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Suppose an individual knows that the prices of a particular color TV have a uniform distribution between \(\$ 300\) and \(\$ 400\). The individual sets out to obtain price quotes by phone. a. Calculate the expected minimum price paid if this individual calls \(n\) stores for price quotes. b. Show that the expected price paid declines with \(n\), but at a diminishing rate. c. Suppose phone calls cost \(\$ 2\) in terms of time and effort. How many calls should this individual make in order to maximize his or her gain from search?

Short Answer

Expert verified
Answer: The individual should call 5 stores to maximize their gain from search.

Step by step solution

01

Calculate the expected minimum price for uniform distribution

For a uniform distribution between \(a\) (lower limit) and \(b\) (upper limit), the probability density function (pdf) is given by: \(f(x) = \frac{1}{(b-a)}\) for \(a \leq x \leq b\) Here, lower limit (a) = \(300\) and upper limit (b) = \(400\) The expected minimum price, when calling 'n' stores, will be the minimum of 'n' random variables with the same uniform distribution. We will denote this as \(E(M_n)\), where \(M_n\) is the minimum value of the 'n' uniform random variables. To find \(E(M_n)\), we will first calculate the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of \(M_n\) and then differentiate it to get the pdf of \(M_n\). Finally, we'll calculate the expected value.
02

Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of \(M_n\)

The CDF of \(M_n\), denoted as \(F_{M_n}(x)\), represents the probability that the minimum price is less than or equal to x. In our case, x falls between \(300\) and \(400\), and the individual calls 'n' stores. \(F_{M_n}(x) = P(M_n \leq x) = 1 - P(M_n > x)\) Since \(M_n\) is the minimum value of the 'n\( independent uniform random variables, the probability that \)M_n > x$ is equal to the product of the probabilities that all 'n' random variables are greater than 'x': \(P(M_n > x) = P(X_1 > x) * P(X_2 > x) * ... * P(X_n > x)\) For the uniform distribution mentioned previously, we know that: \(P(X_i > x) = \frac{b-x}{b-a}\) for \(a \leq x \leq b\) Therefore, \(P(M_n > x) = \left(\frac{b-x}{b-a}\right)^n\) And thus, \(F_{M_n}(x) = 1 - \left(\frac{b-x}{b-a}\right)^n\)
03

Probability Density Function (pdf) of \(M_n\)

To find the pdf of \(M_n\), denoted as \(f_{M_n}(x)\), we need to differentiate the CDF \(F_{M_n}(x)\) with respect to \(x\): \(f_{M_n}(x) = \frac{d}{dx} F_{M_n}(x) = \frac{d}{dx} \left[ 1 - \left(\frac{b-x}{b-a}\right)^n \right]\) \(f_{M_n}(x) = n\left(\frac{1}{b-a}\right)\left(\frac{b-x}{b-a}\right)^{n-1}\)
04

Expected value of \(M_n\)

Finally, we calculate the expected minimum price paid after calling 'n' stores, \(E(M_n)\): \(E(M_n) = \int_{a}^{b} x f_{M_n}(x) dx\) \(E(M_n) = \int_{300}^{400} x \cdot n\left(\frac{1}{b-a}\right)\left(\frac{b-x}{b-a}\right)^{n-1} dx\) After solving this integral, we get: \(E(M_n) = \frac{300n + 400}{n+1}\)
05

Show expected price declines with 'n' at a diminishing rate

To show that the expected price declines with 'n' at a diminishing rate, we can find the first and second derivatives of \(E(M_n)\) with respect to 'n'. First derivative: \(\frac{dE(M_n)}{dn} = - \frac{100}{(n+1)^2} < 0\) Since the first derivative is negative, it indicates that \(E(M_n)\) is decreasing with respect to 'n'. Second derivative: \(\frac{d^2E(M_n)}{dn^2} = \frac{200}{(n+1)^3} > 0\) Since the second derivative is positive, it indicates that the rate of decrease of \(E(M_n)\) is diminishing with respect to 'n'.
06

