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In deciding to park in an illegal place, any individual knows that the probability of getting a ticket is \(p\) and that the fine for receiving the ticket is \(f\). Suppose that all individuals are risk averse (i.e., \(U^{\prime \prime}(W)<0\), where \(W\) is the individual's wealth). Will a proportional increase in the probability of being caught or a proportional increase in the fine be a more effective deterrent to illegal parking? Hint: Use the Taylor series approx- \\[ \text { imation } U(W-f)=U(W)-f U^{\prime}(W)+\left(f^{2} / 2\right) U^{\prime \prime}(W) \\]

Short Answer

Expert verified
Answer: For risk-averse individuals, increasing the probability of being caught is a more effective deterrent to illegal parking than increasing the fine amount.

Step by step solution

01

Write down the initial utility function

The initial utility function is given by: \\[ U(W) \\]
02

Write down the utility function after receiving a fine

Using the Taylor series approximation provided, we can find an expression for the utility function after receiving a fine, U(W-f): \\[ U(W-f) = U(W) - fU'(W) + \frac{1}{2}f^2 U''(W) \\]
03

Write down the expected utility when parking illegally

The expected utility when parking illegally can be calculated by taking into account the probability of getting caught (p) and not getting caught (1-p): \\[ EU_illegal = pU(W - f) + (1-p)U(W) \\]
04

Substitute the expression for U(W-f)

Now, we'll substitute the Taylor series approximation for U(W-f) from Step 2 into the expected utility formula: \\[ EU_illegal = p[U(W) - fU'(W) + \frac{1}{2}f^2 U''(W)] + (1-p)U(W) \\]
05

Calculate the change in expected utility due to an increase in probability (p)

To analyze the impact of an increase in the probability of getting caught, we'll calculate the partial derivative of the expected utility with respect to p: \\[ \frac{\partial EU_{illegal}}{\partial p} = U(W-f) - U(W) \\]
06

Calculate the change in expected utility due to an increase in the fine (f)

Similarly, we'll calculate the partial derivative of the expected utility with respect to the fine (f) to analyze the impact of an increase in the fine amount: \\[ \frac{\partial EU_{illegal}}{\partial f} = p\left[-U'(W) + fU''(W)\right] \\]
07

Compare the effectiveness of increasing p and f

We can compare the two partial derivatives to each other qualitatively: \\[ \frac{\partial EU_{illegal}}{\partial p} = U(W-f) - U(W) \\] \\[ \frac{\partial EU_{illegal}}{\partial f} = p\left[-U'(W) + fU''(W)\right] \\] Observing both expressions, we can see that an increase in the probability of being caught (p) has a direct impact on the utility difference, U(W-f) - U(W). On the other hand, an increase in the fine amount (f) has a mixed effect on the expected utility, as it has both positive and negative impacts (through the risk aversion term fU''(W)). Given all individuals are risk-averse, it is likely that the decrease in utility function would be larger when the probability of being caught is increased compared to increasing the fine amount. Thus, increasing the probability of being caught is a more effective deterrent to illegal parking for risk-averse individuals.

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Key Concepts

These are the key concepts you need to understand to accurately answer the question.

Risk Aversion
Risk aversion is a fundamental concept in microeconomic theory that describes an individual's preference for certainty over uncertainty. An individual who is risk-averse prefers outcomes that are certain and is willing to forego a potentially higher payoff to avoid risk. This behavior is particularly relevant when making financial decisions or evaluating potential losses.

In the context of the illegal parking problem, risk-aversion translates to the individual's inclination to avoid the potential loss of wealth due to a parking fine. Mathematically, risk aversion is represented by the second derivative of the utility function with respect to wealth, \( U''(W) \), being less than zero \( (U''(W) < 0) \). A deeper concavity in the utility function points to a higher degree of risk aversion.

When individuals are risk-averse, they'll likely be more responsive to changes in the probability of incurring a fine (or any negative consequence) rather than changes in the amount of the fine itself. This propensity is because, for a risk-averse person, the increased likelihood of any loss can induce more anxiety and a stronger behavioral response, in this case, deterring from illegal parking.
Expected Utility
Expected utility is a pivotal concept in decision theory and behavioral economics. It represents the anticipated average of all possible outcomes under uncertainty, each weighted by the probability of occurrence. Expected utility combines probabilities and the utility values of outcomes to provide a single number that an individual can use to make a rational decision when faced with uncertain scenarios.

