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Suppose that two competing firms, A and B, produce a homogeneous good. Both firms have a marginal cost of MC = \(50. Describe what would happen to output and price in each of the following situations if the firms are at (i) Cournot equilibrium, (ii) collusive equilibrium, and (iii) Bertrand equilibrium.

  1. Because Firm A must increase wages, its MC increases to \)80.

  2. The marginal cost of both firms increases.

  3. The demand curve shifts to the right.

Short Answer

Expert verified
  1. The market output will reduce, and the price will increase in Cournot equilibrium. In Collusive equilibrium, the market output and price will remain the same. In Bertrand equilibrium, the market output will fall, and the market price will increase.

  2. The market output will reduce, and the price will increase in Cournot equilibrium. In Collusive equilibrium, the market output will fall, and the price will increase. In Bertrand equilibrium, the market output will fall, and the market price will increase.

  3. The market output will increase, and the price will rise in Cournot equilibrium. In Collusive equilibrium, the market output will increase, and the price will increase. In Bertrand equilibrium, the market output will increase, and the market price will not change.

Step by step solution

01

Step 1. Explanation for part (a)

In Cournot equilibrium, the reaction curve of firm 1 will shift inward; thus, the output will fall, and firm B will produce more, taking some share of firm A. Thus, the total market output will fall, and the price in the market will increase.

In Collusive equilibrium, as the marginal cost of firm A increases, firm A will produce zero, and all the output will produce by firm B; hence, there will be no change in market output and price.

In Bertrand equilibrium, the price is equal to price; thus, firm A price will increase, and firm B will sell at a price lower than firm A; thus, taking all the output of firm A. Hence, with the price rise, market output falls.

02

Step 2. Explanation for part (b)

In Cournot equilibrium, after the increase in marginal cost, the firm's output will fall; thus, total output will fall, and the market price will increase.

In Collusive equilibrium, the market output will fall, and the price will increase as the marginal cost increases.

In Bertrand equilibrium, as the marginal cost increases, the price increases; thus, the output will fall.

03

Step 3. Explanation for part (c)

After the rightward shift in the demand curve, the output produced by both firms will increase; thus, the total output will increase, and the price increases in Cournot equilibrium.

In Collusive equilibrium, the marginal revenue increases with demand; thus, both output and price will also increase.

In Bertrand equilibrium, the rise in demand will increase total output, but the marginal cost does not change; thus, the market price will not change.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

This exercise is a continuation of Exercise 3. We return to two firms with the same constant average and marginal cost, AC = MC = 5, facing the market demand curve Q1 + Q2 = 53 - P. Now we will use the Stackelberg model to analyze what will happen if one of the firms makes its output decision before the other.

  1. Suppose Firm 1 is the Stackelberg leader (i.e., makes its output decisions before Firm 2). Find the reaction curves that tell each firm how much to produce in terms of the output of its competitor.
  2. How much will each firm produce, and what will its profit be?

Suppose the airline industry consisted of only two firms: American and Texas Air Corp. Let the two firms have identical cost functions, C(q) = 40q. Assume that the demand curve for the industry is given by P = 100 - Q and that each firm expects the other to behave as a Cournot competitor.

  1. Calculate the Cournot-Nash equilibrium for each firm, assuming that each chooses the output level that maximizes its profits when taking its rivalโ€™s output as given. What are the profits of each firm?
  2. What would be the equilibrium quantity if Texas Air had constant marginal and average costs of \(25 and American had constant marginal and average costs of \)40?
  3. Assuming that both firms have the original cost function, C(q) = 40q, how much should Texas Air be willing to invest to lower its marginal cost from 40 to 25, assuming that American will not follow suit? How much should American be willing to spend to reduce its marginal cost to 25, assuming that Texas Air will have marginal costs of 25 regardless of Americanโ€™s actions?

Suppose all firms in a monopolistically competitive industry were merged into one large firm. Would that new firm produce as many different brands? Would it produce only a single brand? Explain.

Consider two firms facing the demand curve P = 50 - 5Q, where Q = Q1 + Q2. The firmsโ€™ cost functions are C1(Q1) = 20 + 10 Q1 and C2(Q2) = 10 + 12 Q2.

  1. Suppose both firms have entered the industry. What is the joint profit-maximizing level of output? How much will each firm produce? How would your answer change if the firms have not yet entered the industry?
  2. What is each firmโ€™s equilibrium output and profit if they behave noncooperatively? Use the Cournot model. Draw the firmsโ€™ reaction curves and show the equilibrium.
  3. How much should Firm 1 be willing to pay to purchase Firm 2 if collusion is illegal but a takeover is not?

Two firms produce luxury sheepskin auto seat covers: Western Where (WW) and B.B.B. Sheep (BBBS). Each firm has a cost function given by

C(q) = 30q + 1.5q2

The market demand for these seat covers is represented by the inverse demand equation

P = 300 - 3Q

where Q = q1 + q2, total output.

  1. If each firm acts to maximize its profits, taking its rivalโ€™s output as given (i.e., the firms behave as Cournot oligopolists), what will be the equilibrium quantities selected by each firm? What is total output, and what is the market price? What are the profits for each firm?
  2. It occurs to the managers of WW and BBBS that they could do a lot better by colluding. If the two firms collude, what will be the profit-maximizing choice of output? The industry price? The output and the profit for each firm in this case?
  3. The managers of these firms realize that explicit agreements to collude are illegal. Each firm must decide on its own whether to produce the Cournot quantity or the cartel quantity. To aid in making the decision, the manager of WW constructs a payoff matrix like the one below. Fill in each box with the profit of WW and the profit of BBBS. Given this payoff matrix, what output strategy is each firm likely to pursue

    PROFIT PAYOFF MAXTRIX

    (WW PROFIT, BBBS PROFIT)

    BBBS

    PRODUCECOURNOT q

    PRODUCE CARTEL q

    WW

    PRODUCE COURNOT q

    PRODUCE CARTEL q

d. Suppose WW can set its output level before BBBS does. How much will WW choose to produce in this case? How much will BBBS produce? What is the market price, and what is the profit for each firm? Is WW better off by choosing its output first? Explain why or why not.

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