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A monopolist can produce at a constant average (and marginal) cost of AC = MC = \(5. It faces a market demand curve given by Q = 53 - P.

  1. Calculate the profit-maximizing price and quantity for this monopolist. Also calculate its profits.
  2. Suppose a second firm enters the market. Let Q1 be the output of the first firm and Q2 be the output of the second. Market demand is now given by

Q1 + Q2 = 53 - P

Assuming that this second firm has the same costs as the first, write the profits of each firm as functions of Q1 and Q2.

c. Suppose (as in the Cournot model) that each firm chooses its profit maximizing level of output on the assumption that its competitor’s output is fixed. Find each firm’s “reaction curve” (i.e., the rule that gives its desired output in terms of its competitor’s output).

d. Calculate the Cournot equilibrium (i.e., the values of Q1 and Q2 for which each firm is doing as well as it can given its competitor’s output). What are the resulting market price and profits of each firm?

e. Suppose there are N firms in the industry, all with the same constant marginal cost, MC = \)5. Find the Cournot equilibrium. How much will each firm produce, what will be the market price, and how much profit will each firm earn? Also, show that as N becomes large, the market price approaches the price that would prevail under perfect competition.

Short Answer

Expert verified
  1. The profit-maximizing price will be $29, and the quantity will be 24 units. The profit will be $576.
  2. The profit for firm 1 will be π1 = 48Q1 – Q12 – Q1Q2, and for firm 2 will be π2 = 48Q2 – Q22 – Q1Q2.
  3. The reaction curve of firm 1 will be Q1 = 24 – 1/2Q2, and for firm 2 will be Q2 = 24 – 1/2Q1.
  4. Each firm will produce 16 units at $21. The profit of each firm will be $256.
  5. Each firm will produce 48 units at $5, and each will earn a zero profit.

Step by step solution

01

Explanation for part (a)

The monopolist will operate where the marginal revenue is equal to the marginal cost. The price and quantity of the monopolist are calculated below:

The profit-maximizing price will be $29, and the output will be 24 units.

The profit of the monopolist is calculated below:

π=29×24-5×24=696-120=$576

The profit will be $576.

02

Explanation for part (b)

After entering a new firm, the market quantity will be the summation of the quantity produced by both firms. The profit function of both the firm is calculated below:

Thus, the profit for firm 1 will be π1 = 48Q1 – Q12 – Q1Q2, and for firm 2 will be π2 = 48Q2 – Q22 – Q1Q2.

03

Explanation for part (c)

The reaction curve of firm 1 is calculated below:

π1=48Q1-Q12-Q1Q21dQ1=48-2Q1-Q2=048-2Q1-Q2=0Q1=48-Q22Q1=24-12Q2

The reaction curve of firm 2 is calculated below:

π2=48Q2-Q22-Q1Q22dQ2=48-2Q2-Q1=048-2Q2-Q1=0Q2=48-Q12Q2=24-12Q1

Thus, the reaction curve of firm 1 will be Q1 = 24 – 1/2Q2, and for firm 2 will be Q2 = 24 – 1/2Q1.

04

Explanation for part (d)

From the reaction curves of the firm, the output of each firm is calculated. The output of each firm will be:

Q1=48-48-Q1224Q1=48+Q13Q1=48Q1=16Q2=48-162=322=16

The output for each firm will be 16 units.

The price of the market and the profit for each firm is calculated below:

P=53-16-16=$21π1=21×16-5×16=336-80=$256π2=21×16-5×16=336-80=$256

The market price will be $21, and the profit for each will be $256.

05

Explanation for part (e)

Suppose there are N identical firms; then the market price will be:

P = 53 – (Q1 + Q2+………….

The profit function for ith will be:


Since the cost function is the same, the production level for all firms will be the same; thus, Qi = Q*.

Then the total profit:

The quantity, price, and profit will be if ,

The profit is zero, and the price is equal to marginal cost in perfect competition. The profit is zero, and the price is equal to marginal cost, i.e., $5. Hence, when N approaches infinity, the market approaches perfect competition.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Suppose all firms in a monopolistically competitive industry were merged into one large firm. Would that new firm produce as many different brands? Would it produce only a single brand? Explain.

