Chapter 10: Problem 7
In A Treatise on the Family (Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1981 ), G. Becker proposes his famous Rotten Kid theorem as a game between a (potentially rotten) child, \(A\), and his or her parent, \(B . A\) moves first and chooses an action, \(r,\) that affects his or her own income \(Y_{A}(r)\) \(\left(Y_{A}^{\prime}>0\right)\) and the income of the parent \(Y_{s}(r)\left(Y_{B}^{\prime}<0\right) .\) In the second stage of the game, the parent leaves a monetary bequest of \(L\) to the child. The child cares only for his or her own utility, \(U_{A}\left(Y_{A}+L\right),\) but the parent maximizes \(U_{B}\left(Y_{B}-L\right)+X U_{A},\) where \(A>0\) reflects the parent's altruism toward the child. Prove that the child will opt for that value of \(r\) that maximizes \(Y_{A}+Y_{B}\) even though he or she has no altruistic intentions. Plint: You must first find the parent's optimal bequest, then solve for the child's optimal strategy, given this subsequent parental behavior.)
Short Answer
Step by step solution
Key Concepts
These are the key concepts you need to understand to accurately answer the question.