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Suppose the market for tennis shoes has one dominant firm and five fringe firms. The market demand is \(Q=400-2 P .\) The dominant firm has a constant marginal cost of \(20 .\) The fringe firms each have a marginal cost of \(\mathrm{MC}=20+5 q\) a. Verify that the total supply curve for the five fringe firms is \(Q_{f}=P-20\) b. Find the dominant firm's demand curve. c. Find the profit-maximizing quantity produced and price charged by the dominant firm, and the quantity produced and price charged by each of the fringe firms. d. Suppose there are 10 fringe firms instead of five. How does this change your results? e. Suppose there continue to be five fringe firms but that each manages to reduce its marginal cost to \(\mathrm{MC}=20+2 q\). How does this change your results?

Short Answer

Expert verified
For a variety of setups, the dominant firm produced 360 units and priced them at $20 per unit, while the fringe firms would not produce anything.

Step by step solution

01

Verify the total supply curve for the five fringe firms

The marginal cost curve of each fringe firm is given as \(MC = 20 + 5q\), where \(q\) is the quantity supplied by each firm. Supply equals marginal cost for firms in perfect competition, so the supply equation for each firm is \(q = P/5 - 4\). Now, for five such firms, the total quantity supplied by the fringe firms would be \(Q_f = 5q\). This yields \(Q_f = 5(P/5 - 4) = P - 20\) as required.
02

Find the dominant firm's demand curve

The dominant firm's demand is the difference between the market demand and the fringe firms' supply. Thus, subtracting the total quantity supplied by the fringe firms from the market demand, we have \(Q_D = Q - Q_f = 400 - 2P - (P - 20) = 420 - 3P\). This is the demand curve for the dominant firm.
03

Find the profit-maximizing quantity and price

For the dominant firm, profit maximization occurs where MC equals the price derived from the demand curve. The MC is constant at 20. From the demand curve of the dominant firm which is \(Q_D = 420 - 3P\), setting \(P = MC = 20\) yields \(Q_D = 420 - 3*20 = 360\) which is the quantity produced by the dominant firm. The fringe firms collectively supply \(Q_f = P - 20 = 20 - 20 = 0\). This indicates that the firms are producing at their minimum supply point to avoid a loss.
04

Changes with 10 fringe firms

If the number of fringe firms increases to 10, the total supply curve becomes \(Q_f = 10q = 10(P/5 - 4) = 2P - 40\). Substituting this into the market demand curve to get the new demand curve of the dominant firm, we get \(Q_D = 400 - 2P - (2P - 40) = 440 - 4P\). MC still equals price, therefore, setting \(P = 20\) yields \(Q_D = 440 - 4*20 = 360\), same as before. Now, the fringe firms supply \(Q_f = 2P - 40 = 2*20 - 40 = 0\), indicating that they still produce at their minimum supply point.
05

Reduced marginal cost of the fringe firms

If the marginal cost of fringe firms reduces to \(MC = 20 + 2q\), then their supply curve becomes \(q = P/2 - 10\). This results in a total supply curve of \(Q_f = 5(P/2 - 10) = 2.5P - 50\). The demand curve of the dominant firm then shifts to \(Q_D = 400 - 2P - (2.5P - 50) = 450 - 4.5P\). MC still equals price, therefore, setting \(P = 20\) yields \(Q_D = 450 - 4.5*20 = 360\), same as before. The fringe firms now supply \(Q_f = 2.5P - 50 = 2.5*20 - 50 = 0\), indicating that they still produce at their minimum supply point.

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Key Concepts

These are the key concepts you need to understand to accurately answer the question.

Marginal Cost
Understanding marginal cost is crucial in analyzing how firms make production decisions. Marginal cost is the additional cost incurred when producing one more unit of a good. For a firm, a constant marginal cost means that each additional unit produced costs the same to make. In our scenario, the dominant firm has a marginal cost of 20. This means for every extra pair of tennis shoes produced, the cost remains steady at 20 dollars.

