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Two firms compete in selling identical widgets. They choose their output levels Q1 and Q2 simultaneously and face the demand curve P = 30 – Q where Q = Q1 + Q2. Until recently, both firms had zero marginal costs. Recent environmental regulations have increased Firm 2's marginal cost to $15. Firm 1's marginal cost remains constant at zero. True or false: As a result, the market price will rise to the monopoly level.

Short Answer

Expert verified

The statement is true.

Step by step solution

01

Determination of monopoly market price

The monopoly market represents a market where only one seller operates the market and controls the price. The monopolist producer operates at the level where marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost.

The price and quantity are calculated below:

P=30-QTR=30Q-Q2MR=30-2QMC=$0MR=MC30-2Q=02Q=30Q=15P=30-15=$15

The price will be $15, and the quantity will be 15 units.

02

Price when marginal cost increases to $15

Two firms are operating in the market; the marginal revenue and marginal cost are equated with generating each firm's reaction curve.

Assuming that both firms know about the other firm's marginal cost and that they know that the other firm knows this:

Firm 1's reaction curve is calculated below:

P=30-Q1-Q2TR1=30Q1-Q12-Q1Q2MR1=30-2Q1-Q2MC1=$0MR1=MC130-2Q1-Q2=0Q1=30-Q22....................i

Firm 2's reaction curve is calculated below:

P=30-Q1-Q2TR2=30Q2-Q22-Q1Q2MR2=30-2Q2-Q1MC2=$15MR2=MC230-2Q2-Q1=15Q2=15-Q12....................ii

From i and ii,

Q1=30-15-Q122Q1=60-15+Q144Q1-Q1=45Q1=453=15Q2=15-152=0

The output for firm 1 will be 15 units, and for firm 2 will be 0.

The price is calculated below:

P = 30 - 15 - 0

=$15

The price will be $15. Thus, the price is equal to the monopoly price.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Suppose the market for tennis shoes has one dominant firm and five fringe firms. The market demand is Q = 400 - 2 P. The dominant firm has a constant marginal cost of 20. The fringe firms each have a marginal cost of MC = 20 + 5q.

a. Verify that the total supply curve for the five fringe firms is Qf = P - 20.

b. Find the dominant firm’s demand curve.

c. Find the profit-maximizing quantity produced and the price charged by the dominant firm, and the quantity produced and the price charged by each of the fringe firms.

d. Suppose there are 10 fringe firms instead of five. How does this change your results?

e. Suppose there continue to be five fringe firms but that each manages to reduce its marginal cost to MC = 20 + 2q. How does this change your results?

A monopolist can produce at a constant average (and marginal) cost of AC = MC = \(5. It faces a market demand curve given by Q = 53 - P.

  1. Calculate the profit-maximizing price and quantity for this monopolist. Also calculate its profits.
  2. Suppose a second firm enters the market. Let Q1 be the output of the first firm and Q2 be the output of the second. Market demand is now given by

Q1 + Q2 = 53 - P

Assuming that this second firm has the same costs as the first, write the profits of each firm as functions of Q1 and Q2.

c. Suppose (as in the Cournot model) that each firm chooses its profit maximizing level of output on the assumption that its competitor’s output is fixed. Find each firm’s “reaction curve” (i.e., the rule that gives its desired output in terms of its competitor’s output).

d. Calculate the Cournot equilibrium (i.e., the values of Q1 and Q2 for which each firm is doing as well as it can given its competitor’s output). What are the resulting market price and profits of each firm?

e. Suppose there are N firms in the industry, all with the same constant marginal cost, MC = \)5. Find the Cournot equilibrium. How much will each firm produce, what will be the market price, and how much profit will each firm earn? Also, show that as N becomes large, the market price approaches the price that would prevail under perfect competition.

Two firms produce luxury sheepskin auto seat covers: Western Where (WW) and B.B.B. Sheep (BBBS). Each firm has a cost function given by

C(q) = 30q + 1.5q2

The market demand for these seat covers is represented by the inverse demand equation

P = 300 - 3Q

where Q = q1 + q2, total output.

  1. If each firm acts to maximize its profits, taking its rival’s output as given (i.e., the firms behave as Cournot oligopolists), what will be the equilibrium quantities selected by each firm? What is total output, and what is the market price? What are the profits for each firm?
  2. It occurs to the managers of WW and BBBS that they could do a lot better by colluding. If the two firms collude, what will be the profit-maximizing choice of output? The industry price? The output and the profit for each firm in this case?
  3. The managers of these firms realize that explicit agreements to collude are illegal. Each firm must decide on its own whether to produce the Cournot quantity or the cartel quantity. To aid in making the decision, the manager of WW constructs a payoff matrix like the one below. Fill in each box with the profit of WW and the profit of BBBS. Given this payoff matrix, what output strategy is each firm likely to pursue

    PROFIT PAYOFF MAXTRIX

    (WW PROFIT, BBBS PROFIT)

    BBBS

    PRODUCECOURNOT q

    PRODUCE CARTEL q

    WW

    PRODUCE COURNOT q

    PRODUCE CARTEL q

d. Suppose WW can set its output level before BBBS does. How much will WW choose to produce in this case? How much will BBBS produce? What is the market price, and what is the profit for each firm? Is WW better off by choosing its output first? Explain why or why not.

A lemon-growing cartel consists of four orchards. Their total cost functions are

TC1 = 20 + 5Q12

TC2 = 25 + 3Q22

TC3 = 15 + 4Q32

TC4 = 20 + 6Q42

TC is in hundreds of dollars, and Q is in cartons per month picked and shipped.

  1. Tabulate total, average, and marginal costs for each firm for output levels between 1 and 5 cartons per month (i.e., for 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 cartons).
  2. If the cartel decided to ship 10 cartons per month and set a price of $25 per carton, how should output be allocated among the firms?
  3. At this shipping level, which firm has the most incentive to cheat? Does any firm not have an incentive to cheat?

Consider two firms facing the demand curve P = 50 - 5Q, where Q = Q1 + Q2. The firms’ cost functions are C1(Q1) = 20 + 10 Q1 and C2(Q2) = 10 + 12 Q2.

  1. Suppose both firms have entered the industry. What is the joint profit-maximizing level of output? How much will each firm produce? How would your answer change if the firms have not yet entered the industry?
  2. What is each firm’s equilibrium output and profit if they behave noncooperatively? Use the Cournot model. Draw the firms’ reaction curves and show the equilibrium.
  3. How much should Firm 1 be willing to pay to purchase Firm 2 if collusion is illegal but a takeover is not?
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