Warning: foreach() argument must be of type array|object, bool given in /var/www/html/web/app/themes/studypress-core-theme/template-parts/header/mobile-offcanvas.php on line 20

Show that if an individual's utility-of-wealth function is convex (rather than concave, as shown in Figure 8.1 ), he or she will prefer fair gambles to income certainty and may even be willing to accept somewhat unfair gambles. Do you believe this sort of risk-taking behavior is common? What factors might tend to limit its occurrence?

Short Answer

Expert verified
Answer: A convex utility-of-wealth function implies that an individual's utility increases at an increasing rate and may prefer fair gambles over income certainty due to the higher potential satisfaction derived from larger wealth increases. They might even be willing to accept unfair gambles as the potential large gains outweigh the possible losses. However, factors like personal preferences, financial constraints, limited knowledge, and market regulations might limit the occurrence of such risk-taking behavior.

Step by step solution

01

Define Convex Utility-of-Wealth Function

A utility-of-wealth function represents the satisfaction derived from a given level of wealth. A convex utility function indicates that the individual's utility increases at an increasing rate. In contrast, a concave utility function, as shown in Figure 8.1, indicates that the individual's utility increases at a decreasing rate.
02

Explain Preference for Fair Gambles

If the utility function is convex, the individual derives greater utility from wealth increases. This implies that the individual would prefer the potential for larger wealth increases in a gamble over a fixed, less-variable income. Let's use a simple example to illustrate this. Suppose an individual has the option between a certain income of X, and a fair gamble where they have a 50% chance of winning 2X and a 50% chance of losing X. The expected value of the gamble is also X. However, with a convex utility function, the utility derived from winning 2X would be substantially more significant than the disutility from losing X. The individual would, therefore, prefer the gamble over the guaranteed income of X.
03

Willingness to Accept Unfair Gambles

Similarly, an individual with a convex utility function would be more likely to accept unfair gambles because the potential utility derived from the larger wealth increases outweighs the disutility from losses. This risk-taking behavior will depend on the level of convexity of the individual's utility function, as well as their beliefs about the probability distribution of possible outcomes.
04

Discuss Prevalence of Risk-Taking Behavior and Factors Limiting its Occurrence

This sort of risk-taking behavior can be observed in certain circumstances, such as in entrepreneurship, investments, or gambling activities. However, not all individuals exhibit such risk-seeking behavior due to various factors. Factors that might limit risk-taking behavior include: 1. Personal preferences and risk tolerance: Some individuals have a more conservative attitude towards risk-taking and prefer stable and secure incomes to the possibility of large fluctuations in wealth. 2. Financial constraints and responsibilities: Individuals with financial obligations or limited resources may not be able to afford potential losses, thus limiting their exposure to risk. 3. Information and knowledge: A lack of understanding about potential returns and risks associated with certain activities may dissuade individuals from participating in them. 4. Market regulations and restrictions: Laws and policies aimed at reducing risk in financial markets can influence the decision-making process of individuals and limit the occurrence of risk-taking behavior. In conclusion, while the convex utility-of-wealth function may lead to risk-seeking behavior in some cases, personal preferences, financial constraints, knowledge, and market regulations can limit the occurrence of such behavior.

Unlock Step-by-Step Solutions & Ace Your Exams!

  • Full Textbook Solutions

    Get detailed explanations and key concepts

  • Unlimited Al creation

    Al flashcards, explanations, exams and more...

  • Ads-free access

    To over 500 millions flashcards

  • Money-back guarantee

    We refund you if you fail your exam.

Over 30 million students worldwide already upgrade their learning with Vaia!

One App. One Place for Learning.

All the tools & learning materials you need for study success - in one app.

