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As the owner of a family farm whose wealth is \(250,000, you must choose between sitting this season out and investing last year’s earnings (\)200,000) in a safe money market fund paying 5.0 percent or planting summer corn. Planting costs \(200,000, with a six-month time to harvest. If there is rain, planting summer corn will yield \)500,000 in revenues at harvest. If there is a drought, planting will yield \(50,000 in revenues. As a third choice, you can purchase AgriCorp drought-resistant summer corn at a cost of \)250,000 that will yield \(500,000 in revenues at harvest if there is rain, and \)350,000 in revenues if there is a drought. You are risk-averse, and your preference for family wealth (W) is specified by the relationship U(W) = √W. The probability of summer drought is 0.30, while the probability of summer rain is 0.70. Which of the three options should you choose? Explain.

Short Answer

Expert verified

The first option of not planting the crop will be chosen.

Step by step solution

01

Explanation

The expected utility under the safe option is calculated below:

EU=250,000+200,0001+0.050.5=250,000+210,0000.5=460,0000.5=678.23

The expected utility under the corn plantation option is calculated below:

EU=0.7250000+500000-2000000.5+0.3250000+50000-2000000.5=0.7250000+3000000.5+0.3250000-1500000.5=0.75500000.5+0.31000000.5=0.7×741.62+0.3×316.23=519.134+94.869=614

The expected utility under the drought-resistant option is calculated below:

EU=0.7250000+500000-2500000.5+0.3250000+350000-2000000.5=0.7250000+2500000.5+0.3250000-1000000.5=0.75000000.5+0.33500000.5=0.7×707.11+0.3×591.61=494.977+177.483=672.46

The higher expected utility option will be chosen; thus, the first option will be chosen, i.e., not planting the corn.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Draw a utility function over income u(I) that describes a man who is a risk lover when his income is low but risk-averse when his income is high. Can you explain why such a utility function might reasonably describe a person’s preferences?

You are an insurance agent who must write a policy for a new client named Sam. His company, Society for Creative Alternatives to Mayonnaise (SCAM), is working on a low-fat, low-cholesterol mayonnaise substitute for the sandwich-condiment industry. The sandwich industry will pay top dollar to the first inventor to patent such a mayonnaise substitute. Sam’s SCAM seems like a very risky proposition to you. You have calculated his possible returns table as follows:

Probability
Return
Outcome
.999
-\(1,000,000
(he fails)
.001\)1,000,000,000
(he succeeds and sell his formula)

a. What is the expected return of Sam’s project? What is the variance?

b. What is the most that Sam is willing to pay for insurance? Assume Sam is risk-neutral.

c. Suppose you found out that the Japanese are on the verge of introducing their own mayonnaise substitute next month. Sam does not know this and has just turned down your final offer of $1000 for the insurance. Assume that Sam tells you SCAM is only six months away from perfecting its mayonnaise substitute and that you know what you know about the Japanese. Would you raise or lower your policy premium on any subsequent proposal to Sam? Based on his information, would Sam accept?

A city is considering how much to spend to hire people to monitor its parking meters. The following information is available to the city manager:

  • Hiring each meter-monitor costs \(10,000 per year.

  • With one monitoring person hired, the probability of a driver getting a ticket each time he or she parks illegally is equal to .25.

  • With two monitors, the probability of getting a ticket is .5; with three monitors, the probability is .75; and with four, it's equal to 1.

  • With two monitors hired, the current fine for overtime parking is \)20.

  1. Assume first that all drivers are risk-neutral. What parking fine would you levy, and how many meter monitors would you hire (1, 2, 3, or 4) to achieve the current level of deterrence against illegal parking at the minimum cost?

  2. Now assume that drivers are highly risk-averse. How would your answer to (a) change?

  3. (For discussion) What if drivers could insure themselves against the risk of parking fines? Would it make good public policy to permit such insurance?

Suppose you have invested in a new computer company whose profitability depends on two factors: (1) whether the U.S. Congress passes a tariff raising the cost of Japanese computers and (2) whether the U.S. economy grows slowly or quickly. What are the four mutually exclusive states of the world that you should be concerned about?

Suppose that two investments have the same three payoffs, but the probability associated with each payoff differs, as illustrated in the table below:

PAYOFFPROBABILITY (INVESTMENT A)PROBABILITY (INVESTMENT B)
\(3000.100.30
\)2500.800.40
$2000.100.30
  1. Find the expected return and standard deviation of each investment.

  2. Jill has the utility function U = 5I, where I denotes the payoff. Which investment will she choose?

  3. Ken has the utility function U = 51I. Which investment will he choose?

  4. Laura has the utility function U = 5I 2. Which investment will she choose?

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