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You are selling two goods, 1 and 2, to a market consisting of three consumers with reservation prices as follows:

RESERVATION PRICE (\()

CONSUMER FOR 1 FOR 2

A 20 100

B 60 60

C 100 20

The unit cost of each product is \)30.

a. Compute the optimal prices and profits for (i) selling the goods separately, (ii) pure bundling, and (iii) mixed bundling.

b. Which strategy would be most profitable? Why?

Short Answer

Expert verified
  1. i) Optimal price for Good 1 and Good 2 will be $100. The profit of the firm will be $140.

ii) Optimal price for the bundle will be $120. The profit of the firm will be $180.

iii) Optimal price for Good 1 and Good 2 will be $100 for each of them and a bundle price (package of both goods) at $120. The profit of the firm would be $200.

  1. Mixed bundling. It provides the maximum profit.

Step by step solution

01

Step 1. Calculate the optimal prices and profits under different pricing policies.

  • Selling goods separately: The producer sets the price for each good according to the maximum reservation prices of the customer for that good. For the given information, the producer will set the price of Good 1 and Good 2 at $100 each.

At this price level, only Consumer C will buy Good 1, and Consumer A will buy Good 2. Consumer B will not be able to buy any of the goods. The firm's total profit would be (100-30)+(100-30) = $140.

  • Pure bundling: The producer will combine both the goods into a single unit or package. The producer will set the optimal price for the package at a level where it can cover the maximum of reservation prices set by consumers for both the goods.

Since the sum of reservation prices for both the goods is $120 for each consumer, the producer will set the optimal bundle price for the package at $120. The profit of the firm would be ($120-60)3 = $180.

  • Mixed bundling: The producer will charge individual prices for the goods from some consumers and bundle prices from others. The producer will charge separate prices for Good 1 and Good 2 from Consumers C and A for the given information and a bundle price for both the goods from Consumer B.

Thus, it will set the optimal price for Good 1 and Good 2 at $100 and bundle price at $120 for the package. Now sell Good 1 to Consumer C and Good 2 to Consumer A under separate pricing policy and sell the package to Consumer C. The total profit of the firm would be (100-30)+(100-30)+(120-60)= $200.

02

Step 2. Select the most profitable pricing policy for the producer

If the producer decides to sell the goods under a “separate pricing policy,” it will earn a profit of $140. If he sells under a “pure bundling” pricing policy, it will earn a profit of $180. And if he decides to sell them under “mixed pricing policy,” the producer will receive a profit $200. On comparing all the three pricing policies, the mixed pricing policy provides maximum profit to the producer.

Thus, the producer should apply a mixed bundling pricing strategy. This policy will provide maximum profit from the sale of goods.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Many retail video stores offer two alternative plans for renting films:

• A two-part tariff: Pay an annual membership fee (e.g., \(40) and then pay a small fee for the daily rental of each film (e.g., \)2 per film per day).

• A straight rental fee: Pay no membership fee, but pay a higher daily rental fee (e.g., $4 per film per day).

What is the logic behind the two-part tariff in this case? Why offer the customer a choice of two plans rather than simply a two-part tariff?

A cable TV company offers, in addition to its basic service, two products: a Sports Channel (Product 1) and a Movie Channel (Product 2). Subscribers to the basic service can subscribe to these additional services individually at the monthly prices P1 and P2, respectively, or they can buy the two as a bundle for the price PB, where PB 6 P1 + P2. They can also forgo the additional services and simply buy the basic service. The company’s marginal cost for these additional services is zero. Through market research, the cable company has estimated the reservation prices for these two services for a representative group of consumers in the company’s service area. These reservation prices are plotted (as x’s) in Figure 11.21, as are the prices P1, P2, and PB that the cable company is currently charging. The graph is divided into regions I, II, III, and IV.

a. Which products, if any, will be purchased by the consumers in region I? In region II? In region III? In region IV? Explain briefly.

b. Note that as drawn in the figure, the reservation prices for the Sports Channel and the Movie Channel are negatively correlated. Why would you, or why would you not, expect consumers’ reservation prices for cable TV channels to be negatively correlated?

c. The company’s vice president has said: “Because the marginal cost of providing an additional channel is zero, mixed bundling offers no advantage over pure bundling. Our profits would be just as high if we offered the Sports Channel and the

Movie Channel together as a bundle, and only as a bundle.” Do you agree or disagree? Explain why.

d. Suppose the cable company continues to use mixed bundling to sell these two services. Based on the distribution of reservation prices shown in Figure 11.21, do you think the cable company should alter any of the prices that it is now charging? If so, how?

Sal’s satellite company broadcasts TV to subscribers in Los Angeles and New York. The demand functions for each of these two groups are

QNY = 60 - 0.25PNY

QLA = 100 - 0.50PLA

where Q is in thousands of subscriptions per year and P is the subscription price per year. The cost of providing Q units of service is given by

C = 1000 + 40Q

where Q = QNY + QLA.

  1. What are the profit-maximizing prices and quantities for the New York and Los Angeles markets?
  2. As a consequence of a new satellite that the Pentagon recently deployed, people in Los Angeles receive Sal’s New York broadcasts and people in New York receive Sal’s Los Angeles broadcasts. As a result, anyone in New York or Los Angeles can receive Sal’s broadcasts by subscribing in either city. Thus Sal can charge only a single price. What price should he charge, and what quantities will he sell in New York and Los Angeles?
  3. In which of the above situations, (a) or (b), is Sal better off? In terms of consumer surplus, which situation do people in New York prefer and which do people in Los Angeles prefer? Why?

Suppose that BMW can produce any quantity of cars at a constant marginal cost equal to \(20,000 and a fixed cost of \)10 billion. You are asked to advise the CEO as to what prices and quantities BMW should set for sales in Europe and in the United States. The demand for BMWs in each market is given by

QE = 4,000,000 - 100PE

and

QU = 1,000,000 - 20PU

where the subscript E denotes Europe, the subscript U denotes the United States. Assume that BMW can restrict U.S. sales to authorized BMW dealers only.

  1. What quantity of BMWs should the firm sell in each market, and what should the price be in each market? What should the total profit be?
  2. If BMW were forced to charge the same price in each market, what would be the quantity sold in each market, the equilibrium price, and the company’s profit?

If the demand for drive-in movies is more elastic for couples than for single individuals, it will be optimal for theaters to charge one admission fee for the driver of the car and an extra fee for passengers. True or false? Explain.

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