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To promote competition and consumer welfare, the Federal Trade Commission requires firms to advertise truthfully. How does truth in advertising promote competition? Why would a market be less competitive if firms advertised deceptively?

Short Answer

Expert verified
Truth in advertising promotes competition by leveling the playing field, encouraging firms to innovate, improve product quality and maintain fair pricing. Deceptive advertising, on the other hand, disrupts these competition dynamics by creating market inefficiencies, undermining consumer trust and discouraging fair competition.

Step by step solution

01

Understanding the Role of Advertising

Advertising is a significant tool for businesses to communicate with potential customers about their products or services. In a competitive market, it helps distribute information about differences between competing products, which, in turn, allows consumers to make informed buying decisions.
02

Impact of Truthful Advertising

When firms advertise truthfully, they provide accurate and reliable information about their products or services. This increases the consumers' trust in the products, encourages competition as businesses strive to improve their offerings, resulting in increased consumer welfare due to better products and services or competitive prices. Thus, a transparent information flow is essential for the health of a competitive market.
03

The Consequences of Deceptive Advertising

If firms advertised deceptively, they would be providing false or misleading information about their products or services. This could lead consumers to make suboptimal purchasing decisions, creating a market inefficiency. Additionally, it would introduce an unfair advantage for the deceiving firm, undermining competition as competitors may lose customers due to the deceptive advertisements. Hence, a market saturated with deceptive advertising is likely to be less competitive.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Two used car dealerships compete side by side on a main road. The first, Harry's Cars, always sells high quality cars that it carefully inspects and, if necessary, services. On average, it costs Harry's \(\$ 8000\) to buy and service each car that it sells. The second dealership, Lew's Motors, always sells lower-quality cars. On average, it costs Lew's only \(\$ 5000\) for each car that it sells. If consumers knew the quality of the used cars they were buying, they would pay \(\$ 10,000\) on average for Harry's cars and only \(\$ 7000\) on average for Lew's cars. Without more information, consumers do not know the quality of each dealership's cars. In this case, they would figure that they have a \(50-50\) chance of ending up with a high-quality car and are thus willing to pay \(\$ 8500\) for a car. Harry has an idea: He will offer a bumper-to bumper warranty for all cars that he sells. He knows that a warranty lasting \(Y\) years will cost \(\$ 500 Y\) on average, and he also knows that if Lew tries to offer the same warranty, it will cost Lew \(\$ 1000 Y\) on average. a. Suppose Harry offers a one-year warranty on all of the cars he sells. i. What is Lew's profit if he does not offer a oneyear warranty? If he does offer a one-year warranty? ii. What is Harry's profit if Lew does not offer a one-year warranty? If he does offer a one-year warranty? iii. Will Lew's match Harry's one-year warranty? iv. Is it a good idea for Harry to offer a one-year warranty? b. What if Harry offers a two-year warranty? Will this offer generate a credible signal of quality? What about a three-year warranty? c. If you were advising Harry, how long a warranty would you urge him to offer? Explain why.

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A firm's short-run revenue is given by \(R=10 e-e^{2}\) where \(e\) is the level of effort by a typical worker (all workers are assumed to be identical). A worker chooses his level of effort to maximize wage less effort \(w-e\) (the per-unit cost of effort is assumed to be 1 ). Determine the level of effort and the level of profit (reventue less wage paid) for each of the following wage arrangements. Explain why these different principalagent relationships generate different outcomes. a. \(w=2\) for \(e \geq 1\); otherwise \(w=0\) b. \(w=R / 2\) \(\mathbf{c}, w=R-12.5\)

A major university bans the assignment of \(D\) or \(F\) grades. It defends its action by claiming that students tend to perform above average when they are free from the pressures of flunking out. The university states that it wants all its students to get As and Bs. If the goal is to raise overall grades to the B level or above, is this a good policy? Discuss this policy with respect to the problem of moral hazard.

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