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In some cases individuals may care about the date at which the uncertainty they face is resolved. Suppose, for example, that an individual knows that his or her consumption will be 10 units today \((Q)\) but that tomorrow's consumption \(\left(\mathrm{C}_{2}\right)\) will be either 10 or \(2.5,\) depending on whether a coin comes up heads or tails. Suppose also that the individual's utility function has the simple Cobb-Douglas form \\[U\left(Q, C_{2}\right)=V^{\wedge} Q.\\] a. If an individual cares only about the expected value of utility, will it matter whether the coin is flipped just before day 1 or just before day \(2 ?\) Explain. More generally, suppose that the individual's expected utility depends on the timing of the coin flip. Specifically, assume that \\[\text { expected utility }=\mathbf{f}^{\wedge}\left[\left(\mathrm{fi}\left\\{17\left(\mathrm{C}, \mathrm{C}_{2}\right)\right\\}\right) \text { ) } \text { ? } |\right.\\] where \(E_{x}\) represents expectations taken at the start of day \(1, E_{2}\) represents expectations at the start of day \(2,\) and \(a\) represents a parameter that indicates timing preferences. Show that if \(a=1,\) the individual is indifferent about when the coin is flipped. Show that if \(a=2,\) the individual will prefer early resolution of the uncertainty - that is, flipping the coin at the start of day 1 Show that if \(a=.5,\) the individual will prefer later resolution of the uncertainty (flipping at the start of day 2 ). Explain your results intuitively and indicate their relevance for information theory. (Note: This problem is an illustration of "resolution seeking" and "resolution-averse" behavior. See D. M. Kreps and E. L. Porteus, "Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty and Dynamic Choice Theory," Econometrica [January \(1978]: 185-200\).

Short Answer

Expert verified
If yes, how do preferences for timing of resolving uncertainty affect an individual's desire for when the coin is flipped? Answer: Yes, the expected utilities for both scenarios are the same. Preferences for timing of resolving uncertainty affect an individual's desire for when the coin is flipped, as some individuals may be risk-averse and prefer early resolution (flipping at the start of day 1), while others may be more risk-seeking and prefer later resolution of uncertainty (flipping at the start of day 2).

Step by step solution

01

State the utility function and expected utility representation

The utility function is given by \\[U(Q, C_2) = Q^{\wedge} C_2.\\] The expected utility representation is given by \\[\text { expected utility } = \textbf{f}^{\wedge}\left[\left(\mathrm{fi}\left\\{17\left(\mathrm{C},\mathrm{C}_{2}\right)\right\\}\right) \text { ) } \text { ? } |\right.\\] where \(E_{x}\) represents expectations taken at the start of day 1, \(E_{2}\) represents expectations at the start of day 2, and \(a\) represents a parameter that indicates timing preferences.
02

Compute the expected utility for both coin flip scenarios

For each scenario, we need to compute the expected utility when consumption is 10 or 2.5. When the coin is flipped just before day 1: \\[E_{x}[U(Q, C_2)] = \frac{1}{2} U(10, 10) + \frac{1}{2} U(10, 2.5)\\] \\[E_{x}[U(Q, C_2)] = \frac{1}{2}(10^{\wedge} 10) + \frac{1}{2}(10^{\wedge} 2.5)\\] When the coin is flipped just before day 2: \\[E_{2}[U(Q, C_2)] = \frac{1}{2} U(10, 10) + \frac{1}{2} U(10, 2.5)\\] \\[E_{2}[U(Q, C_2)] = \frac{1}{2}(10^{\wedge} 10) + \frac{1}{2}(10^{\wedge} 2.5)\\] The expected utility for both scenarios is the same.
03

Determine the individual's preference for coin flip timing, based on the value of 'a'

For \(a = 1\), the individual is indifferent about when the coin is flipped because the expected utilities are identical. For \(a = 2\), the individual will prefer early resolution of the uncertainty (flipping the coin at the start of day 1). For \(a = .5\), the individual will prefer later resolution of the uncertainty (flipping at the start of day 2).
04

Explain the results intuitively and indicate their relevance for information theory

Intuitively, if an individual's utility only depends on the expected value of consumption, then it doesn't matter when the coin is flipped. However, as preferences for the timing of resolving uncertainty vary, so do preferences for when the coin is flipped. In information theory, this concept is relevant as it highlights the importance of the timing of information and how different individuals will place different value on when uncertainty is resolved. Depending on preferences, some individuals may be risk-averse and prefer early resolution, while others may be more risk-seeking and prefer later resolution of uncertainty.

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Key Concepts

These are the key concepts you need to understand to accurately answer the question.

Expected Utility
The concept of expected utility is central to understanding decision-making under uncertainty. It captures the idea that when faced with various outcomes, each with a certain probability, individuals will opt for the option that offers the highest expected satisfaction, or utility. To calculate expected utility, you multiply the utility of each possible outcome by its probability, and then sum these products.

