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Suppose that two competing firms, \(A\) and \(B\), produce a homogeneous good. Both firms have a marginal cost of \(\mathrm{MC}=\$ 50 .\) Describe what would happen to output and price in each of the following situations if the firms are at (i) Cournot equilibrium, (ii) collusive equilibrium, and (iii) Bertrand equilibrium. a. Because Firm \(A\) must increase wages, its \(\mathrm{MC}\) increases to \(\$ 80\). b. The marginal cost of both firms increases. c. The demand curve shifts to the right.

Short Answer

Expert verified
The central idea is that the behavior of firms and hence the outcome depends substantially on the type of competition. Different market scenarios will produce different results in Cournot, collusive, and Bertrand equilibriums.

Step by step solution

01

Understanding the equilibriums

The Cournot equilibrium is characterized by firms choosing their quantity of production jointly, acknowledging that their decision affects the market price. In a collusive equilibrium, firms cooperate to maximize their joint profit, often by agreeing to produce a certain quantity or price. The Bertrand equilibrium involves firms choosing prices independently, anticipating that their competitors' prices will remain constant.
02

Situation (a) Increase in MC of Firm A

(i) In a Cournot equilibrium, as Firm A's marginal cost increases, it will reduce its quantity of production which will increase the market price. Firm B will seize the opportunity by producing more and increasing its profit. (ii) In a collusive equilibrium, the firms may choose to raise the market price to make up for Firm A's increased cost of production. (iii) In a Bertrand equilibrium, as firm A raises its price due to higher cost, firm B will not change its price and will capture the entire market.
03

Situation (b) MC of both firms increases

(i) In a Cournot equilibrium, both firms will reduce their quantity of production, leading to higher market prices. (ii) In a collusive equilibrium, both firms may agree to raise prices to absorb the increased cost. (iii) In a Bertrand equilibrium, as both firms face higher costs, they are likely to pass it onto consumers by raising their prices.
04

Situation (c) Demand curve shifts right

(i) In a Cournot equilibrium, the rise in demand leads to a larger market size that both firms could exploit. Both firms would increase their quantities resulting in a higher price as long as the marginal cost remains constant. (ii) In a collusive equilibrium, the firms might decide to keep production constant and increase the price. (iii) In a Bertrand equilibrium, as demand increases, both firms would increase their quantities to meet the larger market, leading to higher prices only if the increased demand is price inelastic.

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Key Concepts

These are the key concepts you need to understand to accurately answer the question.

Cournot Equilibrium
In a Cournot equilibrium, firms simultaneously choose how much to produce, under the assumption that their competitors will hold their output constant. This creates a strategic interdependence as each firm's decision influences the market price and their rival's profits. Imagine two runners on parallel tracks; they're not running together but certainly affect each other's pace. In the context of rising marginal costs for one firm, say Firm A, the firm would cut back on its production to maintain profitability. This would give an incentive to Firm B to expand its output to fill the gap left by Firm A, leading to a new equilibrium.

However, if the industry as a whole faces increased marginal costs, both firms would reduce their quantity, effectively driving the price up for consumers. This delicate balance of actions and reactions underscores the complexity within an oligopolistic market structure and highlights the critical role marginal cost plays in determining a firm's quantity of output.
Collusive Equilibrium
Imagine two friends in a schoolyard sharing a secret plan; that's somewhat like a collusive equilibrium, where firms act together rather than independently, essentially setting market conditions that favor them. They could determine a fixed price, decide on the quantity of production, or divide the market among themselves to maximize their combined profits while disregarding consumer welfare or competitive pressures.

In the face of rising costs for one or both firms, a collusive agreement might lead to a new higher price. This is done to shield the firms' profits from the increased expenses. While such behavior often violates competition laws, it illustrates the inherent tension between industry collaboration and market competition.
Bertrand Equilibrium
Unlike the Cournot equilibrium which focuses on quantities, the Bertrand equilibrium centers on price competition. Two ice cream stands on a beach setting prices independently would understand this well. Even a small price difference could lead customers to choose the cheaper option, forcing the competitors to consider their pricing meticulously. In a scenario where one firm's marginal cost increases, such as Firm A, it would have to raise its prices. Meanwhile, Firm B could maintain its price and attract customers away from Firm A, potentially monopolizing the market. Alternatively, if both firms faced increased costs, they might both increase their prices. In an ideal Bertrand scenario, however, prices tend to gravitate towards marginal costs over time, ensuring minimum profit margins.
Marginal Cost
Marginal cost is the cost of producing one additional unit of goods. It is a fundamental concept in economics, serving as a guidepost for a firm when it comes to making decisions on production levels. If we think of baking cookies, the marginal cost would include the materials and labor for that one extra cookie. A firm's marginal cost impacts its behavior in competitive settings; higher marginal costs might limit production, while lower marginal costs can encourage expansion. Firm A, facing wage hikes, must grapple with these decisions if their marginal cost goes up. In an oligopolistic market, such cost changes can ripple through to affect overall supply, demand, and market price dynamics.
Market Price
Market price is the current price at which an asset or service can be bought or sold. It's the meeting point of buyers' willingness to pay and sellers' willingness to accept, akin to haggling at a flea market until both parties nod in agreement. In an oligopoly, market price is heavily influenced by firm behavior – whether competitive like in the Bertrand model, cooperative as in collusive arrangements, or somewhere in between like Cournot competitors. Market prices fluctuate based on demand and supply changes, influenced by factors such as a firm’s rising marginal cost or a rightward shift in the demand curve. The dance of supply and demand in setting the market price keeps the market dynamic and sometimes unpredictable, reflecting the ever-changing nature of our economy.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