Each of the fringe firms has a different situation. Their marginal cost equation is given by \(MC = 20 + 5q\), where \(q\) represents the quantity supplied by each firm. This implies that the cost of production for these firms increases with the production quantity. Understanding this helps us to see why fringe firms may not produce large volumes independently, as it becomes increasingly expensive for them.
  • The constant marginal cost for the dominant firm allows it to predict costs accurately and assist in setting competitive prices.
  • For fringe firms, increasing marginal costs restrict them from scaling production without facing significant cost hikes.
Market Demand
Market demand is the total quantity of a product consumers are willing to purchase at various price levels in a theoretical market. In this framework, the market demand for tennis shoes is expressed with the equation \(Q = 400 - 2P\), where \(Q\) stands for quantity demanded and \(P\) is the price.

This inverse relationship means as the price of the tennis shoes increases, the overall quantity demanded decreases, which is a typical economic pattern. The dominant firm's strategy revolves around gauging this market demand to decide its output level and pricing strategy.

In a market dominated by one firm and several small fringe firms, the dominant firm can influence market dynamics significantly. By assessing the market demand, this firm can decide on a production level that maximizes its profits by aligning production costs and consumer demand effectively. The dominant firm's decision-making relies heavily on understanding the total market demand to carve out its slice efficiently.
  • Market demand helps predict consumer behavior and informs production and pricing.
  • The dominant firm's understanding of demand allows them to control market shares by adjusting their output.
Fringe Firms Supply
In a market where several smaller companies operate alongside a dominant firm, these smaller companies are referred to as fringe firms. Each fringe firm's supply is linked to its marginal cost structure, where the total supply impacts the market as a whole.

Originally, with five fringe firms each having a supply equation of \(q = P/5 - 4\), their collective supply equation becomes \(Q_f = P - 20\). This equation illustrates how the fringe firms' supply contributes to the market, acting externally to the dominant firm's production.

When changes occur, such as having 10 fringe firms, this equation shifts to \(Q_f = 2P - 40\), revealing how increased competition affects the supply curve. However, the presence of fringe firms doesn't always guarantee a change in output when their ability to produce at minimal costs is limited, as reducing their marginal cost to \(MC = 20 + 2q\) again reveals when leading to a new supply equation \(Q_f = 2.5P - 50\).
  • Fringe firms' supply is more sensitive to changes in marginal cost and number of firms than the dominant firm.
  • Increasing fringe firm presence shifts the overall market supply, but their capacity to undercut the dominant firm depends on their internal costs.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Two firms produce luxury sheepskin auto seat covers: Western Where (WW) and B.B.B. Sheep (BBBS). Each firm has a cost function given by \\[ C(q)=30 q+1.5 q^{2} \\] The market demand for these seat covers is represented by the inverse demand equation \\[ P=300-3 Q \\] where \(Q=q_{1}+q_{2},\) total output. a. If each firm acts to maximize its profits, taking its rival's output as given (i.e., the firms behave as Cournot oligopolists), what will be the equilibrium quantities selected by each firm? What is total output, and what is the market price? What are the profits for each firm? b. It occurs to the managers of WW and BBBS that they could do a lot better by colluding. If the two firms collude, what will be the profit-maximizing choice of output? The industry price? The output and the profit for each firm in this case? c. The managers of these firms realize that explicit agreements to collude are illegal. Each firm must decide on its own whether to produce the Cournot quantity or the cartel quantity. To aid in making the decision, the manager of \(\mathrm{WW}\) constructs a payoff matrix like the one below. Fill in each box with the profit of \(\mathrm{WW}\) and the profit of BBBS. Given this payoff matrix, what output strategy is each firm likely to pursue? d. Suppose WW can set its output level before BBBS does. How much will WW choose to produce in this case? How much will BBBS produce? What is the market price, and what is the profit for each firm? Is WW better off by choosing its output first? Explain why or why not.

