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This exercise is a continuation of Exercise 3. We return to two firms with the same constant average and marginal cost, AC = MC = 5, facing the market demand curve Q1 + Q2 = 53 - P. Now we will use the Stackelberg model to analyze what will happen if one of the firms makes its output decision before the other.

  1. Suppose Firm 1 is the Stackelberg leader (i.e., makes its output decisions before Firm 2). Find the reaction curves that tell each firm how much to produce in terms of the output of its competitor.
  2. How much will each firm produce, and what will its profit be?

Short Answer

Expert verified
  1. There cannot be any reaction curve for firm1 as it is leading the market. The reaction curve for firm 2 will be Q2 = 24 – 1/2Q1.
  2. Output for firm 1 will be 24 units, and for firm 2 will be 12 units. The profit for firm 1 will be $288, and for firm 2 will be $144.

Step by step solution

01

Explanation for part (a)

The reaction curve of firm 2 will be Q2=24-12Q1. There is no reaction curve for firm 1 as it sets the output decision earlier than firm 2; thus, there is nothing to react to.

02

Explanation for part (b)

Firm 1 is the leading firm, and firm 2 is the follower; thus, the firm 2 reaction curve will put in the profit function of firm 1.

The output of firm 1, and firm 2 are calculated below:

π1=53-Q1-24-Q12Q1-5Q11dQ1=53-2Q1-24+Q1-5=024-Q1=0Q1=24Q2=24-242=24-12=12

Firm 1 will produce 24 units, and firm 2 will produce 12 units.

The profit of firm 1 and firm 2 are calculated below:

role="math" localid="1644230814271" P=53-24-12=$17π1=17×24-5×24=408-120=$288π1=17×12-5×12=204-60=$144

The profit of firm 1 will be $288, and for firm 2 will be $144.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Suppose the market for tennis shoes has one dominant firm and five fringe firms. The market demand is Q = 400 - 2 P. The dominant firm has a constant marginal cost of 20. The fringe firms each have a marginal cost of MC = 20 + 5q.

a. Verify that the total supply curve for the five fringe firms is Qf = P - 20.

b. Find the dominant firm’s demand curve.

c. Find the profit-maximizing quantity produced and the price charged by the dominant firm, and the quantity produced and the price charged by each of the fringe firms.

d. Suppose there are 10 fringe firms instead of five. How does this change your results?

e. Suppose there continue to be five fringe firms but that each manages to reduce its marginal cost to MC = 20 + 2q. How does this change your results?

Suppose that two competing firms, A and B, produce a homogeneous good. Both firms have a marginal cost of MC = \(50. Describe what would happen to output and price in each of the following situations if the firms are at (i) Cournot equilibrium, (ii) collusive equilibrium, and (iii) Bertrand equilibrium.

  1. Because Firm A must increase wages, its MC increases to \)80.

  2. The marginal cost of both firms increases.

  3. The demand curve shifts to the right.

Suppose all firms in a monopolistically competitive industry were merged into one large firm. Would that new firm produce as many different brands? Would it produce only a single brand? Explain.

A lemon-growing cartel consists of four orchards. Their total cost functions are

TC1 = 20 + 5Q12

TC2 = 25 + 3Q22

TC3 = 15 + 4Q32

TC4 = 20 + 6Q42

TC is in hundreds of dollars, and Q is in cartons per month picked and shipped.

  1. Tabulate total, average, and marginal costs for each firm for output levels between 1 and 5 cartons per month (i.e., for 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 cartons).
  2. If the cartel decided to ship 10 cartons per month and set a price of $25 per carton, how should output be allocated among the firms?
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Consider two firms facing the demand curve P = 50 - 5Q, where Q = Q1 + Q2. The firms’ cost functions are C1(Q1) = 20 + 10 Q1 and C2(Q2) = 10 + 12 Q2.

  1. Suppose both firms have entered the industry. What is the joint profit-maximizing level of output? How much will each firm produce? How would your answer change if the firms have not yet entered the industry?
  2. What is each firm’s equilibrium output and profit if they behave noncooperatively? Use the Cournot model. Draw the firms’ reaction curves and show the equilibrium.
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