Referring to our exercise, the individual is evaluating the uncertainty of tomorrow’s consumption and is looking to maximize their expected utility. Whether to flip the coin before day 1 or day 2 becomes a question of when they prefer to deal with uncertainty. The calculated expected utility for both scenarios was identical, meaning if the individual were only concerned with expected utility, they would be indifferent to the timing of the coin flip. However, preference over timing indicates that factors beyond the expected utility, such as risk preferences and the psychological value of information, are in play.
Cobb-Douglas Utility Function
The Cobb-Douglas utility function is a widely used form to represent preferences in economics. It is characterized by a simply multiplicative form, often used to model the utility that a consumer gets from consuming different goods. In our particular problem, the Cobb-Douglas utility function is represented as a function of two consumption goods, today's and tomorrow's consumption (Q and C2).

The utility from consumption for each day is expressed as the product of the consumption amounts raised to a specific power, typically reflecting the proportion of expenditure on each good. This form captures the trade-offs consumers are willing to make between goods and has an implication of constant elasticity of substitution, which in simpler terms means individuals are able to substitute one good for another to some extent without a change in the level of happiness or utility.
Risk Preferences
The term risk preferences refers to an individual's tolerance for risk and uncertainty in their choices. In the context of our exercise, the risk preferences of the individual are revealed through the timing of the coin flipping that determines consumption. If the individual prefers to flip the coin earlier (a = 2), they are demonstrating a preference for early resolution of risk, which aligns with risk-averse behavior. Conversely, a preference for flipping the coin later (a = 0.5) indicates a tolerance for uncertainty, often associated with risk-seeking behavior.

It's important to realize that each person's risk preferences are unique and can greatly affect their decision-making process, especially in economic contexts where uncertainty is prevalent. The utility function and the concept of expected utility help to model these preferences in a way that we can analyze and predict behavior.
Information Theory
Lastly, information theory is a field that examines the processing, transmission, and communication of information. In economic decisions, the timing and resolution of uncertainty are relevant topics within information theory. The individuals’ preferences for when they would like to resolve uncertainty relates closely to the value of information and how it is processed.

Our exercise demonstrates that the value of information is not just about the content of what is known, but also about when it is known. Depending on a person's risk preferences, the timing of resolving uncertainty can alter their perceived utility. In information theory, this is important because it asserts that the timing of information can be just as valuable as the information itself. For instance, knowing the outcome of a risky event ahead of time can reduce anxiety and lead to better decision-making, which is directly correlated with the individual's utility and preferences.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Suppose there is a \(50-50\) chance that a risk-averse individual with a current wealth of \(\$ 20,000\) will contact a debilitating disease and suffer a loss of \(\$ 10,000\) a. Calculate the cost of actuarially fair insurance in this situation and use a utility-of-wealth graph (such as shown in Figure 8.1 ) to show that the individual will prefer fair insurance against this loss to accepting the gamble uninsured. b. Suppose two types of insurance policies were available: (1) A fair policy covering the complete loss. (2) A fair policy covering only half of any loss incurred. Calculate the cost of the second type of policy and show that the individual will generally regard it as inferior to the first.

In deciding to park in an illegal place, any individual knows that the probability of getting a ticket is \(p\) and that the fine for receiving the ticket is / Suppose that all individuals are risk averse (that is, \(U^{\prime \prime}(W)<0\), where Wis the individual's wealth) Will a proportional increase in the probability of being caught or a proportional increase in the fine be a more effective deterrent to illegal parking? \([\text {Hint}\) : Use the Taylor \(\text { series approximation }\left.U(W-f)=U(W)-f U^{\prime}(W)+-U^{\prime \prime}(W) .\right]\)

Suppose an individual knows that the prices of a particular color TV have a uniform distribution between \(\$ 300\) and \(\$ 400\). The individual sets out to obtain price quotes by phone. a. Calculate the expected minimum price paid if this individual calls \(n\) stores for price quotes. b. Show that the expected price paid declines with \(n\), but at a diminishing rate. c. Suppose phone calls cost \(\$ 2\) in terms of time and effort. How many calls should this individual make in order to maximize his or her gain from search?

Blue-eyed people are more likely to lose their expensive watches than are brown-eyed people. Specifically, there is an 80 percent probability that a blue-eyed individual will lose a \(\$ 1,000\) watch during a year, but only a 20 percent probability that a brown-eyed person will. Blue-eyed and brown-eyed people are equally represented in the population. a. If an insurance company assumes blue-eyed and brown-eyed people are equally likely to buy watch-loss insurance, what will the actuarially fair insurance premium be? b. If blue-eyed and brown-eyed people have logarithmic utility-of-wealth functions and cur rent wealths of \(\$ 10,000\) each, will these individuals buy watch insurance at the premium calculated in part (a)? c. Given your results from part (b), will the insurance premiums be correctly computed? What should the premium be? What will the utility for each type of person be? d. Suppose that an insurance company charged different premiums for blue-eyed and brown-eyed people. How would these individuals' maximum utilities compare to those computed in parts (b) and (c)? (This problem is an example of adverse selection in insurance.)

An individual purchases a dozen eggs and must take them home. Although making trips home is costless, there is a 50 percent chance that all of the eggs carried on any one trip will be broken during the trip. The individual considers two strategies: Strategy 1: Take all 12 eggs in one trip. Strategy 2: Take two trips with 6 in each trip. a. List the possible outcomes of each strategy and the probabilities of these outcomes. Show that on the average, 6 eggs will remain unbroken after the trip home under either strategy. b. Develop a graph to show the utility obtainable under each strategy. Which strategy will be preferable? c. Could utility be improved further by taking more than two trips? How would this possi bility be affected if additional trips were costly?

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