In terms of our parking problem, we calculate the expected utility of engaging in illegal parking \( EU_{illegal} \) by considering both outcomes: getting caught with a probability \( p \) and not getting caught with a probability \( 1-p \).

Due to risk aversion, individuals would consider the negative utility from a possible fine more significantly than the utility without the fine. Thus, even if the expected utility might seem favorable when considering the potential fine as a monetary loss alone, the individual's subjective weighting due to risk aversion can make the decision to park illegally less attractive.
Taylor Series Approximation
The Taylor series approximation is a technique used in mathematics to approximate complicated functions using polynomials. By expanding a function at a certain point, the Taylor series provides an approximate value of the function around that point through a finite sum of its derivatives at the point.

In our scenario, we use the Taylor series to approximate the change in utility \( U(W-f) \) after receiving a fine \( f \) based on the individual's current wealth \( W \). The approximation up to the second order is given by:
\[ U(W-f) \approx U(W) - fU'(W) + \frac{1}{2}f^2 U''(W) \]
Here, \( U(W) \) is the utility at the original wealth, \( U'(W) \) is the first derivative (representing the marginal utility of wealth), and \( U''(W) \) is the second derivative (indicating risk aversion). The Taylor series approximation enables us to simplify the calculation of the expected utility when the fine's exact impact on utility is unknown or too complex to model directly.

By applying the Taylor series approximation to the expected utility function for parking illegally, we see the comparative impact of increasing the fine \( f \) versus the probability of getting caught \( p \). This application illustrates neatly how even intuitive concepts like risk aversion and expected utility can be quantified and compared using the powerful mathematical tool of Taylor series.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

A farmer believes there is a \(50-50\) chance that the next growing season will be abnormally rainy. His expected utility function has the form \\[ E[U(Y)]=\frac{1}{2} \ln Y_{N R}+\frac{1}{2} \ln Y_{R} \\] where \(Y_{N R}\) and \(Y_{R}\) represent the farmer's income in the states of "normal rain" and "rainy," respectively. a. Suppose the farmer must choose between two crops that promise the following income prospects: \\[ \begin{array}{lcc} \text { Crop } & Y_{N R} & Y_{R} \\ \hline \text { Wheat } & \$ 28,000 & \$ 10,000 \\ \text { Corn } & \$ 19,000 & \$ 15,000 \end{array} \\] Which of the crops will he plant? b. Suppose the farmer can plant half his field with each crop. Would he choose to do so? Explain your result. c. What mix of wheat and corn would provide maximum expected utility to this farmer? d. Would wheat crop insurance-which is available to farmers who grow only wheat and which costs \(\$ 4,000\) and pays off \(\$ 8,000\) in the event of a rainy growing season-cause this farmer to change what he plants?

Investment in risky assets can be examined in the state-preference framework by assuming that \(W_{0}\) dollars invested in an asset with a certain return \(r\) will yield \(W_{0}(1+r)\) in both states of the world, whereas investment in a risky asset will yield \(W_{0}\left(l+r_{g}\right)\) in good times and \(W_{0}\left(l+r_{b}\right)\) in bad times (where \(\left.r_{g}>r>r_{b}\right)\). a. Graph the outcomes from the two investments. b. Show how a "mixed portfolio" containing both risk-free and risky assets could be illustrated in your graph. How would you show the fraction of wealth invested in the risky asset? c. Show how individuals' attitudes toward risk will determine the mix of risk- free and risky assets they will hold. In what case would a person hold no risky assets? d. If an individual's utility takes the constant relative risk aversion form (Equation 7.42 ), explain why this person will not change the fraction of risky assets held as his or her wealth increases. \(^{26}\)

