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Price discrimination requires the ability to sort customers and the ability to prevent arbitrage. Explain how the following can function as price discrimination schemes and discuss both sorting and arbitrage:

  1. Requiring airline travelers to spend at least one Saturday night away from home to qualify for a low fare.

  2. Insisting on delivering cement to buyers and basing prices on buyers’ locations.

  3. Selling food processors along with coupons that can be sent to the manufacturer for a $10 rebate.

  4. Offering temporary price cuts on bathroom tissue.

  5. Charging high-income patients more than low-income patients for plastic surgery

Short Answer

Expert verified
  1. The arbitrage is not possible when a particular customer is considered.

  2. The sorting is possible based on location.

  3. The arbitrage is possible as the food processors can be sold below the retail price.

  4. Arbitrage is possible, but the cost of arbitrage is high.

  5. The arbitrage is not possible as it is difficult to transfer the plastic surgery.

Step by step solution

01

Step 1. Explanation for part (a)

The tourist has no urgency and makes travel plans generally on weekends, whereas it is difficult for business travellers to stay on the weekends. Thus, a particular customer name will be mentioned; hence, there is no space for arbitrage.

02

Step 2. Explanation for part (b)

The consumers are sorted based on geography by basing the price buyers’ location. The cement price includes the transportation charges paid by the consumer, whether the delivery location buyers’ place or the sellers’ place. The pricing strategy is called basing-point pricing; all the sellers use the same point to calculate the transportation cost. Hence, every seller changes the same price.

03

Step 3. Explanation for part (c)

The rebate is possible only when the consumer sends the form of rebate to the manufacturer. The consumer with less price-sensitive does not fill the form for the rebate, and the consumer with more price-sensitive does fill the form for rebate. The group of consumers who fill the form has an opportunity to sell the food processors below the retail price after receiving the rebate.

04

Step 4. Explanation for part (d)

The temporary price cut on the bathroom tissues is intertemporal price discrimination. The consumer with less price sensitivity will not change their demand, but the more price sensitivity will increase their demand. Here arbitrage is possible, but the profit from the arbitrage process will be very small as it requires a high cost of storing, transportation, and resale.

05

Step 5. Explanation for part (e)

Segregating the patients between high-income and low-income is very difficult for the doctor, as the doctor can only guess. The doctor can initially impose a high price, and gradually the patients will negotiate depending on their income level. Thus, plastic surgery cannot shift from low-income to high-income patients; hence, arbitrage is impossible.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Elizabeth Airlines (EA) flies only one route: Chicago–Honolulu. The demand for each flight is Q = 500 - P. EA’s cost of running each flight is \(30,000 plus \)100 per passenger.

  1. What is the profit-maximizing price that EA will charge? How many people will be on each flight? What is EA’s profit for each flight?
  2. EA learns that the fixed costs per flight are in fact \(41,000 instead of \)30,000. Will the airline stay in business for long? Illustrate your answer using a graph of the demand curve that EA faces, EA’s average cost curve when fixed costs are \(30,000, and EA’s average cost curve when fixed costs are \)41,000.
  3. Wait! EA finds out that two different types of people fly to Honolulu. Type A consists of business people with a demand of QA = 260 - 0.4P. Type B consists of students whose total demand is QB = 240 - 0.6P. Because the students are easy to spot, EA decides to charge them different prices. Graph each of these demand curves and their horizontal sum. What price does EA charge the students? What price does it charge other customers? How many of each type are on each flight?
  4. What would EA’s profit be for each flight? Would the airline stay in business? Calculate the consumer surplus of each consumer group. What is the total consumer surplus?
  5. Before EA started price discriminating, how much consumer surplus was the Type A demand getting from air travel to Honolulu? Type B? Why did total consumer surplus decline with price discrimination, even though total quantity sold remained unchanged?

Suppose that two competing firms, A and B, produce a homogeneous good. Both firms have a marginal cost of MC = \(50. Describe what would happen to output and price in each of the following situations if the firms are at (i) Cournot equilibrium, (ii) collusive equilibrium, and (iii) Bertrand equilibrium.

(a) Because Firm A must increase wages, its MC increases to \)80.

(b) The marginal cost of both firms increases.

(c) The demand curve shifts to the right.

As the owner of the only tennis club in an isolated wealthy community, you must decide on membership dues and fees for court time. There are two types of tennis players. “Serious” players have demand

Q1 - 10 - P

where Q1 is court hours per week and P is the fee per hour for each individual player. There are also “occasional” players with demand

Q2 = 4 - 0.25P

Assume that there are 1000 players of each type. Because you have plenty of courts, the marginal cost of court time is zero. You have fixed costs of $10,000 per week. Serious and occasional players look alike, so you must charge them the same prices.

  1. Suppose that to maintain a “professional” atmosphere, you want to limit membership to serious players. How should you set the annual membership dues and court fees (assume 52 weeks per year) to maximize profits, keeping in mind the constraint that only serious players choose to join? What would profits be (per week)?
  2. A friend tells you that you could make greater profits by encouraging both types of players to join. Is your friend right? What annual dues and court fees would maximize weekly profits? What would these profits be?
  3. Suppose that over the years, young, upwardly mobile professionals move to your community, all of whom are serious players. You believe there are now 3000 serious players and 1000 occasional players. Would it still be profitable to cater to the occasional player? What would be the profit-maximizing annual dues and court fees? What would profits be per week?

Look again at Figure 11.17 (p. 438). Suppose that the marginal costs c1 and c2 were zero. Show that in this case, pure bundling, not mixed bundling, is the most profitable pricing strategy. What price should be charged for the bundle? What will the firm’s profit be?

You are selling two goods, 1 and 2, to a market consisting of three consumers with reservation prices as follows:

RESERVATION PRICE (\()

CONSUMER FOR 1 FOR 2

A 20 100

B 60 60

C 100 20

The unit cost of each product is \)30.

a. Compute the optimal prices and profits for (i) selling the goods separately, (ii) pure bundling, and (iii) mixed bundling.

b. Which strategy would be most profitable? Why?

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