underline{p}\), according to the demand curve \(Q=a-\underline{p}\). That is, the firm with the lowest price gets all of the sales. If the lowest price is offered by more than one firm, then these firms equally share the quantity demanded. Assume that firms must supply the quantities demanded of them and that production takes place at a cost of \(c\) per unit. That is, a firm producing \(q_{i}\) units pays a cost \(c q_{i}\). Assume \(a>c>0\). (a) Represent this game in the normal form by describing the strategy spaces and payoff (profit) functions. (b) Find the Nash equilibrium of this market game. (c) Is the notion of a best response well defined for every belief that a firm could hold? Explain.

An island has two reefs that are suitable for fishing, and there are twenty fishers who simultaneously and independently choose at which of the two reefs ( 1 or 2 ) to fish. Each fisher can fish at only one reef. The total number of fish harvested at a single reef depends on the number of fishers who choose to fish there. The total catch is equally divided between the fishers at the reef. At reef 1 , the total harvest is given by \(f_{1}\left(r_{1}\right)=8 r_{1}-\frac{r_{1}^{2}}{2}\), where \(r_{1}\) is the number of fishers who select reef 1 . For reef 2 , the total catch is \(f_{2}\left(r_{2}\right)=4 r_{2}\), where \(r_{2}\) is the number of fishers who choose reef 2 . Assume that each fisher wants to maximize the number of fish that he or she catches. (a) Find the Nash equilibrium of this game. In equilibrium, what is the total number of fish caught? (b) The chief of the island asks his economics advisor whether this arrangement is efficient (i.e., whether the equilibrium allocation of fishers among reefs maximizes the number of fish caught). What is the answer to the chief's question? What is the efficient number of fishers at each reef? (c) The chief decides to require a fishing license for reef 1 , which would require each fisher who fishes there to pay the chief \(x\) fish. Find the Nash equilibrium of the resulting location-choice game between the fishers. Is there a value of \(x\) such that the equilibrium choices of the fishers results in an efficient outcome? If so, what is this value of \(x\) ?

Consider a more general Cournot model than the one presented in this chapter. Suppose there are \(n\) firms. The firms simultaneously and independently select quantities to bring to the market. Firm \(i\) 's quantity is denoted \(q_{i}\), which is constrained to be greater than or equal to zero. All of the units of the good are sold, but the prevailing market price depends on the total quantity in the industry, which is \(Q=\sum_{i=1}^{n} q_{i}\). Suppose the price is given by \(p=a-b Q\) and suppose each firm produces with marginal cost \(c\). There is no fixed cost for the firms. Assume \(a>c>0\) and \(b>0\). Note that firm \(i\) 's profit is given by \(u_{i}=p(Q) q_{i}-c q_{i}=(a-b Q) q_{i}-c q_{i}\). Defining \(Q_{-i}\) as the sum of the quantities produced by all firms except firm \(i\), we have \(u_{i}=\left(a-b q_{i}-b Q_{-i}\right) q_{i}-c q_{i}\). Each firm maximizes its own profit. (a) Represent this game in the normal form by describing the strategy spaces and payoff functions. (b) Find firm \(i\) 's best-response function as a function of \(Q_{-i}\). Graph this function. (c) Compute the Nash equilibrium of this game. Report the equilibrium quantities, price, and total output. (Hint: Summing the best-response functions over the different players will help.) What happens to the equilibrium price and the firm's profits as \(n\) becomes large? (d) Show that for the Cournot duopoly game \((n=2)\), the set of rationalizable strategies coincides with the Nash equilibrium.

Consider a strategic setting in which two geographically distinct firms (players 1 and 2) compete by setting prices. Suppose that consumers are uniformly distributed across the interval \([0,1]\), and each will buy either one unit or nothing. Firm 1 is located at 0 and firm 2 is located at 1 . Assume that the firms cannot change their locations; they can only select prices. Simultaneously and independently, firm 1 chooses a price \(p_{1}\) and firm 2 chooses a price \(p_{2}\). Suppose that the firms produce at zero cost and that due to a government regulation, they must set prices between 0 and 6 . As in the standard location game, consumers are sensitive to the distance they have to travel in order to purchase. But they are also sensitive to price. Consumers get a benefit of 6 from the good that is purchased, but they also pay a personal cost of \(c\) times the distance they have to travel to make the purchase. Assume that \(c\) is a positive constant. If the consumer at location \(x \in[0,1]\) purchases from firm 1, then this consumer's utility is \(6-c x-p_{1}\). If this consumer instead purchases from firm 2 , then her utility is \(6-c(1-x)-p_{2}\). If this consumer does not purchase the good, her utility is 0 . (a) Suppose that for given prices \(p_{1}\) and \(p_{2}\), every consumer purchases the good. That is, ignore the case in which prices are so high that some consumers prefer not to purchase. Find an expression for the "marginal consumer" who is indifferent between purchasing from firm 1 or firm \(2 .\) Denote this consumer's location as \(x^{*}\left(p_{1}, p_{2}\right)\). (b) Continue to assume that all consumers purchase at the prices you are analyzing. Note that firm 1's payoff (profit) is \(p_{1} x^{*}\left(p_{1}, p_{2}\right)\) and firm 2's payoff is \(p_{2}\left[1-x^{*}\left(p_{1}, p_{2}\right)\right]\). Calculate each firm's best response as a function of the other player's strategy. Also graph the best-response functions for the case of \(c=2\). (c) Find and report the Nash equilibrium of this game for the case in which \(c=2\). (d) As \(c\) converges to 0 , what happens to the firms' equilibrium profits? (e) What are the rationalizable strategies of this game for the case in which \(c=2\) ? (f) Find the Nash equilibrium of this game for the case in which \(c=8\).

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