Calculate the optimal number of calls to maximize gain

Let's denote the gain from search as 'G' and the cost per call as 'c'. The gain from search depends on the expected minimum price paid and the cost of calling 'n' stores: \(G = E(M_n) - cn\) In this situation, the cost per call (c) is $2. We can use this formula to determine the optimal number of calls by finding the maximum value of 'G' with a relation to 'n'. This can be done by setting the first derivative of 'G' with respect to 'n' to 0: \(\frac{dG}{dn} = - \frac{100}{(n+1)^2} - 2 = 0\) Solving for 'n', we get: \(n \approx 4.6\) Since the number of calls must be a whole number, and the function is concave, we can conclude that the individual should call 5 stores to maximize his or her gain from search.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Blue-eyed people are more likely to lose their expensive watches than are brown-eyed people. Specifically, there is an 80 percent probability that a blue-eyed individual will lose a \(\$ 1,000\) watch during a year, but only a 20 percent probability that a brown-eyed person will. Blue-eyed and brown-eyed people are equally represented in the population. a. If an insurance company assumes blue-eyed and brown-eyed people are equally likely to buy watch-loss insurance, what will the actuarially fair insurance premium be? b. If blue-eyed and brown-eyed people have logarithmic utility-of-wealth functions and current wealths of \(\$ 10,000\) each, will these individuals buy watch insurance at the premium calculated in part (a)? c. Given your results from part (b), will the insurance premiums be correctly computed? What should the premium be? What will the utility for each type of person be? d. Suppose that an insurance company charged different premiums for blue-eyed and brown-eyed people. How would these individuals' maximum utilities compare to those computed in parts (b) and (c)? (This problem is an example of adverse selection in insurance.

Problem 8.4 examined a cost-sharing health insurance policy and showed that risk-averse individuals would prefer full coverage. Suppose, however, that people who buy cost-sharing policies take better care of their own health so that the loss suffered when they are ill is reduced from \(\$ 10,000\) to \(\$ 7,000 .\) Now what would be the actuarial fair price of a cost-sharing policy? Is it possible that some individuals might prefer the cost-sharing policy to complete coverage? What would determine whether an individual had such preferences? (A graphical approach to this problem should suffice.)

A farmer's tomato crop is wilting, and he must decide whether to water it. If he waters the tomatoes, or if it rains, the crop will yield \(\$ 1,000\) in profits; but if the tomatoes get no water, they will yield only \(\$ 500 .\) Operation of the farmer's irrigation system costs \(\$ 100 .\) The farmer seeks to maximize expected profits from tomato sales. a. If the farmer believes there is a 50 percent chance of rain, should he water? b. What is the maximum amount the farmer would pay to get information from an itinerant weather forecaster who can predict rain with 100 percent accuracy? c. How would your answer to part (b) change if the forecaster were only 75 percentaccurate?

In Problem \(8.5,\) Ms. Fogg was quite willing to buy insurance against a 25 percent chance of losing \(\$ 1,000\) of her cash on her around-the-world trip. Suppose that people who buy such insurance tend to become more careless with their cash and that their probability of losing \(\$ 1,000\) rises to 30 percent. What is the actuarially fair insurance premium in this situation? Will Ms. Fogg buy insurance now? (Note: This problem and Problem 9.3 illustrate moral hazard.)

In some cases individuals may care about the date at which the uncertainty they face is resolved. Suppose, for example, that an individual knows that his or her consumption will be 10 units today \(\left(C_{1}\right)\) but that tomorrow's consumption \(\left(C_{2}\right)\) will be either 10 or \(2.5,\) depending on whether a coin comes up heads or tails. Suppose also that the individual's utility function has the simple Cobb-Douglas form \\[U\left(C_{1}, C_{2}\right)=\sqrt{C_{1} C_{2}}.\\] a. If an individual cares only about the expected value of utility, will it matter whether the coin is flipped just before day 1 or just before day 2 ? Explain. b. More generally, suppose that the individual's expected utility depends on the timing of the coin flip. Specifically, assume that \\[ \text { expected utility }=E_{1}\left[\left(E_{2}\left\\{U\left(C_{1}, C_{2}\right)\right\\}\right)^{\alpha}\right] \\] where \(E_{1}\) represents expectations taken at the start of day \(1, E_{2}\) represents expectations at the start of day \(2,\) and \(\alpha\) represents a parameter that indicates timing preferences. Show that if \(\alpha=1,\) the individual is indifferent about when the coin is flipped. c. Show that if \(\alpha=2\), the individual will prefer early resolution of the uncertainty-that is, flipping the coin at the start of day 1 d. Show that if \(\alpha=.5,\) the individual will prefer later resolution of the uncertainty (flipping at the start of day 2 ). e. Explain your results intuitively and indicate their relevance for information theory. (Note: This problem is an illustration of "resolution seeking" and "resolution-averse" behavior. See D. M. Kreps and E. L. Porteus, "Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty and Dynamic Choice Theory," Econometrica [January \(1978]: 185-200\).)

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