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Suppose the airline industry consisted of only two firms: American and Texas Air Corp. Let the two firms have identical cost functions, \(C(q)=40 q\). Assume that the demand curve for the industry is given by \(P=100-Q\) and that each firm expects the other to behave as a Cournot competitor. a. Calculate the Cournot-Nash equilibrium for each firm, assuming that each chooses the output level that maximizes its profits when taking its rival's output as given. What are the profits of each firm? b. What would be the equilibrium quantity if Texas Air had constant marginal and average costs of \(\$ 25\) and American had constant marginal and average costs of \(\$ 40 ?\) c. Assuming that both firms have the original cost function, \(C(q)=40 q,\) how much should Texas Air be willing to invest to lower its marginal cost from 40 to \(25,\) assuming that American will not follow suit? How much should American be willing to spend to reduce its marginal cost to \(25,\) assuming that Texas Air will have marginal costs of 25 regardless of American's actions?

Short Answer

Expert verified
The Cournot-Nash equilibriums, the profits of each firm at these equilibriums, the new equilibriums with different costs, and the investment each firm should make to lower marginal cost are all obtained through the calculation detailed in the step-by-step solution. The actual calculation will depend upon the values used.

Step by step solution

01

Formation of Profit Functions

Start by formulating the profit function, \(\Pi\), for each firm. The profit function is given by \(\Pi = PQ - C(q)\), where \(\Pi\) is the profit, \(P\) is the price per unit (from the demand curve), \(Q\) is the total quantity produced, and \(C(q)\) is the cost function. Assuming the firms are Cournot competitors, each firm makes its output decision assuming that the output of the other firm, which we denote as \(q^*\), will remain fixed. Therefore, for American, the profit function is \(\Pi_A = (100 - (q_A + q^*_{TA}))q_A - 40q_A\) and for Texas Air, the profit function becomes \(\Pi_{TA} = (100 - (q_{TA} + q^*_A))q_{TA} - 40q_{TA}\).
02

Calculation of Cournot-Nash Equilibrium

For each firm, obtain the first-order derivative of the respective profit function and set it to zero to maximize the profit. This will give the reaction function for each company in terms of the output (quantity produced) of the competitor. For each case, keep the competitor's quantity as constant and solving the equation gives the output for each company at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. The profits of each firm will simply be their respective profit functions evaluated at the equilibrium output.
03

Calculation of New Equilibrium Quantity for Different Costs

For this step, re-calculate the profit function, given that the constant marginal and average costs are now 25 for Texas Air and 40 for American. Repeat step 2 for calculating the new equilibrium quantities for each firm with these new costs.
04

Investment for Lower Marginal Cost

Under the assumption that both firms initially have costs given by \(C(q) = 40q\), the investment each firm should be willing to make to lower its marginal cost from 40 to 25 is the difference between their original profit and the profit they would have with lower costs. To find these amounts, calculate the profit for each firm with the lower cost, and then subtract each firm's original profit.

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Key Concepts

These are the key concepts you need to understand to accurately answer the question.

Microeconomic Models
Microeconomic models are essential tools used to analyze and predict the behavior of firms and individuals in the context of supply and demand within a particular market. In these models, key factors such as production, pricing, and consumption are scrutinized to understand how market equilibrium is reached.

One such model is the Cournot competition model, which describes an industry structure where firms compete on the amount of output they will produce, which they can control. Each firm makes its decision about how much to produce based on the quantity they expect their rival will produce. By doing so, each firm seeks a position where the market can bear their output without depressing prices too much, thus affecting overall revenue.

When we apply this to the exercise in question, we see that American and Texas Air Corp are Cournot competitors in an airline market. They base their production decisions on the anticipated output of the other. Through the use of mathematical analysis – specifically, the reaction functions and subsequent profit maximization – we can determine the Cournot-Nash equilibrium showcasing the optimal production levels for these firms.
Profit Maximization
In the realm of economics, profit maximization is the process by which a firm determines the price and output level that returns the greatest profit. This is one of the fundamental goals of firms in the marketplace. The conditions for profit maximization occur where the marginal cost of production equals the marginal revenue from sales - a point known as the profit-maximizing output.

Looking at the exercise, the profit functions formulated for American and Texas Air Corp incorporate variables representing both the cost to produce and the revenue gained from sales, reflecting how firms assess real-world conditions. To find this optimal point, companies use marginal cost analysis, determining at what output level producing one more unit will cease to be profitable. The calculation of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is an exemplar of profit maximization in action, reaching an optimal point where neither firm can increase profit by unilaterally changing its output.
Marginal Cost Analysis
Marginal cost analysis is a critical element of microeconomics and business decision-making, concerning the increase or decrease in the total cost of production when the level of output is changed by one unit. Essentially, it answers the question, 'How much does it cost to produce one more unit of a good?'

