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Many retail video stores offer two alternative plans for renting films:

• A two-part tariff: Pay an annual membership fee (e.g., \(40) and then pay a small fee for the daily rental of each film (e.g., \)2 per film per day).

• A straight rental fee: Pay no membership fee, but pay a higher daily rental fee (e.g., $4 per film per day).

What is the logic behind the two-part tariff in this case? Why offer the customer a choice of two plans rather than simply a two-part tariff?

Short Answer

Expert verified

The logic behind the two-part tariff is to segregate the consumer into different groups as per their need. The customers are offered two plans rather than simply a two-part tariff because every customer has different needs and generates revenue from each customer.

Step by step solution

01

Step 1. Logic of two-part tariff

The strategy of two-part tariff is used to sort the customer into two groups namely, high-volume group, and low-volume group; suppose the high-volume group rent more than 30 movies per year and low-volume group rents less than 30 movies per year. The problem with the two-part tariff is that the firm faces difficulty deciding the entry and rental fees. Thus, the firm charges two different prices for two different groups of customers.

02

Reason for offering two plans instead of two-part tariff

If the entry fee is high and the rental fee is low, it will benefit the high-volume customer, but it will not benefit the low-volume customers. If the entry fee is low and the rental fee is high, it will benefit the low-volume customer, but it will not benefit the high-volume customers. Hence, the firm keeps both the membership and rent options.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Elizabeth Airlines (EA) flies only one route: Chicago–Honolulu. The demand for each flight is Q = 500 - P. EA’s cost of running each flight is \(30,000 plus \)100 per passenger.

  1. What is the profit-maximizing price that EA will charge? How many people will be on each flight? What is EA’s profit for each flight?
  2. EA learns that the fixed costs per flight are in fact \(41,000 instead of \)30,000. Will the airline stay in business for long? Illustrate your answer using a graph of the demand curve that EA faces, EA’s average cost curve when fixed costs are \(30,000, and EA’s average cost curve when fixed costs are \)41,000.
  3. Wait! EA finds out that two different types of people fly to Honolulu. Type A consists of business people with a demand of QA = 260 - 0.4P. Type B consists of students whose total demand is QB = 240 - 0.6P. Because the students are easy to spot, EA decides to charge them different prices. Graph each of these demand curves and their horizontal sum. What price does EA charge the students? What price does it charge other customers? How many of each type are on each flight?
  4. What would EA’s profit be for each flight? Would the airline stay in business? Calculate the consumer surplus of each consumer group. What is the total consumer surplus?
  5. Before EA started price discriminating, how much consumer surplus was the Type A demand getting from air travel to Honolulu? Type B? Why did total consumer surplus decline with price discrimination, even though total quantity sold remained unchanged?

If the demand for drive-in movies is more elastic for couples than for single individuals, it will be optimal for theaters to charge one admission fee for the driver of the car and an extra fee for passengers. True or false? Explain.

Sal’s satellite company broadcasts TV to subscribers in Los Angeles and New York. The demand functions for each of these two groups are

QNY = 60 - 0.25PNY

QLA = 100 - 0.50PLA

where Q is in thousands of subscriptions per year and P is the subscription price per year. The cost of providing Q units of service is given by

C = 1000 + 40Q

where Q = QNY + QLA.

  1. What are the profit-maximizing prices and quantities for the New York and Los Angeles markets?
  2. As a consequence of a new satellite that the Pentagon recently deployed, people in Los Angeles receive Sal’s New York broadcasts and people in New York receive Sal’s Los Angeles broadcasts. As a result, anyone in New York or Los Angeles can receive Sal’s broadcasts by subscribing in either city. Thus Sal can charge only a single price. What price should he charge, and what quantities will he sell in New York and Los Angeles?
  3. In which of the above situations, (a) or (b), is Sal better off? In terms of consumer surplus, which situation do people in New York prefer and which do people in Los Angeles prefer? Why?

Suppose that two competing firms, A and B, produce a homogeneous good. Both firms have a marginal cost of MC = \(50. Describe what would happen to output and price in each of the following situations if the firms are at (i) Cournot equilibrium, (ii) collusive equilibrium, and (iii) Bertrand equilibrium.

(a) Because Firm A must increase wages, its MC increases to \)80.

(b) The marginal cost of both firms increases.

(c) The demand curve shifts to the right.

A monopolist is deciding how to allocate output between two geographically separated markets (East Coast and Midwest). Demand and marginal revenue for the two markets are

P1 = 15 – Q1 MR1 = 15 - 2Q1

P2 = 25 - 2Q2 MR2 = 25 - 4Q2

The monopolist’s total cost is C = 5 + 3(Q1 + Q2). What are price, output, profits, marginal revenues, and deadweight loss (i) if the monopolist can price discriminate? (ii) if the law prohibits charging different prices in the two regions?

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