A monopolist can produce at a constant average (and marginal) cost of \(\mathrm{AC}=\mathrm{MC}=\$ 5 .\) It faces a market demand curve given by \(Q=53-P\) a. Calculate the profit-maximizing price and quantity for this monopolist. Also calculate its profits. b. Suppose a second firm enters the market. Let \(Q_{1}\) be the output of the first firm and \(Q_{2}\) be the output of the second. Market demand is now given by \\[ Q_{1}+Q_{2}=53-P \\] Assuming that this second firm has the same costs as the first, write the profits of each firm as functions of \(Q_{1}\) and \(Q_{2}\) c. Suppose (as in the Cournot model) that each firm chooses its profit- maximizing level of output on the assumption that its competitor's output is fixed. Find each firm's "reaction curve" (i.e., the rule that gives its desired output in terms of its competitor's output). d. Calculate the Cournot equilibrium (i.e., the values of \(Q_{1}\) and \(Q_{2}\) for which each firm is doing as well as it can given its competitor's output). What are the resulting market price and profits of each firm? *e. Suppose there are \(N\) firms in the industry, all with the same constant marginal cost, \(\mathrm{MC}=\$ 5 .\) Find the Cournot equilibrium. How much will each firm produce, what will be the market price, and how much profit will each firm earn? Also, show that as N becomes large, the market price approaches the price that would prevail under perfect competition.

Suppose the market for tennis shoes has one dominant firm and five fringe firms. The market demand is \(Q=400-2 P .\) The dominant firm has a constant marginal cost of \(20 .\) The fringe firms each have a marginal cost of \(\mathrm{MC}=20+5 q\) a. Verify that the total supply curve for the five fringe firms is \(Q_{f}=P-20\) b. Find the dominant firm's demand curve. c. Find the profit-maximizing quantity produced and price charged by the dominant firm, and the quantity produced and price charged by each of the fringe firms. d. Suppose there are 10 fringe firms instead of five. How does this change your results? e. Suppose there continue to be five fringe firms but that each manages to reduce its marginal cost to \(\mathrm{MC}=20+2 q\). How does this change your results?

Demand for light bulbs can be characterized by \(Q=100-P,\) where \(Q\) is in millions of boxes of lights sold and \(P\) is the price per box. There are two producers of lights, Everglow and Dimlit. They have identical cost functions: \\[ \begin{array}{c} C_{i}=10 Q_{i}+\frac{1}{2} Q_{i}^{2}(i=E, D) \\ Q=Q_{E}+Q_{D} \end{array} \\] a. Unable to recognize the potential for collusion, the two firms act as short-run perfect competitors. What are the equilibrium values of \(Q_{E}, Q_{D},\) and \(P ?\) What are each firm's profits? b. Top management in both firms is replaced. Each new manager independently recognizes the oligopolistic nature of the light bulb industry and plays Cournot. What are the equilibrium values of \(Q_{E}\) \(Q_{D},\) and \(P ?\) What are each firm's profits? c. Suppose the Everglow manager guesses correctly that Dimlit is playing Cournot, so Everglow plays Stackelberg. What are the equilibrium values of \(Q_{E}\) \(Q_{D},\) and \(P ?\) What are each firm's profits? d. If the managers of the two companies collude, what are the equilibrium values of \(Q_{E}, Q_{D},\) and \(P ?\) What are each firm's profits?

Suppose the airline industry consisted of only two firms: American and Texas Air Corp. Let the two firms have identical cost functions, \(C(q)=40 q\). Assume that the demand curve for the industry is given by \(P=100-Q\) and that each firm expects the other to behave as a Cournot competitor. a. Calculate the Cournot-Nash equilibrium for each firm, assuming that each chooses the output level that maximizes its profits when taking its rival's output as given. What are the profits of each firm? b. What would be the equilibrium quantity if Texas Air had constant marginal and average costs of \(\$ 25\) and American had constant marginal and average costs of \(\$ 40 ?\) c. Assuming that both firms have the original cost function, \(C(q)=40 q,\) how much should Texas Air be willing to invest to lower its marginal cost from 40 to \(25,\) assuming that American will not follow suit? How much should American be willing to spend to reduce its marginal cost to \(25,\) assuming that Texas Air will have marginal costs of 25 regardless of American's actions?

A lemon-growing cartel consists of four orchards. Their total cost functions are \\[ \begin{array}{l} \mathrm{TC}_{1}=20+5 Q_{1}^{2} \\ \mathrm{TC}_{2}=25+3 Q_{2}^{2} \\ \mathrm{TC}_{3}=15+4 Q_{3}^{2} \\ \mathrm{TC}_{4}=20+6 Q_{4}^{2} \end{array} \\] \(\mathrm{TC}\) is in hundreds of dollars, and \(Q\) is in cartons per month picked and shipped. a. Tabulate total, average, and marginal costs for each firm for output levels between 1 and 5 cartons per month (i.e., for \(1,2,3,4,\) and 5 cartons). b. If the cartel decided to ship 10 cartons per month and set a price of \(\$ 25\) per carton, how should output be allocated among the firms? c. At this shipping level, which firm has the most incentive to cheat? Does any firm not have an incentive to cheat?

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