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Show that if an individual's utility-of-wealth function is convex then he or she will prefer fair gambles to income certainty and may even be willing to accept somewhat unfair gambles. Do you believe this sort of risk-taking behavior is common? What factors might tend to limit its occurrence?

Short Answer

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Answer: The relationship between a convex utility-of-wealth function and an individual's preference for fair gambles over income certainty lies in the expected utility theory. A convex utility function implies that an individual is risk-seeking. According to Jensen's inequality, the expected utility of a fair gamble will be greater than or equal to the utility of the expected wealth for a convex utility function, meaning the individual will prefer the fair gamble over income certainty. However, this risk-taking behavior might not be common, as it can be influenced or limited by factors such as financial constraints, regulatory constraints, cultural and social norms, and limited information and cognitive biases.

Step by step solution

01

Defining a fair gamble

A fair gamble is a situation where the expected value of the gamble is equal to the certain income that the person receives. In other words, the probability of gaining or losing in the gamble multiplied by the respective amounts is the same as the person's income certainty.
02

Defining expected utility

Expected utility is the sum of the utilities of each possible outcome, each weighted by the probability of that outcome. The expected utility can be represented as E(U) = ∑(p_i * U(w_i)), where p_i is the probability of outcome i, U(w_i) is the utility of the wealth in outcome i, and the summation is over all possible outcomes.
03

Analyzing a convex utility function and a fair gamble

Assuming the individual has a convex utility-of-wealth function U(w), let's analyze a fair gamble with a potential gain of G and a potential loss of L, both with an equal probability of 0.5. Let w be the initial wealth, then the expected utility of the fair gamble can be written as: E(U) = 0.5 * U(w + G) + 0.5 * U(w - L) Now, since U(w) is a convex function, according to Jensen's inequality, E(U(w)) ≥ U(E(w)), where E(w) is the expected wealth. In other words, the expected utility of the gamble will be greater than or equal to the utility of the expected wealth. Since it's a fair gamble, the expected wealth E(w) is equal to the initial wealth w (because the expected gain and loss cancel each other out). Hence, we have E(U(w)) ≥ U(w), which means the individual will prefer the fair gamble over income certainty.
04

Discussing the preference for unfair gambles

If the convexity of the utility function is strong (i.e., the individual is very risk-seeking), the individual may also prefer somewhat unfair gambles, where the potential loss is greater than the potential gain. The preference for these gambles depends on the magnitude of the convexity and the degree of unfairness of the gamble.
05

Discussing risk-taking behavior and limiting factors

While some individuals might exhibit risk-seeking behavior due to a convex utility function, it may not be a common phenomenon. People's risk preferences can be influenced by several factors, such as their financial situations, psychological factors, and past experiences. Moreover, factors that might limit the occurrence of risk-taking behavior include: 1. Regulatory constraints: Policies and regulations often limit the amount of risk that individuals or institutions can undertake. 2. Financial constraints: People with less financial capacity to absorb losses may refrain from taking too much risk. 3. Cultural and social norms: Societal attitudes towards risk-taking can play a role in shaping people's risk preferences. 4. Limited information and cognitive biases: People might not always possess complete information to make decisions, and cognitive biases could lead them to make suboptimal choices. In conclusion, although a convex utility function may imply a preference for fair or somewhat unfair gambles over income certainty, other factors might limit the occurrence of risk-taking behavior, and it might not be a prevalent phenomenon.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

