Chapter 12: Problem 24
As the extent of environmental protection expands, would you expect the marginal benefits of environmental protection to rise or fall? Why or why not?
Chapter 12: Problem 24
As the extent of environmental protection expands, would you expect the marginal benefits of environmental protection to rise or fall? Why or why not?
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Get started for freeConsider the case of global environmental problems that spill across international borders as a prisoner's dilemma of the sort studied in Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly. Say that there are two countries, A and B. Each country can choose whether to protect the environment, at a cost of \(10,\) or not to protect it, at a cost of zero. If one country decides to protect the environment, there is a benefit of \(16,\) but the benefit is divided equally between the two countries. If both countries decide to protect the environment, there is a benefit of \(32,\) which is divided equally between the two countries. a. In Table \(12.10,\) fill in the costs, benefits, and total payoffs to the countries of the following decisions. Explain why, without some international agreement, they are likely to end up with neither country acting to protect the environment.
Table 12.5 provides the supply and demand conditions for a manufacturing firm. The third column represents a supply curve without accounting for the social cost of pollution. The fourth column represents the supply curve when the firm is required to account for the social cost of pollution. Identify the equilibrium before the social cost of production is included and after the social cost of production is included. $$\begin{array}{l|l|ll}\hline \text { Price } & \begin{array}{l}\text { Quantity } \\\\\text { Demanded }\end{array} & \begin{array}{l}\text { Quantity Supplied without paying } \\\\\text { the cost of the pollution }\end{array} & \begin{array}{c}\text { Quantity Supplied after paying } \\\\\text { the cost of the pollution }\end{array} \\\\\hline \$ 10 & 450 & 400 & 250 \\\\\hline \$ 15 & 440 & 440 & 290 \\\\\hline \$ 20 & 430 & 480 & 330 \\\\\hline \$ 25 & 420 &520 & 370 \\\\\hline \$ 30 & 410 & 560 & 410 \\\\\hline\end{array}$$
An emissions tax on a quantity of emissions from a firm is not a command-and- control approach to reducing pollution. Why?
How can high-income countries benefit from covering much of the cost of reducing pollution created by low-income countries?
Show the market for cigarettes in equilibrium, assuming that there are no laws banning smoking in public. Label the equilibrium private market price and quantity as \(\mathrm{Pm}\) and \(\mathrm{Qm}\). Add whatever is needed to the model to show the impact of the negative externality from second-hand smoking. (Hint: In this case it is the consumers, not the sellers, who are creating the negative externality.) Label the social optimal output and price as Pe and Qe. On the graph, shade in the deadweight loss at the market output.
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