For both American and Texas Air Corp, the exercise highlights that the marginal cost directly influences profit maximization. By examining how a change in marginal cost will affect their strategies, they can make informed decisions on operations and investments. In our scenario, Texas Air contemplates an investment to lower its marginal cost, which is a strategic move to potentially increase its profit margins. Marginal cost analysis helps the firm decide how much to invest by comparing the additional profits that would result from lower costs to the amount of the investment itself, ensuring that the benefits outweigh the costs.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Suppose the market for tennis shoes has one dominant firm and five fringe firms. The market demand is \(Q=400-2 P .\) The dominant firm has a constant marginal cost of \(20 .\) The fringe firms each have a marginal cost of \(\mathrm{MC}=20+5 q\) a. Verify that the total supply curve for the five fringe firms is \(Q_{f}=P-20\) b. Find the dominant firm's demand curve. c. Find the profit-maximizing quantity produced and price charged by the dominant firm, and the quantity produced and price charged by each of the fringe firms. d. Suppose there are 10 fringe firms instead of five. How does this change your results? e. Suppose there continue to be five fringe firms but that each manages to reduce its marginal cost to \(\mathrm{MC}=20+2 q\). How does this change your results?

Suppose all firms in a monopolistically competitive industry were merged into one large firm. Would that new firm produce as many different brands? Would it produce only a single brand? Explain.

Two firms compete by choosing price. Their demand functions are \\[ Q_{1}=20-P_{1}+P_{2} \\] and \\[ Q_{2}=20+P_{1}-P_{2} \\] where \(P_{1}\) and \(P_{2}\) are the prices charged by each firm, respectively, and \(Q_{1}\) and \(Q_{2}\) are the resulting demands. Note that the demand for each good depends only on the difference in prices; if the two firms colluded and set the same price, they could make that price as high as they wanted, and earn infinite profits. Marginal costs are zero. a. Suppose the two firms set their prices at the same time. Find the resulting Nash equilibrium. What price will each firm charge, how much will it sell, and what will its profit be? (Hint: Maximize the profit of each firm with respect to its price.) b. Suppose Firm 1 sets its price first and then Firm 2 sets its price. What price will each firm charge, how much will it sell, and what will its profit be? c. Suppose you are one of these firms and that there are three ways you could play the game: (i) Both firms set price at the same time; (ii) You set price first; or (iii) Your competitor sets price first. If you could choose among these options, which would you prefer? Explain why.

Demand for light bulbs can be characterized by \(Q=100-P,\) where \(Q\) is in millions of boxes of lights sold and \(P\) is the price per box. There are two producers of lights, Everglow and Dimlit. They have identical cost functions: \\[ \begin{array}{c} C_{i}=10 Q_{i}+\frac{1}{2} Q_{i}^{2}(i=E, D) \\ Q=Q_{E}+Q_{D} \end{array} \\] a. Unable to recognize the potential for collusion, the two firms act as short-run perfect competitors. What are the equilibrium values of \(Q_{E}, Q_{D},\) and \(P ?\) What are each firm's profits? b. Top management in both firms is replaced. Each new manager independently recognizes the oligopolistic nature of the light bulb industry and plays Cournot. What are the equilibrium values of \(Q_{E}\) \(Q_{D},\) and \(P ?\) What are each firm's profits? c. Suppose the Everglow manager guesses correctly that Dimlit is playing Cournot, so Everglow plays Stackelberg. What are the equilibrium values of \(Q_{E}\) \(Q_{D},\) and \(P ?\) What are each firm's profits? d. If the managers of the two companies collude, what are the equilibrium values of \(Q_{E}, Q_{D},\) and \(P ?\) What are each firm's profits?

Two firms produce luxury sheepskin auto seat covers: Western Where (WW) and B.B.B. Sheep (BBBS). Each firm has a cost function given by \\[ C(q)=30 q+1.5 q^{2} \\] The market demand for these seat covers is represented by the inverse demand equation \\[ P=300-3 Q \\] where \(Q=q_{1}+q_{2},\) total output. a. If each firm acts to maximize its profits, taking its rival's output as given (i.e., the firms behave as Cournot oligopolists), what will be the equilibrium quantities selected by each firm? What is total output, and what is the market price? What are the profits for each firm? b. It occurs to the managers of WW and BBBS that they could do a lot better by colluding. If the two firms collude, what will be the profit-maximizing choice of output? The industry price? The output and the profit for each firm in this case? c. The managers of these firms realize that explicit agreements to collude are illegal. Each firm must decide on its own whether to produce the Cournot quantity or the cartel quantity. To aid in making the decision, the manager of \(\mathrm{WW}\) constructs a payoff matrix like the one below. Fill in each box with the profit of \(\mathrm{WW}\) and the profit of BBBS. Given this payoff matrix, what output strategy is each firm likely to pursue? d. Suppose WW can set its output level before BBBS does. How much will WW choose to produce in this case? How much will BBBS produce? What is the market price, and what is the profit for each firm? Is WW better off by choosing its output first? Explain why or why not.

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