The CARA and CRRA utility functions are both members of a more general class of utility functions called harmonic absolute risk aversion (HARA) functions. The general form for this function is \(U(W)=\theta(\mu+W / \gamma)^{1-\gamma},\) where the various parameters obey the following restrictions: \(\bullet\) \(\gamma \leq 1\) \(\bullet\) \(\mu+W / \gamma>0\) \(\bullet\) \(\theta[(1-\gamma) / \gamma]>0\) The reasons for the first two restrictions are obvious; the third is required so that \(U^{\prime}>0\) a. Calculate \(r(W)\) for this function. Show that the reciprocal of this expression is linear in \(W\). This is the origin of the term harmonic in the function's name. b. Show that when \(\mu=0\) and \(\theta=[(1-\gamma) / \gamma]^{\gamma-1}\), this function reduces to the CRRA function given in Chapter 7 (see footnote 17 ). c. Use your result from part (a) to show that if \(\gamma \rightarrow \infty\), then \(r(W)\) is a constant for this function. d. Let the constant found in part (c) be represented by \(A\). Show that the implied form for the utility function in this case is the CARA function given in Equation 7.35 e. Finally, show that a quadratic utility function can be generated from the HARA function simply by setting \(\gamma=-1\) f. Despite the seeming generality of the HARA function, it still exhibits several limitations for the study of behavior in uncertain situations. Describe some of these shortcomings.

In deciding to park in an illegal place, any individual knows that the probability of getting a ticket is \(p\) and that the fine for receiving the ticket is \(f\). Suppose that all individuals are risk averse (i.e., \(U^{\prime \prime}(W)<0\), where \(W\) is the individual's wealth). Will a proportional increase in the probability of being caught or a proportional increase in the fine be a more effective deterrent to illegal parking? Hint: Use the Taylor series approx- \\[ \text { imation } U(W-f)=U(W)-f U^{\prime}(W)+\left(f^{2} / 2\right) U^{\prime \prime}(W) \\]

An individual purchases a dozen eggs and must take them home. Although making trips home is costless, there is a 50 percent chance that all the eggs carried on any one trip will be broken during the trip. The individual considers two strategies: (1) take all 12 eggs in one trip or (2) take two trips with six eggs in each trip. a. List the possible outcomes of each strategy and the probabilities of these outcomes. Show that, on average, six eggs will remain unbroken after the trip home under either strategy. b. Develop a graph to show the utility obtainable under each strategy. Which strategy will be preferable? c. Could utility be improved further by taking more than two trips? How would this possibility be affected if additional trips were costly?

A farmer believes there is a \(50-50\) chance that the next growing season will be abnormally rainy. His expected utility function has the form \\[ E[U(Y)]=\frac{1}{2} \ln Y_{N R}+\frac{1}{2} \ln Y_{R} \\] where \(Y_{N R}\) and \(Y_{R}\) represent the farmer's income in the states of "normal rain" and "rainy," respectively. a. Suppose the farmer must choose between two crops that promise the following income prospects: \\[ \begin{array}{lcc} \text { Crop } & Y_{N R} & Y_{R} \\ \hline \text { Wheat } & \$ 28,000 & \$ 10,000 \\ \text { Corn } & \$ 19,000 & \$ 15,000 \end{array} \\] Which of the crops will he plant? b. Suppose the farmer can plant half his field with each crop. Would he choose to do so? Explain your result. c. What mix of wheat and corn would provide maximum expected utility to this farmer? d. Would wheat crop insurance-which is available to farmers who grow only wheat and which costs \(\$ 4,000\) and pays off \(\$ 8,000\) in the event of a rainy growing season-cause this farmer to change what he plants?

Return to Example \(7.5,\) in which we computed the value of the real option provided by a flexible-fuel car. Continue to assume that the payoff from a fossil-fuel-burning car is \(O_{1}(x)=1-x\) Now assume that the payoff from the biofuel car is higher, \(\mathrm{O}_{2}(x)=2 x\). As before, \(x\) is a random variable uniformly distributed between 0 and 1 , capturing the relative availability of biofuels versus fossil fuels on the market over the future lifespan of the car. a. Assume the buyer is risk neutral with von NeumannMorgenstern utility function \(U(x)=x\). Compute the option value of a flexible-fuel car that allows the buyer to reproduce the payoff from either single-fuel car. b. Repeat the option value calculation for a risk-averse buyer with utility function \(U(x)=\sqrt{x}\) c. Compare your answers with Example \(7.5 .\) Discuss how the increase in the value of the biofuel car affects the option value provided by the flexible- fuel car.

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