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A lemon-growing cartel consists of four orchards. Their total cost functions are \\[ \begin{array}{l} \mathrm{TC}_{1}=20+5 Q_{1}^{2} \\ \mathrm{TC}_{2}=25+3 Q_{2}^{2} \\ \mathrm{TC}_{3}=15+4 Q_{3}^{2} \\ \mathrm{TC}_{4}=20+6 Q_{4}^{2} \end{array} \\] \(\mathrm{TC}\) is in hundreds of dollars, and \(Q\) is in cartons per month picked and shipped. a. Tabulate total, average, and marginal costs for each firm for output levels between 1 and 5 cartons per month (i.e., for \(1,2,3,4,\) and 5 cartons). b. If the cartel decided to ship 10 cartons per month and set a price of \(\$ 25\) per carton, how should output be allocated among the firms? c. At this shipping level, which firm has the most incentive to cheat? Does any firm not have an incentive to cheat?

Short Answer

Expert verified
For the 'a' part of the question, the costs can be tabulated for each firm and for each output level. For the 'b' part, output should ideally be allocated minimizing total costs, with details depending on computed marginal costs. For the 'c' part, the firm with the most incentive to cheat is the firm with the lowest marginal cost, while any firm with a marginal cost higher than the cartel price won't have an incentive to cheat.

Step by step solution

01

Calculation of Costs

The Total Cost (TC), Average Cost (AC, which is TC/Q) and Marginal Cost (MC, which is the derivative of TC with respect to Q) for each output level from 1 to 5 need to be calculated for each firm. For example, for firm 1, for an output level of 1 carton, TC = 20 + 5*(1^2), AC = TC / 1, and MC is the derivative of the TC equation, which is 10*Q, so MC at Q=1 is 10*1
02

Output Allocation

To decide how the output of 10 cartons per month should be allocated among the firms, we need to calculate how many cartons each firm should produce to minimize their costs. Each firm's output is decided by checking which firm has the lowest MC until total production reaches 10 cartons. We equalize MC among firms for optimal output allocation.
03

Incentive to Cheat

To figure out which firm has the most incentive to cheat on the cartel agreement, we need to look at the firm with the lowest MC as they have the most to gain from producing more than their allocated amount and selling it. If any firm's MC is higher than the cartel's price, that firm doesn't have an incentive to cheat as they would make a loss.

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Key Concepts

These are the key concepts you need to understand to accurately answer the question.

Total Cost Function
Understanding the total cost function is critical for any business or in this case, a lemon-growing cartel. The total cost function combines all the costs associated with production, including both fixed and variable costs. In our example, each of the four orchards has its own total cost function represented as \( TC_1, TC_2, TC_3, \) and \( TC_4 \) with the equations provided in the problem.

These equations allow us to calculate the total cost for any number of cartons, \( Q \), produced and shipped by each orchard. The total costs vary with the square of the quantity produced due to the quadratic term in the function, indicating that costs rise at an increasing rate as production increases. This is a common feature in production where increasing output leads to higher incremental costs.
Average Cost
The average cost (AC) is the total cost (TC) divided by the number of units produced (Q). It tells us the cost of producing each unit and is vital for setting the price to ensure profitability. In our case scenario, For firm 1, at an output level of 1 carton, \( AC = TC / Q \), which simplifies to the total costs divided by 1, yielding the average cost for that output level.

As production increases, it’s interesting to observe how the average cost changes. Often, AC decreases as production increases due to the spreading of fixed costs over more units, a concept known as economies of scale, up to a certain point before it may start increasing again.
Marginal Cost
The marginal cost (MC) is a concept that refers to the additional cost of producing one more unit. It is derived from the total cost function and in this example, it is the derivative of the TC equation with respect to quantity, \( Q \). For instance, for firm 1, the marginal cost at any given output level is calculated as \(10 \times Q\).

Understanding MC is crucial for decision-making. In a competitive market, firms ideally produce until MC equals the price. A cartel, such as the one in our scenario, may manipulate output and prices, but marginal cost still provides essential information about the cost of increasing production.
Cartel Production Allocation
A cartel’s production allocation is about distributing the total output among individual firms in a way that minimizes costs for the entire group. The allocation is based on the principle of equating marginal costs across all firms, which essentially means that the last unit produced by each firm costs the same.

For our lemon cartel, this involves calculating the MC for each firm and comparing them to ensure that cumulative production meets the market demand, in our case, 10 cartons per month. The allocation optimally assigns production quantities that take advantage of each firm's cost efficiencies.
Incentive to Cheat
The incentive to cheat in a cartel arrangement arises when a firm can benefit by secretly producing more than the agreed quantity. For our lemon cartel, the firm with the lowest marginal cost at the point of allocated production has the most to gain by doing this since it can produce additional units at a lower cost than the agreed price.