Suppose that two identical firms produce widgets and that they are the only firms in the market. Their costs are given by \(C_{1}=60 Q_{1}\) and \(C_{2}=60 Q_{2},\) where \(Q_{1}\) is the output of Firm 1 and \(Q_{2}\) the output of Firm 2. Price is determined by the following demand curve: \\[ \begin{aligned} P &=300-Q \\ \text { where } Q=Q_{1}+Q_{2} \end{aligned} \\] a. Find the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Calculate the profit of each firm at this equilibrium. b. Suppose the two firms form a cartel to maximize joint profits. How many widgets will be produced? Calculate each firm's profit. c. Suppose Firm 1 were the only firm in the industry. How would market output and Firm 1's profit differ from that found in part (b) above? d. Returning to the duopoly of part (b), suppose Firm 1 abides by the agreement but Firm 2 cheats by increasing production. How many widgets will Firm 2 produce? What will be each firm's profits?

Demand for light bulbs can be characterized by \(Q=100-P,\) where \(Q\) is in millions of boxes of lights sold and \(P\) is the price per box. There are two producers of lights, Everglow and Dimlit. They have identical cost functions: \\[ \begin{array}{c} C_{i}=10 Q_{i}+\frac{1}{2} Q_{i}^{2}(i=E, D) \\ Q=Q_{E}+Q_{D} \end{array} \\] a. Unable to recognize the potential for collusion, the two firms act as short-run perfect competitors. What are the equilibrium values of \(Q_{E}, Q_{D},\) and \(P ?\) What are each firm's profits? b. Top management in both firms is replaced. Each new manager independently recognizes the oligopolistic nature of the light bulb industry and plays Cournot. What are the equilibrium values of \(Q_{E}\) \(Q_{D},\) and \(P ?\) What are each firm's profits? c. Suppose the Everglow manager guesses correctly that Dimlit is playing Cournot, so Everglow plays Stackelberg. What are the equilibrium values of \(Q_{E}\) \(Q_{D},\) and \(P ?\) What are each firm's profits? d. If the managers of the two companies collude, what are the equilibrium values of \(Q_{E}, Q_{D},\) and \(P ?\) What are each firm's profits?

A lemon-growing cartel consists of four orchards. Their total cost functions are \\[ \begin{array}{l} \mathrm{TC}_{1}=20+5 Q_{1}^{2} \\ \mathrm{TC}_{2}=25+3 Q_{2}^{2} \\ \mathrm{TC}_{3}=15+4 Q_{3}^{2} \\ \mathrm{TC}_{4}=20+6 Q_{4}^{2} \end{array} \\] \(\mathrm{TC}\) is in hundreds of dollars, and \(Q\) is in cartons per month picked and shipped. a. Tabulate total, average, and marginal costs for each firm for output levels between 1 and 5 cartons per month (i.e., for \(1,2,3,4,\) and 5 cartons). b. If the cartel decided to ship 10 cartons per month and set a price of \(\$ 25\) per carton, how should output be allocated among the firms? c. At this shipping level, which firm has the most incentive to cheat? Does any firm not have an incentive to cheat?

The dominant firm model can help us understand the behavior of some cartels. Let's apply this model to the OPEC oil cartel. We will use isoelastic curves to describe world demand \(W\) and noncartel (competitive supply \(S\). Reasonable numbers for the price elasticities of world demand and noncartel supply are \(-1 / 2\) and \(1 / 2,\) respectively. Then, expressing \(W\) and \(S\) in millions of barrels per day \((\mathrm{mb} / \mathrm{d}),\) we could write \\[ W=160 P^{-1 / 2} \\] and \\[ S=\left(3 \frac{1}{3}\right) P^{1 / 2} \\] Note that OPEC's net demand is \(D=W-S\) a. Draw the world demand curve \(W\), the non-OPEC supply curve \(S,\) OPEC's net demand curve \(D,\) and OPEC's marginal revenue curve. For purposes of approximation, assume OPEC's production cost is zero. Indicate OPEC's optimal price, OPEC's optimal production, and non-OPEC production on the diagram. Now, show on the diagram how the various curves will shift and how OPEC's optimal price will change if non-OPEC supply becomes more expensive because reserves of oil start running out. b. Calculate OPEC's optimal (profit-maximizing) price. (Hint: Because OPEC's cost is zero, just write the expression for OPEC revenue and find the price that maximizes it.) c. Suppose the oil-consuming countries were to unite and form a "buyers' cartel" to gain monopsony power. What can we say, and what can't we say, about the impact this action would have on price?

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