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Two firms compete by choosing price. Their demand functions are \\[ Q_{1}=20-P_{1}+P_{2} \\] and \\[ Q_{2}=20+P_{1}-P_{2} \\] where \(P_{1}\) and \(P_{2}\) are the prices charged by each firm, respectively, and \(Q_{1}\) and \(Q_{2}\) are the resulting demands. Note that the demand for each good depends only on the difference in prices; if the two firms colluded and set the same price, they could make that price as high as they wanted, and earn infinite profits. Marginal costs are zero. a. Suppose the two firms set their prices at the same time. Find the resulting Nash equilibrium. What price will each firm charge, how much will it sell, and what will its profit be? (Hint: Maximize the profit of each firm with respect to its price.) b. Suppose Firm 1 sets its price first and then Firm 2 sets its price. What price will each firm charge, how much will it sell, and what will its profit be? c. Suppose you are one of these firms and that there are three ways you could play the game: (i) Both firms set price at the same time; (ii) You set price first; or (iii) Your competitor sets price first. If you could choose among these options, which would you prefer? Explain why.

Short Answer

Expert verified
The Nash equilibrium prices, quantities, and profits for each scenario are calculated by maximizing the profit functions using the demand functions provided. The preferred strategy depends on which scenario results in the highest profit for each firm.

Step by step solution

01

Calculating the Nash Equilibrium for Simultaneous Pricing

Firstly both firms maximize their profits, supposing the other firm's action is given. For zero marginal costs, the profit of a firm is just the firm’s price times the quantity it sells, namely \( \Pi_{i}=P_{i}Q_{i} \). Firm 1 maximizes: \( \Pi_{1}=P_{1}(20-P_{1}+P_{2}) \) and Firm 2 maximizes: \( \Pi_{2}=P_{2}(20+P_{1}-P_{2}) \). To find the best responses, take the first derivatives with respect to own price and setting equal to zero. This allows us to find the prices \( P_{1} \) and \( P_{2} \) that maximize the profit for each firm.
02

Substituting and Calculating the Equilibrium Prices and Profits

Solving the equations from step 1, allows us to find the Nash equilibrium which is the price combination ( \( P_{1} \), \( P_{2} \)) where neither firm would want to deviate, given the price of the other. The equilibrium quantities and profits can also be calculated using these equilibrium prices.
03

Calculating for Sequential Pricing

Here, we suppose Firm 1 sets its price first (it becomes the leader) and then Firm 2 sets its price. Find the best response of Firm 2 as in step 1 but by treating \( P_{1} \) as a given. Substitute this into the profit function of firm 1 and maximize it with respect to \( P_{1} \) to obtain \( P_{1} \). The resulting equilibrium prices, quantities and profits can also be calculated for this scenario.
04

Selecting Optimal Strategy Given three Options

Analyzing the results of the previous steps, decide which scenario yields the highest profit for a firm. Consider the three available options: (i) Both firms set price at the same time; (ii) Firm sets price first; or (iii) competitor sets price first.

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Key Concepts

These are the key concepts you need to understand to accurately answer the question.

Cournot Competition
In a Cournot competition, companies determine their output quantity in order to maximize their profits, considering the quantity choices of their competitors.
This model is built on the assumption that companies choose how much to produce, and not the price itself.
The result is a Nash equilibrium, where each firm's output decision is optimal given the output decision of other firms.
  • Firms simultaneously decide their output levels.
  • The market price is determined by the total output of all firms.
  • Each firm decides the best production level by assuming competitors' production will remain constant.
In our original exercise, the concept of Cournot competition can be indirectly applied by analyzing each firm's output or pricing decision with respect to the other.
Essentially, though it appears like pricing competition, each firm carefully chooses their pricing strategy by estimating how the other firm will react.
This strategic interaction leads to a stable state or Nash equilibrium where neither firm wishes to change their decision.
Sequential Pricing
Sequential pricing occurs when firms take turns setting prices, moving away from simultaneous decision-making.
This results in a dynamic strategic interaction, typically modeled using the Stackelberg leadership model.
  • The first firm (the leader) sets its price first.
  • The second firm (the follower) observes the leader's decision and optimizes its price accordingly.
  • Sequential decisions often give the leader an advantage, as they can anticipate and incorporate the follower's reactions.
In the exercise, Firm 1 sets its price first, making it the leader, and Firm 2 sets its price after observing Firm 1's choice.
This strategic positioning allows Firm 1 to potentially enjoy higher profits by factoring in Firm 2's likely response into its price setting.
The result is a new equilibrium different from the one found in simultaneous pricing, often resulting in a more advantageous position for the leader.
Profit Maximization
Profit maximization entails choosing the price or quantity that leads to the highest possible profit.
Companies in competitive markets constantly analyze and adjust their pricing strategies to balance supply and demand, all while considering costs.
  • Profits are maximized by setting the derivative of the profit function with respect to price or quantity to zero.
  • The demand function of a firm, reliant on its pricing and that of its competitor, plays a crucial role.
  • Firms aim to set prices where total revenue is highest above the total cost, leading to maximum profit.
In the exercise, both firms optimize their profits based on zero marginal costs, thus profit is simply the firm's price times the quantity sold.
By solving equations to find optimal pricing strategies, each firm determines a strategic price that maximizes its own profit given the competitor's probable actions.
The process showcases how businesses arrive at pricing decisions by leveraging calculus to find where profits plateau, which is the goal in profit maximization.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Suppose that two competing firms, \(A\) and \(B\), produce a homogeneous good. Both firms have a marginal cost of \(\mathrm{MC}=\$ 50 .\) Describe what would happen to output and price in each of the following situations if the firms are at (i) Cournot equilibrium, (ii) collusive equilibrium, and (iii) Bertrand equilibrium. a. Because Firm \(A\) must increase wages, its \(\mathrm{MC}\) increases to \(\$ 80\). b. The marginal cost of both firms increases. c. The demand curve shifts to the right.