Get started for free

Most popular questions from this chapter

In some cases individuals may care about the date at which the uncertainty they face is resolved. Suppose, for example, that an individual knows that his or her consumption will be 10 units today (Q) but that tomorrow's consumption (C2) will be either 10 or 2.5, depending on whether a coin comes up heads or tails. Suppose also that the individual's utility function has the simple Cobb-Douglas form \[U\left(Q, C_{2}\right)=V^{\wedge} Q.\] a. If an individual cares only about the expected value of utility, will it matter whether the coin is flipped just before day 1 or just before day 2? Explain. More generally, suppose that the individual's expected utility depends on the timing of the coin flip. Specifically, assume that \[\text { expected utility }=\mathbf{f}^{\wedge}\left[\left(\mathrm{fi}\left\{17\left(\mathrm{C}, \mathrm{C}_{2}\right)\right\}\right) \text { ) } \text { ? } |\right.\] where Ex represents expectations taken at the start of day 1,E2 represents expectations at the start of day 2, and a represents a parameter that indicates timing preferences. Show that if a=1, the individual is indifferent about when the coin is flipped. Show that if a=2, the individual will prefer early resolution of the uncertainty - that is, flipping the coin at the start of day 1 Show that if a=.5, the individual will prefer later resolution of the uncertainty (flipping at the start of day 2 ). Explain your results intuitively and indicate their relevance for information theory. (Note: This problem is an illustration of "resolution seeking" and "resolution-averse" behavior. See D. M. Kreps and E. L. Porteus, "Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty and Dynamic Choice Theory," Econometrica [January 1978]:185200.

A farmer believes there is a 5050 chance that the next growing season will be abnormally rainy. His expected utility function has the form \[ 1 expected utility =InYNR+InYR \] where YNR and YR represent the farmer's income in the states of "normal rain" and "rainy," respectively. a. Suppose the farmer must choose between two crops that promise the following income prospects:  Crop YHYR Wheat $28,000$10,000 Corn 19,00015,000 Which of the crops will he plant? b. Suppose the farmer can plant half his field with each crop. Would he choose to do so? Explain your result. c. What mix of wheat and corn would provide maximum expected utility to this farmer? d. Would wheat crop insurance, available to farmers who grow only wheat, which costs $4000 and pays off $8000 in the event of a rainy growing season, cause this farmer to change what he plants?

In Problem 8.5, Ms. Fogg was quite willing to buy insurance against a 25 percent chance of losing $1,000 of her cash on her around-the-world trip. Suppose that people who buy such insurance tend to become more careless with their cash and that their probability of losing $1,000 rises to 30 percent. What is the actuarially fair insurance premium in this situation? Will Ms. Fogg buy insurance now? (Note: This problem and Problem 9.3 illustrate moral hazard.)

Suppose Molly Jock wishes to purchase a high-definition television to watch the Olympic Greco-Roman wrestling competition. Her current income is $20,000, and she knows where she can buy the television she wants for $2,000. She has heard the rumor that the same set can be bought at Crazy Eddie's (recently out of bankruptcy) for $1,700, but is unsure if the rumor is true. Suppose this individual's utility is given by \[\text { utility }=\ln (Y).\] where Fis her income after buying the television. a. What is Molly's utility if she buys from the location she knows? b. What is Molly's utility if Crazy Eddie's really does offer the lower price? c. Suppose Molly believes there is a 5050 chance that Crazy Eddie does offer the lowerpriced television, but it will cost her $100 to drive to the discount store to find out for sure (the store is far away and has had its phone disconnected). Is it worth it to her to invest the money in the trip?

A farmer's tomato crop is wilting, and he must decide whether to water it. If he waters the tomatoes, or if it rains, the crop will yield $1,000 in profits; but if the tomatoes get no water, they will yield only $500. Operation of the farmer's irrigation system costs $100. The farmer seeks to maximize expected profits from tomato sales. a. If the farmer believes there is a 50 percent chance of rain, should he water? b. What is the maximum amount the farmer would pay to get information from an itiner ant weather forecaster who can predict rain with 100 percent accuracy? c. How would your answer to part (b) change if the forecaster were only 75 percent accurate?

See all solutions

Recommended explanations on Economics Textbooks

View all explanations

What do you think about this solution?

We value your feedback to improve our textbook solutions.

Study anywhere. Anytime. Across all devices.

Sign-up for free