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A farmer's tomato crop is wilting, and he must decide whether to water it. If he waters the tomatoes, or if it rains, the crop will yield \(\$ 1,000\) in profits; but if the tomatoes get no water, they will yield only \(\$ 500 .\) Operation of the farmer's irrigation system costs \(\$ 100 .\) The farmer seeks to maximize expected profits from tomato sales. a. If the farmer believes there is a 50 percent chance of rain, should he water? b. What is the maximum amount the farmer would pay to get information from an itiner ant weather forecaster who can predict rain with 100 percent accuracy? c. How would your answer to part (b) change if the forecaster were only 75 percent accurate?

Short Answer

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Answer: The farmer should water his tomato crop with a 50% chance of rain, as the expected profit from watering ($900) is higher than the expected profit without watering ($750). The maximum amount the farmer should pay for perfectly accurate weather information is $50, while he should pay up to $37.50 for 75% accurate information.

Step by step solution

01

Calculate expected profits with and without watering

To decide whether the farmer should water his crop or not, we need to compare the expected profits in each case. 1. Calculate the expected profit with watering: - Irrigation operating cost: $100 - Profit if it rains, or irrigation is used: $1,000 - Expected profit from watering: \(1,000 - \)100 = $900 2. Calculate the expected profits without watering: - Probability of rain: 50% or 0.5 - Profit if it rains: $1,000 - Profit if there's no rain: $500 - Expected profit without watering: (0.5 * \(1,000) + (0.5 * \)500) = $750
02

Compare expected profits to make a decision

Now, we'll compare the expected profits in both scenarios: - Expected profit with watering: $900 - Expected profit without watering: $750 Since the expected profit with watering is higher, the farmer should water his crop when there's a 50% chance of rain. b. Calculate the maximum amount the farmer would pay for accurate weather forecasting
03

Determine the value of perfect information

If the farmer can obtain perfectly accurate weather forecasting information, he can make the best decision every time, either irrigating when rain won't come or not irrigating when it will. With a 50% chance of rain, the optimal decision would yield an expected profit of (0.5 * \(1,000) + (0.5 * \)900) = $950 The value of perfect information is the difference between the expected profit with perfect information and the expected profit with current information: Value of perfect information = \(950 - \)900 = $50 The farmer should be willing to pay up to $50 for perfectly accurate information from the weather forecaster. c. Determine the maximum amount the farmer would pay for 75% accurate weather forecasting
04

Calculate expected profits with and without a 75% accurate forecast

With a 75% accurate weather forecaster, the farmer can choose the optimal action in 75% of the cases. This means he will make the correct decision 75% of the time. 1. Probability of correct decision: 75% or 0.75 2. Probability of incorrect decision: 25% or 0.25 Expected profit with a 75% accurate forecast: - (0.75 * \(950) + (0.25 * \)900) = $937.50 The value of the 75% accurate information is the difference between the expected profit with the 75% accurate forecast and the expected profit with current information: Value of 75% accurate information = \(937.50 - \)900 = $37.50 The farmer should be willing to pay up to $37.50 for 75% accurate information from the weather forecaster.

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Key Concepts

These are the key concepts you need to understand to accurately answer the question.

Probability in Decision Making
When making decisions, especially under uncertain conditions, probability can be extremely helpful. Let's look at the case of the farmer's watering decision. The probability of rain is a key factor. In this scenario, a 50% chance of rain was given. Probability helps us determine how likely it is that a particular outcome will occur.
By understanding these chances, the farmer can better assess the potential profits or losses associated with each decision. Here, the probability helps the farmer weigh the profit from watering versus not watering. If the probability of rain were higher or lower, the decision might change.
Understanding probability allows individuals to make informed decisions by evaluating the risk and potential rewards. Hence, using probability let's the farmer improve his decision-making by considering all possible outcomes and their likelihood. Some essential elements to consider include:
  • Probability of a favorable outcome (rain leading to more profit)
  • Probability of unfavorable outcomes (no rain leading to lesser profit)
  • Using probability to determine expected value, which aids in decision making.
Cost-Benefit Analysis
Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) is a method used to weigh the benefits and costs of a particular decision. For the farmer, watering the crop versus not watering it requires a CBA. The benefits of watering are higher profits if conditions are right, while the cost is the operational expense of the irrigation system, which is $100.
In this situation, performing a cost-benefit analysis involves calculating the expected profits in dollars for each scenario. With watering, the potential for earning $1,000 minus the watering cost results in an expected profit of $900. Without watering, the expected profit, considering probability, is $750.
This comparison allows the farmer to see that watering provides a larger net benefit (or profit) of $150 more than not watering. CBA is a valuable tool for decision-making as it quantifies the potential benefits and costs, assisting in making choices that maximize profit or value.
The core steps of a Cost-Benefit Analysis are:
  • Identify all potential costs and benefits.
  • Quantify them in economic terms.
  • Compare the total benefits and costs to determine the most profitable option.
Value of Information
Knowing the "Value of Information" is crucial in making smart choices. But what does it mean? Information has value if it can change the decision you make to achieve better outcomes. For the farmer, knowing the weather forecast with certainty has value. This value is the improvement in expected profits by using the additional information.
For perfect information about rain, the farmer finds out that the maximum value he can get is $950. This means if he had perfect weather prediction, he could potentially increase his profit by $50 compared to no extra information ($900). Thus, he should be willing to pay up to $50 for exact forecasts.
With a 75% accurate forecast, the expected additional profit is $937.50, which equates to a $37.50 increase. This tells the farmer the maximum amount he should be willing to pay for the forecasts considering the information's accuracy.
The calculation for the information value involves:
  • Assess the benefits of having the information.
  • Evaluate decisions that will change due to new information.
  • Compute the difference in outcomes with and without information.
  • Keep in mind that more accurate information often holds more value because it reduces uncertainty.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