Two firms compete in selling identical widgets. They choose their output levels \(Q_{1}\) and \(Q_{2}\) simultaneously and face the demand curve \\[ P=30-Q \\] where \(Q=Q_{1}+Q_{2}\). Until recently, both firms had zero marginal costs. Recent environmental regulations have increased Firm 2 's marginal cost to \(\$ 15 .\) Firm 1 's marginal cost remains constant at zero. True or false: As a result, the market price will rise to the monopoly level.

Demand for light bulbs can be characterized by \(Q=100-P,\) where \(Q\) is in millions of boxes of lights sold and \(P\) is the price per box. There are two producers of lights, Everglow and Dimlit. They have identical cost functions: \\[ \begin{array}{c} C_{i}=10 Q_{i}+\frac{1}{2} Q_{i}^{2}(i=E, D) \\ Q=Q_{E}+Q_{D} \end{array} \\] a. Unable to recognize the potential for collusion, the two firms act as short-run perfect competitors. What are the equilibrium values of \(Q_{E}, Q_{D},\) and \(P ?\) What are each firm's profits? b. Top management in both firms is replaced. Each new manager independently recognizes the oligopolistic nature of the light bulb industry and plays Cournot. What are the equilibrium values of \(Q_{E}\) \(Q_{D},\) and \(P ?\) What are each firm's profits? c. Suppose the Everglow manager guesses correctly that Dimlit is playing Cournot, so Everglow plays Stackelberg. What are the equilibrium values of \(Q_{E}\) \(Q_{D},\) and \(P ?\) What are each firm's profits? d. If the managers of the two companies collude, what are the equilibrium values of \(Q_{E}, Q_{D},\) and \(P ?\) What are each firm's profits?

A monopolist can produce at a constant average (and marginal) cost of \(\mathrm{AC}=\mathrm{MC}=\$ 5 .\) It faces a market demand curve given by \(Q=53-P\) a. Calculate the profit-maximizing price and quantity for this monopolist. Also calculate its profits. b. Suppose a second firm enters the market. Let \(Q_{1}\) be the output of the first firm and \(Q_{2}\) be the output of the second. Market demand is now given by \\[ Q_{1}+Q_{2}=53-P \\] Assuming that this second firm has the same costs as the first, write the profits of each firm as functions of \(Q_{1}\) and \(Q_{2}\) c. Suppose (as in the Cournot model) that each firm chooses its profit- maximizing level of output on the assumption that its competitor's output is fixed. Find each firm's "reaction curve" (i.e., the rule that gives its desired output in terms of its competitor's output). d. Calculate the Cournot equilibrium (i.e., the values of \(Q_{1}\) and \(Q_{2}\) for which each firm is doing as well as it can given its competitor's output). What are the resulting market price and profits of each firm? *e. Suppose there are \(N\) firms in the industry, all with the same constant marginal cost, \(\mathrm{MC}=\$ 5 .\) Find the Cournot equilibrium. How much will each firm produce, what will be the market price, and how much profit will each firm earn? Also, show that as N becomes large, the market price approaches the price that would prevail under perfect competition.

The dominant firm model can help us understand the behavior of some cartels. Let's apply this model to the OPEC oil cartel. We will use isoelastic curves to describe world demand \(W\) and noncartel (competitive supply \(S\). Reasonable numbers for the price elasticities of world demand and noncartel supply are \(-1 / 2\) and \(1 / 2,\) respectively. Then, expressing \(W\) and \(S\) in millions of barrels per day \((\mathrm{mb} / \mathrm{d}),\) we could write \\[ W=160 P^{-1 / 2} \\] and \\[ S=\left(3 \frac{1}{3}\right) P^{1 / 2} \\] Note that OPEC's net demand is \(D=W-S\) a. Draw the world demand curve \(W\), the non-OPEC supply curve \(S,\) OPEC's net demand curve \(D,\) and OPEC's marginal revenue curve. For purposes of approximation, assume OPEC's production cost is zero. Indicate OPEC's optimal price, OPEC's optimal production, and non-OPEC production on the diagram. Now, show on the diagram how the various curves will shift and how OPEC's optimal price will change if non-OPEC supply becomes more expensive because reserves of oil start running out. b. Calculate OPEC's optimal (profit-maximizing) price. (Hint: Because OPEC's cost is zero, just write the expression for OPEC revenue and find the price that maximizes it.) c. Suppose the oil-consuming countries were to unite and form a "buyers' cartel" to gain monopsony power. What can we say, and what can't we say, about the impact this action would have on price?

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