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Suppose the airline industry consisted of only two firms: American and Texas Air Corp. Let the two firms have identical cost functions, C(q) = 40q. Assume that the demand curve for the industry is given by P = 100 - Q and that each firm expects the other to behave as a Cournot competitor.

  1. Calculate the Cournot-Nash equilibrium for each firm, assuming that each chooses the output level that maximizes its profits when taking its rival’s output as given. What are the profits of each firm?
  2. What would be the equilibrium quantity if Texas Air had constant marginal and average costs of \(25 and American had constant marginal and average costs of \)40?
  3. Assuming that both firms have the original cost function, C(q) = 40q, how much should Texas Air be willing to invest to lower its marginal cost from 40 to 25, assuming that American will not follow suit? How much should American be willing to spend to reduce its marginal cost to 25, assuming that Texas Air will have marginal costs of 25 regardless of American’s actions?

Short Answer

Expert verified
  1. Each firm produces 20 units at $60. The profit of each firm will be $400.
  2. The equilibrium quantity will be 45 units.
  3. Texas Air will be willing to spend $500 to reduce the marginal cost to $25. Americans will be willing to spend $400 to reduce the marginal cost to $25.

Step by step solution

01

Explanation for part (a)

Texas is considered firm 1, and America is considered to be firm 2.

The Cournot-Nash equilibrium is calculated below:

The firm 1 reaction curve will be;

P=100-Q1-Q2C=40Qπ1=TR1-C1=100Q1-Q12-Q1Q2-40Q11dQ1=100-2Q1-Q2-40=060-2Q1-Q2=0Q1=60-Q22

The firm 2 reaction curve will be:

The marginal cost of both firms is the same; thus, the reaction curve of firm 2 will be the same as firm 1. Thus, the firm 2 reaction curve will be Q2=60-Q12.

The equilibrium output is calculated below:

role="math" localid="1644240743037" Q1=60-60-Q1224Q1=60+Q13Q1=60Q1=20Q2=60-202=20QT=Q1+Q2=20+20=40P=100-40=$60

The equilibrium output will be 40 units at $60.

The profit of each firm is calculated below:

π1=60×20-40×20=1200-800=$400π2=60×20-40×20=1200-800=$400

The profit of each firm will be $400.

02

Explanation for part (b)

The reaction curve of firm 1 is calculated below:

P=100-Q1-Q2C=25Qπ1=TR1-C1=100Q1-Q12-Q1Q2-25Q11dQ1=100-2Q1-Q2-25=075-2Q1-Q2=0Q1=75-Q22

The firm 2 reaction curve is calculated below:

π2=TR2-C2=100Q2-Q22-Q1Q2-40Q22dQ2=100-2Q2-Q1-40=060-2Q2-Q1=0Q2=60-Q12

The equilibrium output is calculated below:

Q1=75-60-Q1224Q1=150-60+Q13Q1=90Q1=30Q2=60-302=15QT=Q1+Q2=30+15=45

The equilibrium output will be 45 units.

03

Explanation for part (c)

The profit of Texas when marginal cost is $25. The profit will be

When marginal cost is $40, then profit is $400, and when marginal cost is $25, the profit will be $900; thus, the difference will be $500. Hence, Texas should be willing to invest $500 to lower the marginal cost from $40 to $25.

The profit for Americans before the investment is calculated below:

The profit will be $225.

The profit after the investment is calculated below:

The reaction curve of firm1 and firm 2 will be:

The output of firm 1, firm 2, and the price will be:

When marginal cost is $40, then profit is $225, and when marginal cost is $25,the profit will be $625; thus, the difference will be $400. Hence, Americans should invest $400 to lower the marginal cost from $40 to $25.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Two firms compete by choosing price. Their demand functions are

Q1 = 20 - P1 + P2

and

Q2 = 20 + P1 - P2

where P1 and P2 are the prices charged by each firm, respectively, and Q1 and Q2 are the resulting demands. Note that the demand for each good depends only on the difference in prices; if the two firms colluded and set the same price, they could make that price as high as they wanted, and earn infinite profits. Marginal costs are zero.

