Warning: foreach() argument must be of type array|object, bool given in /var/www/html/web/app/themes/studypress-core-theme/template-parts/header/mobile-offcanvas.php on line 20

As the owner of the only tennis club in an isolated wealthy community, you must decide on membership dues and fees for court time. There are two types of tennis players. “Serious” players have demand

Q1 - 10 - P

where Q1 is court hours per week and P is the fee per hour for each individual player. There are also “occasional” players with demand

Q2 = 4 - 0.25P

Assume that there are 1000 players of each type. Because you have plenty of courts, the marginal cost of court time is zero. You have fixed costs of $10,000 per week. Serious and occasional players look alike, so you must charge them the same prices.

  1. Suppose that to maintain a “professional” atmosphere, you want to limit membership to serious players. How should you set the annual membership dues and court fees (assume 52 weeks per year) to maximize profits, keeping in mind the constraint that only serious players choose to join? What would profits be (per week)?
  2. A friend tells you that you could make greater profits by encouraging both types of players to join. Is your friend right? What annual dues and court fees would maximize weekly profits? What would these profits be?
  3. Suppose that over the years, young, upwardly mobile professionals move to your community, all of whom are serious players. You believe there are now 3000 serious players and 1000 occasional players. Would it still be profitable to cater to the occasional player? What would be the profit-maximizing annual dues and court fees? What would profits be per week?

Short Answer

Expert verified
  1. The annual membership fee will be $2600, and the court fee will be zero. The total profit will be $40,000.
  2. Yes, your friend is right. The annual dues will be $1098.5, and the court fee will be $3. The total profit will be $63,000.
  3. The annual dues will be $1053, and the court fee will be $3.27. the total profit will be $147,455.

Step by step solution

01

Explanation for part (a)

The club owner will change the membership fee equal to the serious player's consumer surplus. The consumer surplus of serious players will be:

Q1=10-PMC=0CS=0.510-010-0=0.5×10×10=$50=$2,600peryear

Thus, the annual entry fee will be $2,600. The court fee is zero.

The total profit will be:

π=501000-10,000=50,000-10,000=$40,000

The total profit will be $40,000 per week.

02

Explanation for part (b)

If there are both types of players, the club owner will be profitable by setting the court fee above the marginal cost and annual fee equal to the consumer surplus of the type of player with less demand.

The annual fee (T) will be:

T = 0.5Q216 - P= 0.54 - 0.25P16 - P= 32 - 4P + 0.125P2

The total annual fee will be:

TA= 200032 - 4P + 0.125P2= 64,000 - 8,000P + 250P2

Total revenue from court fee will be:

TR = P1,00010 - P+ 10004 - 0.25P= 14,000P - 1250P2

The total revenue from the annual fee and court fee will be:

TR = 64,000 + 6000P - 1000P2

The maximum TR will be:

dTRdP= 6000 - 200P = 0P = $ 3

The demand for both the players will be:

Q1= 10 - 3= 7Q2= 4 - 0.253= 3.25

The profit will be:

TR=64,000+60003-10003=$73,000perweekπ=73,000-10,000=$63,000

The profit is greater than when the only serious player was a member. Thus, your friend is right.

03

Explanation for part (c)

There are 4,000 players; then the entry fee will be:

T = 400032 - 4P + 0.125P2= 128,000 - 16,000P + 500P2

The court fee will be:

P3000Q1+ 1000Q2= P300010 - P+ 10004 - 0.25P= 24,000 - 2350P2

The total revenue will be:

TR=128,000+18000P-2750P2dTRdP=18,000-5500P=0P=$3.27perhour

The total profit will be,

TR=128,000+18,0003.27-27503.27=$157,455π=157,455-10,000=$147,455

The annual dues will be:

5232 - 43.27+ 0.1253.272= $ 1053

The annual profit will be,

52147.455= $ 7.67millionperyear

Unlock Step-by-Step Solutions & Ace Your Exams!

  • Full Textbook Solutions

    Get detailed explanations and key concepts

  • Unlimited Al creation

    Al flashcards, explanations, exams and more...

  • Ads-free access

    To over 500 millions flashcards

  • Money-back guarantee

    We refund you if you fail your exam.

Over 30 million students worldwide already upgrade their learning with Vaia!

One App. One Place for Learning.

All the tools & learning materials you need for study success - in one app.

Get started for free

Most popular questions from this chapter

Sal’s satellite company broadcasts TV to subscribers in Los Angeles and New York. The demand functions for each of these two groups are

QNY = 60 - 0.25PNY

QLA = 100 - 0.50PLA

where Q is in thousands of subscriptions per year and P is the subscription price per year. The cost of providing Q units of service is given by

C = 1000 + 40Q

where Q = QNY + QLA.

  1. What are the profit-maximizing prices and quantities for the New York and Los Angeles markets?
  2. As a consequence of a new satellite that the Pentagon recently deployed, people in Los Angeles receive Sal’s New York broadcasts and people in New York receive Sal’s Los Angeles broadcasts. As a result, anyone in New York or Los Angeles can receive Sal’s broadcasts by subscribing in either city. Thus Sal can charge only a single price. What price should he charge, and what quantities will he sell in New York and Los Angeles?
  3. In which of the above situations, (a) or (b), is Sal better off? In terms of consumer surplus, which situation do people in New York prefer and which do people in Los Angeles prefer? Why?

In Example 11.1 (page 422), we saw how producers of processed foods and related consumer goods use coupons as a means of price discrimination. Although coupons are widely used in the United States, that is not the case in other countries. In Germany, coupons are illegal.

  1. Does prohibiting the use of coupons in Germany make German consumers better off or worse off?

  2. Does prohibiting the use of coupons make German producers better off or worse off?

Many retail video stores offer two alternative plans for renting films:

• A two-part tariff: Pay an annual membership fee (e.g., \(40) and then pay a small fee for the daily rental of each film (e.g., \)2 per film per day).

• A straight rental fee: Pay no membership fee, but pay a higher daily rental fee (e.g., $4 per film per day).

What is the logic behind the two-part tariff in this case? Why offer the customer a choice of two plans rather than simply a two-part tariff?

Suppose that BMW can produce any quantity of cars at a constant marginal cost equal to \(20,000 and a fixed cost of \)10 billion. You are asked to advise the CEO as to what prices and quantities BMW should set for sales in Europe and in the United States. The demand for BMWs in each market is given by

QE = 4,000,000 - 100PE

and

QU = 1,000,000 - 20PU

where the subscript E denotes Europe, the subscript U denotes the United States. Assume that BMW can restrict U.S. sales to authorized BMW dealers only.

  1. What quantity of BMWs should the firm sell in each market, and what should the price be in each market? What should the total profit be?
  2. If BMW were forced to charge the same price in each market, what would be the quantity sold in each market, the equilibrium price, and the company’s profit?

If the demand for drive-in movies is more elastic for couples than for single individuals, it will be optimal for theaters to charge one admission fee for the driver of the car and an extra fee for passengers. True or false? Explain.

See all solutions

Recommended explanations on Economics Textbooks

View all explanations

What do you think about this solution?

We value your feedback to improve our textbook solutions.

Study anywhere. Anytime. Across all devices.

Sign-up for free