Warning: foreach() argument must be of type array|object, bool given in /var/www/html/web/app/themes/studypress-core-theme/template-parts/header/mobile-offcanvas.php on line 20

Professor Jones has just been hired by the economics department at a major university. The president of the board of regents has stated that the university is committed to providing top-quality education for undergraduates. Two months into the semester, Jones fails to show up for his classes. It seems he is devoting all his time to research rather than to teaching. Jones argues that his research will bring prestige to the department and the university. Should he be allowed to continue exclusively with research? Discuss with reference to the principal-agent problem.

Short Answer

Expert verified
The principle-agent problem arises when the agent's interests contradict the principal's. In this case, the University, as the principal, should negotiate a solution where Professor Jones can fulfill his teaching duties and also engage in his research. It helps in ensuring a high-quality education and potentially raising the university's prestige.

Step by step solution

01

Understanding the Principal-Agent Problem

In a principal-agent relationship, the principal hires the agent to perform a service on their behalf. However, conflicts can arise if the agent's interests do not align with the principal's. The principal here is the university and the agent is Professor Jones. The university wants to provide excellent education while Professor Jones is interested in his research.
02

Analyze the Competing Interests

The University clearly wishes to prioritize high-quality undergraduate education. This requires active and consistent professor involvement, which Professor Jones is not providing. On the other hand, Professor Jones argues that his research will bring prestige to the university. Both sides have valid points, and their interests must be thoroughly evaluated.
03

Evaluate the Short-term and Long-term Impacts

In the short-term, failing to teach classes could potentially harm the students' education quality. This contradicts the university's mission. However, in the long-term, if Jones's research brings prestige to the university, it could potentially attract more applications, improve university rankings, and correspond to better opportunities for students.
04

Propose a Possible Solution

A possible solution might be to require Professor Jones to meet the minimum teaching responsibilities while prioritizing his research. This way, he can contribute to the university's reputation by his research and also fulfill his teaching duties.

Unlock Step-by-Step Solutions & Ace Your Exams!

  • Full Textbook Solutions

    Get detailed explanations and key concepts

  • Unlimited Al creation

    Al flashcards, explanations, exams and more...

  • Ads-free access

    To over 500 millions flashcards

  • Money-back guarantee

    We refund you if you fail your exam.

Over 30 million students worldwide already upgrade their learning with Vaia!

One App. One Place for Learning.

All the tools & learning materials you need for study success - in one app.

Get started for free

Most popular questions from this chapter

To promote competition and consumer welfare, the Federal Trade Commission requires firms to advertise truthfully. How does truth in advertising promote competition? Why would a market be less competitive if firms advertised deceptively?

UNIVERSAL SAVINGS \& LOAN has \(\$ 1000\) to lend. Risk-free loans will be paid back in full next year with \(4 \%\) interest. Risky loans have a \(20 \%\) chance of defaulting (paying back nothing) and an \(80 \%\) chance of paying back in full with \(30 \%\) interest. a. How much profit can the lending institution expect to earn? Show that the expected profits are the same whether the lending institution makes risky or riskfree loans. b. Now suppose that the lending institution knows that the government will "bail out" UNIVERSAL if there is a default (paying back the original \(\$ 1000\) ). What type of loans will the lending institution choose to make? What is the expected cost to the government? c. Suppose that the lending institution doesn't know for sure that there will be a bail out, but one will occur with probability \(P\), For what values of \(P\) will the lending institution make risky loans?

Two used car dealerships compete side by side on a main road. The first, Harry's Cars, always sells high quality cars that it carefully inspects and, if necessary, services. On average, it costs Harry's \(\$ 8000\) to buy and service each car that it sells. The second dealership, Lew's Motors, always sells lower-quality cars. On average, it costs Lew's only \(\$ 5000\) for each car that it sells. If consumers knew the quality of the used cars they were buying, they would pay \(\$ 10,000\) on average for Harry's cars and only \(\$ 7000\) on average for Lew's cars. Without more information, consumers do not know the quality of each dealership's cars. In this case, they would figure that they have a \(50-50\) chance of ending up with a high-quality car and are thus willing to pay \(\$ 8500\) for a car. Harry has an idea: He will offer a bumper-to bumper warranty for all cars that he sells. He knows that a warranty lasting \(Y\) years will cost \(\$ 500 Y\) on average, and he also knows that if Lew tries to offer the same warranty, it will cost Lew \(\$ 1000 Y\) on average. a. Suppose Harry offers a one-year warranty on all of the cars he sells. i. What is Lew's profit if he does not offer a oneyear warranty? If he does offer a one-year warranty? ii. What is Harry's profit if Lew does not offer a one-year warranty? If he does offer a one-year warranty? iii. Will Lew's match Harry's one-year warranty? iv. Is it a good idea for Harry to offer a one-year warranty? b. What if Harry offers a two-year warranty? Will this offer generate a credible signal of quality? What about a three-year warranty? c. If you were advising Harry, how long a warranty would you urge him to offer? Explain why.

Faced with a reputation for producing automobiles with poor repair records, a number of American companies have offered extensive guarantees to car purchasers (e.g., a seven-year warranty on all parts and labor associated with mechanical problems). a. In light of your knowledge of the lemons market, why is this a reasonable policy? b. Is the policy likely to create a moral hazard probIem? Explain.

A firm's short-run revenue is given by \(R=10 e-e^{2}\) where \(e\) is the level of effort by a typical worker (all workers are assumed to be identical). A worker chooses his level of effort to maximize wage less effort \(w-e\) (the per-unit cost of effort is assumed to be 1 ). Determine the level of effort and the level of profit (reventue less wage paid) for each of the following wage arrangements. Explain why these different principalagent relationships generate different outcomes. a. \(w=2\) for \(e \geq 1\); otherwise \(w=0\) b. \(w=R / 2\) \(\mathbf{c}, w=R-12.5\)

See all solutions

Recommended explanations on Economics Textbooks

View all explanations

What do you think about this solution?

We value your feedback to improve our textbook solutions.

Study anywhere. Anytime. Across all devices.

Sign-up for free