For the constant relative risk aversion utility function (Equation 8.62 ) we showed that the degree of risk aversion is measured by \((1-R)\). In Chapter 3 we showed that the elasticity of substitution for the same function is given by \(1 /(1-R) .\) Hence, the measures are reciprocals of each other. Using this result, discuss the following questions: a. Why is risk aversion related to an individual's willingness to substitute wealth between states of the world? What phenomenon is being captured by both concepts? b. How would you interpret the polar cases \(R=1\) and \(R--^{\circ}\) in both the risk-aversion and substitution frameworks? c. A rise in the price of contingent claims in "bad" times \(\left(P_{b}\right)\) will induce substitution and income effects into the demands for \(W_{g}\) and \(W_{h}\). If the individual has a fixed budget to devote to these two goods, how will choices among them be affected? Why might \(W_{g}\) rise or fall depending on the degree of risk aversion exhibited by the individual? d. Suppose that empirical data suggest an individual requires an average return of 0.5 per cent if he or she is to be tempted to invest in an investment that has a \(50-50\) chance of gaining or losing 5 percent. That is, this person gets the same utility from \(W_{o}\) as from an even bet on \(1.055 W_{o}\) and \(0.955 W_{o}\) i. What value of \(R\) is consistent with this behavior? ii. How much average return would this person require to accept a \(50-50\) chance of gaining or losing 10 percent? Note: This part requires solving nonlinear equations, so approximate solutions will suffice. The comparison of the risk/reward trade-off illustrates what is called the "equity premium puzzle," in that risky investments seem to actually earn much more than is consistent with the degree of risk-aversion suggested by other data. See N. R. Kocherlakota, "The Equity Premium: It's Still a Puzzle" Journal of Economic Literature (March 1996 ): \(42-71\)

Suppose there are two types of workers, high-ability workers and low-ability workers. Workers' wages are determined by their ability- high ability workers earn \(\$ 50,000\) per year, low ability workers earn \(\$ 30,000 .\) Firms cannot measure workers' abilities but they can observe whether a worker has a high school diploma. Workers' utility depends on the difference between their wages and the costs they incur in obtaining a diploma. a. If the cost of obtaining a high school diploma is the same for high-ability and low-ability workers, can there be a separating equilibrium in this situation in which high-ability workers get high-wage jobs and low-ability workers get low wages? b. What is the maximum amount that a high-ability worker would pay to obtain a high school diploma? Why must a diploma cost more than this for a low-ability person if having a diploma is to permit employers to identify high-ability workers?

In deciding to park in an illegal place, any individual knows that the probability of getting a ticket is \(p\) and that the fine for receiving the ticket is / Suppose that all individuals are risk averse (that is, \(U^{\prime \prime}(W)<0\), where Wis the individual's wealth) Will a proportional increase in the probability of being caught or a proportional increase in the fine be a more effective deterrent to illegal parking? \([\text {Hint}\) : Use the Taylor \(\text { series approximation }\left.U(W-f)=U(W)-f U^{\prime}(W)+-U^{\prime \prime}(W) .\right]\)

In Problem \(8.5,\) Ms. Fogg was quite willing to buy insurance against a 25 percent chance of losing \(\$ 1,000\) of her cash on her around-the-world trip. Suppose that people who buy such insurance tend to become more careless with their cash and that their probability of losing \(\$ 1,000\) rises to 30 percent. What is the actuarially fair insurance premium in this situation? Will Ms. Fogg buy insurance now? (Note: This problem and Problem 9.3 illustrate moral hazard.)

Blue-eyed people are more likely to lose their expensive watches than are brown-eyed people. Specifically, there is an 80 percent probability that a blue-eyed individual will lose a \(\$ 1,000\) watch during a year, but only a 20 percent probability that a brown-eyed person will. Blue-eyed and brown-eyed people are equally represented in the population. a. If an insurance company assumes blue-eyed and brown-eyed people are equally likely to buy watch-loss insurance, what will the actuarially fair insurance premium be? b. If blue-eyed and brown-eyed people have logarithmic utility-of-wealth functions and cur rent wealths of \(\$ 10,000\) each, will these individuals buy watch insurance at the premium calculated in part (a)? c. Given your results from part (b), will the insurance premiums be correctly computed? What should the premium be? What will the utility for each type of person be? d. Suppose that an insurance company charged different premiums for blue-eyed and brown-eyed people. How would these individuals' maximum utilities compare to those computed in parts (b) and (c)? (This problem is an example of adverse selection in insurance.)

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