  1. Suppose the two firms set their prices at the same time. Find the resulting Nash equilibrium. What price will each firm charge, how much will it sell, and what will its profit be? (Hint: Maximize the profit of each firm with respect to its price.)
  2. Suppose Firm 1 sets its price first and then Firm 2 sets its price. What price will each firm charge, how much will it sell, and what will its profit be?
  3. Suppose you are one of these firms and that there are three ways you could play the game: (i) Both firms set price at the same time; (ii) You set price first; or (iii) Your competitor sets price first. If you could choose among these options, which would you prefer? Explain why.

Demand for light bulbs can be characterized by Q = 100 - P, where Q is in millions of boxes of lights sold and P is the price per box. There are two producers of lights, Everglow and Dimlit. They have identical cost functions: Ci = 10Qi +1/2Qi2(i = E, D) Q = QE + QD

  1. Unable to recognize the potential for collusion, the two firms act as short-run perfect competitors. What are the equilibrium values of QE, QD, and P? What are each firm’s profits?
  2. Top management in both firms is replaced. Each new manager independently recognizes the oligopolistic nature of the light bulb industry and plays Cournot. What are the equilibrium values of QE, QD, and P? What are each firm’s profits?
  3. Suppose the Everglow manager guesses correctly that Dimlit is playing Cournot, so Everglow plays Stackelberg. What are the equilibrium values of QE, QD, and P? What are each firm’s profits?
  4. If the managers of the two companies collude, what are the equilibrium values of QE, QD, and P? What are each firm’s profits?

Two firms produce luxury sheepskin auto seat covers: Western Where (WW) and B.B.B. Sheep (BBBS). Each firm has a cost function given by

C(q) = 30q + 1.5q2

The market demand for these seat covers is represented by the inverse demand equation

P = 300 - 3Q

where Q = q1 + q2, total output.

  1. If each firm acts to maximize its profits, taking its rival’s output as given (i.e., the firms behave as Cournot oligopolists), what will be the equilibrium quantities selected by each firm? What is total output, and what is the market price? What are the profits for each firm?
  2. It occurs to the managers of WW and BBBS that they could do a lot better by colluding. If the two firms collude, what will be the profit-maximizing choice of output? The industry price? The output and the profit for each firm in this case?
  3. The managers of these firms realize that explicit agreements to collude are illegal. Each firm must decide on its own whether to produce the Cournot quantity or the cartel quantity. To aid in making the decision, the manager of WW constructs a payoff matrix like the one below. Fill in each box with the profit of WW and the profit of BBBS. Given this payoff matrix, what output strategy is each firm likely to pursue

    PROFIT PAYOFF MAXTRIX

    (WW PROFIT, BBBS PROFIT)

    BBBS

    PRODUCECOURNOT q

    PRODUCE CARTEL q

    WW

    PRODUCE COURNOT q

    PRODUCE CARTEL q

d. Suppose WW can set its output level before BBBS does. How much will WW choose to produce in this case? How much will BBBS produce? What is the market price, and what is the profit for each firm? Is WW better off by choosing its output first? Explain why or why not.

Suppose the market for tennis shoes has one dominant firm and five fringe firms. The market demand is Q = 400 - 2 P. The dominant firm has a constant marginal cost of 20. The fringe firms each have a marginal cost of MC = 20 + 5q.

a. Verify that the total supply curve for the five fringe firms is Qf = P - 20.

b. Find the dominant firm’s demand curve.

c. Find the profit-maximizing quantity produced and the price charged by the dominant firm, and the quantity produced and the price charged by each of the fringe firms.

d. Suppose there are 10 fringe firms instead of five. How does this change your results?

e. Suppose there continue to be five fringe firms but that each manages to reduce its marginal cost to MC = 20 + 2q. How does this change your results?

Two firms compete in selling identical widgets. They choose their output levels Q1 and Q2 simultaneously and face the demand curve P = 30 – Q where Q = Q1 + Q2. Until recently, both firms had zero marginal costs. Recent environmental regulations have increased Firm 2's marginal cost to $15. Firm 1's marginal cost remains constant at zero. True or false: As a result, the market price will rise to the monopoly level.

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