Chapter 10: Problem 10
Consider the following sealed-bid auction for a rare baseball card. Player \(A\) values the card being auctioned at \(\$ 600,\) player lvalues the card at \(\$ 500,\) and these valuations are known to each player who will submit a sealed bid for the card. Whoever bids the most will win the card. If equal bids are submitted, the auctioneer will flip a coin to decide the winner. Each player must now decide how much to bid. a. How would you categorize the strategies in this game? Do some strategies dominate others? b. Does this game have a Nash equilibrium? Is it unique? c. How would this game change if each player did not know the other's valuation for the card?
Short Answer
Step by step solution
Key Concepts
These are the key concepts you need to understand to accurately answer the question.