Two firms produce luxury sheepskin auto seat covers: Western Where (WW) and B.B.B. Sheep (BBBS). Each firm has a cost function given by

C(q) = 30q + 1.5q2

The market demand for these seat covers is represented by the inverse demand equation

P = 300 - 3Q

where Q = q1 + q2, total output.

  1. If each firm acts to maximize its profits, taking its rival’s output as given (i.e., the firms behave as Cournot oligopolists), what will be the equilibrium quantities selected by each firm? What is total output, and what is the market price? What are the profits for each firm?
  2. It occurs to the managers of WW and BBBS that they could do a lot better by colluding. If the two firms collude, what will be the profit-maximizing choice of output? The industry price? The output and the profit for each firm in this case?
  3. The managers of these firms realize that explicit agreements to collude are illegal. Each firm must decide on its own whether to produce the Cournot quantity or the cartel quantity. To aid in making the decision, the manager of WW constructs a payoff matrix like the one below. Fill in each box with the profit of WW and the profit of BBBS. Given this payoff matrix, what output strategy is each firm likely to pursue

    PROFIT PAYOFF MAXTRIX

    (WW PROFIT, BBBS PROFIT)

    BBBS

    PRODUCECOURNOT q

    PRODUCE CARTEL q

    WW

    PRODUCE COURNOT q

    PRODUCE CARTEL q

d. Suppose WW can set its output level before BBBS does. How much will WW choose to produce in this case? How much will BBBS produce? What is the market price, and what is the profit for each firm? Is WW better off by choosing its output first? Explain why or why not.

Demand for light bulbs can be characterized by Q = 100 - P, where Q is in millions of boxes of lights sold and P is the price per box. There are two producers of lights, Everglow and Dimlit. They have identical cost functions: Ci = 10Qi +1/2Qi2(i = E, D) Q = QE + QD

  1. Unable to recognize the potential for collusion, the two firms act as short-run perfect competitors. What are the equilibrium values of QE, QD, and P? What are each firm’s profits?
  2. Top management in both firms is replaced. Each new manager independently recognizes the oligopolistic nature of the light bulb industry and plays Cournot. What are the equilibrium values of QE, QD, and P? What are each firm’s profits?
  3. Suppose the Everglow manager guesses correctly that Dimlit is playing Cournot, so Everglow plays Stackelberg. What are the equilibrium values of QE, QD, and P? What are each firm’s profits?
  4. If the managers of the two companies collude, what are the equilibrium values of QE, QD, and P? What are each firm’s profits?

Suppose the market for tennis shoes has one dominant firm and five fringe firms. The market demand is Q = 400 - 2 P. The dominant firm has a constant marginal cost of 20. The fringe firms each have a marginal cost of MC = 20 + 5q.

a. Verify that the total supply curve for the five fringe firms is Qf = P - 20.

b. Find the dominant firm’s demand curve.

c. Find the profit-maximizing quantity produced and the price charged by the dominant firm, and the quantity produced and the price charged by each of the fringe firms.

d. Suppose there are 10 fringe firms instead of five. How does this change your results?

e. Suppose there continue to be five fringe firms but that each manages to reduce its marginal cost to MC = 20 + 2q. How does this change your results?

A lemon-growing cartel consists of four orchards. Their total cost functions are

TC1 = 20 + 5Q12

TC2 = 25 + 3Q22

TC3 = 15 + 4Q32

TC4 = 20 + 6Q42

TC is in hundreds of dollars, and Q is in cartons per month picked and shipped.

  1. Tabulate total, average, and marginal costs for each firm for output levels between 1 and 5 cartons per month (i.e., for 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 cartons).
  2. If the cartel decided to ship 10 cartons per month and set a price of $25 per carton, how should output be allocated among the firms?
  3. At this shipping level, which firm has the most incentive to cheat? Does any firm not have an incentive to cheat?
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