Defendo has decided to introduce a revolutionary video game. As the first firm
in the market, it will have a monopoly position for at least some time. In
deciding what type of manufacturing plant to build, it has the choice of two
technologies. Technology \(A\) is publicly available and will result in annual
costs of
\\[
C^{A}(q)=10+8 q
\\]
Technology \(B\) is a proprietary technology developed in Defendo's research
labs. It involves a higher fixed cost of production but lower marginal costs:
\\[
C^{B}(q)=60+2 q
\\]
Defendo must decide which technology to adopt. Market demand for the new
product is \(P=20-Q\), where \(Q\) is total industry output.
a. Suppose Defendo were certain that it would maintain its monopoly position
in the market for the entire product lifespan (about five years) without
threat of entry. Which technology would you advise Defendo to adopt? What
would be Defendo's profit given this choice?
b. Suppose Defendo expects its archrival, Offendo, to consider entering the
market shortly after Defendo introduces its new product. Offendo will have
access only to Technology \(A\). If Offendo does enter the market, the two firms
will play a Cournot game (in quantities) and arrive at the CournotNash
equilibrium.
i. If Defendo adopts Technology \(A\) and Offendo enters the market, what will
be the profit of each firm? Would Offendo choose to enter the market given
these profits?
ii. If Defendo adopts Technology \(B\) and Offendo enters the market, what will
be the profit of each firm? Would Offendo choose to enter the market given
these profits?
iii. Which technology would you advise Defendo to adopt given the threat of
possible entry? What will be Defendo's profit given this choice? What will be
consumer surplus given this choice?
c. What happens to social welfare (the sum of consumer surplus and producer
profit) as a result of the threat of entry in this market? What happens to
equilibrium price? What might this imply about the role of potential
competition in limiting market power?