On the flip side, if a firm's marginal cost exceeds the cartel's price, it has no incentive to cheat since producing more would result in a loss rather than profit. Analyzing marginal costs relative to the price can indicate which firm might be most tempted to step outside the cartel's agreement.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Two firms compete by choosing price. Their demand functions are \\[ Q_{1}=20-P_{1}+P_{2} \\] and \\[ Q_{2}=20+P_{1}-P_{2} \\] where \(P_{1}\) and \(P_{2}\) are the prices charged by each firm, respectively, and \(Q_{1}\) and \(Q_{2}\) are the resulting demands. Note that the demand for each good depends only on the difference in prices; if the two firms colluded and set the same price, they could make that price as high as they wanted, and earn infinite profits. Marginal costs are zero. a. Suppose the two firms set their prices at the same time. Find the resulting Nash equilibrium. What price will each firm charge, how much will it sell, and what will its profit be? (Hint: Maximize the profit of each firm with respect to its price.) b. Suppose Firm 1 sets its price first and then Firm 2 sets its price. What price will each firm charge, how much will it sell, and what will its profit be? c. Suppose you are one of these firms and that there are three ways you could play the game: (i) Both firms set price at the same time; (ii) You set price first; or (iii) Your competitor sets price first. If you could choose among these options, which would you prefer? Explain why.

Two firms produce luxury sheepskin auto seat covers: Western Where (WW) and B.B.B. Sheep (BBBS). Each firm has a cost function given by \\[ C(q)=30 q+1.5 q^{2} \\] The market demand for these seat covers is represented by the inverse demand equation \\[ P=300-3 Q \\] where \(Q=q_{1}+q_{2},\) total output. a. If each firm acts to maximize its profits, taking its rival's output as given (i.e., the firms behave as Cournot oligopolists), what will be the equilibrium quantities selected by each firm? What is total output, and what is the market price? What are the profits for each firm? b. It occurs to the managers of WW and BBBS that they could do a lot better by colluding. If the two firms collude, what will be the profit-maximizing choice of output? The industry price? The output and the profit for each firm in this case? c. The managers of these firms realize that explicit agreements to collude are illegal. Each firm must decide on its own whether to produce the Cournot quantity or the cartel quantity. To aid in making the decision, the manager of \(\mathrm{WW}\) constructs a payoff matrix like the one below. Fill in each box with the profit of \(\mathrm{WW}\) and the profit of BBBS. Given this payoff matrix, what output strategy is each firm likely to pursue? d. Suppose WW can set its output level before BBBS does. How much will WW choose to produce in this case? How much will BBBS produce? What is the market price, and what is the profit for each firm? Is WW better off by choosing its output first? Explain why or why not.

A monopolist can produce at a constant average (and marginal) cost of \(\mathrm{AC}=\mathrm{MC}=\$ 5 .\) It faces a market demand curve given by \(Q=53-P\) a. Calculate the profit-maximizing price and quantity for this monopolist. Also calculate its profits. b. Suppose a second firm enters the market. Let \(Q_{1}\) be the output of the first firm and \(Q_{2}\) be the output of the second. Market demand is now given by \\[ Q_{1}+Q_{2}=53-P \\] Assuming that this second firm has the same costs as the first, write the profits of each firm as functions of \(Q_{1}\) and \(Q_{2}\) c. Suppose (as in the Cournot model) that each firm chooses its profit- maximizing level of output on the assumption that its competitor's output is fixed. Find each firm's "reaction curve" (i.e., the rule that gives its desired output in terms of its competitor's output). d. Calculate the Cournot equilibrium (i.e., the values of \(Q_{1}\) and \(Q_{2}\) for which each firm is doing as well as it can given its competitor's output). What are the resulting market price and profits of each firm? *e. Suppose there are \(N\) firms in the industry, all with the same constant marginal cost, \(\mathrm{MC}=\$ 5 .\) Find the Cournot equilibrium. How much will each firm produce, what will be the market price, and how much profit will each firm earn? Also, show that as N becomes large, the market price approaches the price that would prevail under perfect competition.

Suppose the airline industry consisted of only two firms: American and Texas Air Corp. Let the two firms have identical cost functions, \(C(q)=40 q\). Assume that the demand curve for the industry is given by \(P=100-Q\) and that each firm expects the other to behave as a Cournot competitor. a. Calculate the Cournot-Nash equilibrium for each firm, assuming that each chooses the output level that maximizes its profits when taking its rival's output as given. What are the profits of each firm? b. What would be the equilibrium quantity if Texas Air had constant marginal and average costs of \(\$ 25\) and American had constant marginal and average costs of \(\$ 40 ?\) c. Assuming that both firms have the original cost function, \(C(q)=40 q,\) how much should Texas Air be willing to invest to lower its marginal cost from 40 to \(25,\) assuming that American will not follow suit? How much should American be willing to spend to reduce its marginal cost to \(25,\) assuming that Texas Air will have marginal costs of 25 regardless of American's actions?

Suppose that two identical firms produce widgets and that they are the only firms in the market. Their costs are given by \(C_{1}=60 Q_{1}\) and \(C_{2}=60 Q_{2},\) where \(Q_{1}\) is the output of Firm 1 and \(Q_{2}\) the output of Firm 2. Price is determined by the following demand curve: \\[ \begin{aligned} P &=300-Q \\ \text { where } Q=Q_{1}+Q_{2} \end{aligned} \\] a. Find the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Calculate the profit of each firm at this equilibrium. b. Suppose the two firms form a cartel to maximize joint profits. How many widgets will be produced? Calculate each firm's profit. c. Suppose Firm 1 were the only firm in the industry. How would market output and Firm 1's profit differ from that found in part (b) above? d. Returning to the duopoly of part (b), suppose Firm 1 abides by the agreement but Firm 2 cheats by increasing production. How many widgets will Firm 2 produce? What will be each firm's profits?

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