The CARA and CRRA utility functions are both members of a more general class of utility functions called harmonic absolute risk aversion (HARA) functions. The general form for this function is \(U(W)=\theta(\mu+W / \gamma)^{1-\gamma},\) where the various parameters obey the following restrictions: \(\bullet\) \(\gamma \leq 1\) \(\bullet\) \(\mu+W / \gamma>0\) \(\bullet\) \(\theta[(1-\gamma) / \gamma]>0\) The reasons for the first two restrictions are obvious; the third is required so that \(U^{\prime}>0\) a. Calculate \(r(W)\) for this function. Show that the reciprocal of this expression is linear in \(W\). This is the origin of the term harmonic in the function's name. b. Show that when \(\mu=0\) and \(\theta=[(1-\gamma) / \gamma]^{\gamma-1}\), this function reduces to the CRRA function given in Chapter 7 (see footnote 17 ). c. Use your result from part (a) to show that if \(\gamma \rightarrow \infty\), then \(r(W)\) is a constant for this function. d. Let the constant found in part (c) be represented by \(A\). Show that the implied form for the utility function in this case is the CARA function given in Equation 7.35 e. Finally, show that a quadratic utility function can be generated from the HARA function simply by setting \(\gamma=-1\) f. Despite the seeming generality of the HARA function, it still exhibits several limitations for the study of behavior in uncertain situations. Describe some of these shortcomings.

Maria has \(\$ 1\) she can invest in two assets, \(A\) and \(B\). A dollar invested in \(A\) has a \(50-50\) chance of returning 16 or nothing and in \(B\) has a \(50-50\) chance of returning 9 or nothing. Maria's utility over wealth is given by the function \(U(W)=\sqrt[0]{W}\) a. Suppose the assets' returns are independent. (1) Despite the fact that \(A\) has a much higher expected return than \(B\), show that Maria would prefer to invest half of her money in \(B\) rather than investing everything in \(A\) (2) Let \(a\) be the fraction of the dollar she invests in \(A\) What value would Maria choose if she could pick any \(a\) between 0 and \(1 ?\) Hint: Write down her expected utility as a function of \(a\) and then either graph this function and look for the peak or compute this function over the grid of values \(a=0,0.1,0.2,\) etc. b. Now suppose the assets' returns are perfectly negatively correlated: When \(A\) has a positive return, \(B\) returns nothing and vice versa. (1) Show that Maria is better off investing half her money in each asset now than when the assets' returns were independent. (2) If she can choose how much to invest in each, show that she would choose to invest a greater fraction in \(B\) than when assets' returns were independent.

For the CRRA utility function (Equation 7.42), we showed that the degree of risk aversion is measured by \(1-R .\) In Chapter 3 we showed that the elasticity of substitution for the same function is given by \(1 /(1-R) .\) Hence the measures are reciprocals of each other. Using this result, discuss the following questions. a. Why is risk aversion related to an individual's willingness to substitute wealth between states of the world? What phenomenon is being captured by both concepts? b. How would you interpret the polar cases \(R=1\) and \(R=-\infty\) in both the risk-aversion and substitution frameworks? c. A rise in the price of contingent claims in "bad" times \(\left(p_{b}\right)\) will induce substitution and income effects into the demands for \(W_{g}\) and \(W_{b}\). If the individual has a fixed budget to devote to these two goods, how will choices among them be affected? Why might \(W_{g}\) rise or fall depending on the degree of risk aversion exhibited by the individual? d. Suppose that empirical data suggest an individual requires an average return of 0.5 percent before being tempted to invest in an investment that has a \(50-50\) chance of gaining or losing 5 percent. That is, this person gets the same utility from \(W_{0}\) as from an even bet on \(1.055 \mathrm{W}_{0}\) and \(0.955 W_{0}\) (1) What value of \(R\) is consistent with this behavior? (2) How much average return would this person require to accept a \(50-50\) chance of gaining or losing 10 percent? Note: This part requires solving nonlinear equations, so approximate solutions will suffice. The comparison of the risk-reward trade-off illustrates what is called the equity premium puzzle in that risky investments seem actually to earn much more than is consistent with the degree of risk aversion suggested by other data. See N. R. Kocherlakota, "The Equity Premium: It's Still a Puzzle," Journal of Economic Literature (March 1996): 42-71.

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