The Georges Bank, a highly productive fishing area off New England, can be
divided into two zones in terms of fish population. Zone 1 has the higher
population per square mile but is subject to severe diminishing returns to
fishing effort. The daily fish catch (in tons) in Zone 1 is
\\[F_{1}=200\left(X_{1}\right)-2\left(X_{1}\right)^{2}\\]
where \(X_{1}\) is the number of boats fishing there. Zone 2 has fewer fish per
mile but is larger, and diminishing returns are less of a problem. Its daily
fish catch is
\\[F_{2}=100\left(X_{2}\right)-\left(X_{2}\right)^{2}\\]
where \(X_{2}\) is the number of boats fishing in Zone \(2 .\) The marginal fish
catch MFC in each zone can be represented as
\\[\begin{array}{l}
\mathrm{MFC}_{1}=200-4\left(\mathrm{X}_{1}\right) \\
\mathrm{MFC}_{2}=100-2\left(\mathrm{X}_{2}\right)
\end{array}\\]
There are 100 boats now licensed by the U.S. government to fish in these two
zones. The fish are sold at \(\$ 100\) per ton. Total cost (capital and
operating) per boat is constant at \(\$ 1000\) per day. Answer the following
questions about this situation:
a. If the boats are allowed to fish where they want, with no government
restriction, how many will fish in each zone? What will be the gross value of
the catch?
b. If the U.S. government can restrict the number and distribution of the
boats, how many should be allocated to each zone? What will be the gross value
of the catch? Assume the total number of boats remains at 100.
c. If additional fishermen want to buy boats and join the fishing fleet,
should a government wishing to maximize the net value of the catch grant them
licenses? Why or why not?