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Suppose there are only two individuals in society. Person \(A\) 's demand curve for mosquito control is given by \\[ q_{a}=100-p \\] for person \(B,\) the demand curve for mosquito control is given by \\[ q_{b}=200-p \\] a. Suppose mosquito control is a pure public good; that is, once it is produced, everyone benefits from it. What would be the optimal level of this activity if it could be produced at a constant marginal cost of \(\$ 120\) per unit? b. If mosquito control were left to the private market, how much might be produced? Does your answer depend on what each person assumes the other will do? c. If the government were to produce the optimal amount of mosquito control, how much will this cost? How should the tax bill for this amount be allocated between the individuals if they are to share it in proportion to benefits received from mosquito control?

Short Answer

Expert verified
Answer: The optimal level of mosquito control is 10 units. The tax bill should be allocated proportionally to the benefits each individual receives, resulting in each person paying 600 in taxes.

Step by step solution

01

Find the combined demand curve

To find the combined demand curve, we need to sum the individual demand curves for person A and person B: Combined Demand Curve: \(q_{c}=q_{a}+q_{b}\) Plugging in their demand curves, we get: \(q_{c} = (100-p) + (200-p)\) Simplify the equation: \(q_{c}=300-2p\)
02

Find the optimal level of mosquito control

Now we need to find the optimal level of activity by setting the combined demand equal to the constant marginal cost (\(MC=120\)): \(300 - 2p = 120\) Solve for p: \(2p = 180\) \(p = 90\) We have the price that corresponds to the optimal level of mosquito control. Now, plug the price into either person A or person B's demand curve to find the optimal quantity. Using person A's demand curve: \(q_{a} = 100 - p\) \(q_{a} = 100 - 90\) \(q_{a} = 10\) Since mosquito control is a public good, both individual A and B will consume 10 units of this good. So, the optimal level of mosquito control is 10 units.
03

Analyze private market production

If mosquito control were left to the private market, it's possible to assume that each person acts independently and decides on their consumption level. Also, both individuals know that once mosquito control is produced, they will both benefit from it. Hence, each person will take into account the other's action in consuming mosquito control. The outcome, in this case, will depend on each person's assumption about the other's action. Therefore, it is not possible to give a specific quantity that would be produced by the private market.
04

Calculate the government production cost

To find the cost of producing the optimal amount of mosquito control by the government, multiply the optimal quantity by the marginal cost: Total Cost: \(q_{optimal} * MC\) Total Cost: \(10 * 120\) Total Cost: \(1200\)
05

Allocate the tax bill

To allocate the tax bill between individuals, we can do so proportionally to the benefits they receive from mosquito control. First, let's find the total benefit from mosquito control: Total benefit: \(q_{a}+q_{b}\) Total benefit: \(10+10\) Total benefit: \(20\) Now, we can allocate the tax bill proportionally to their benefits: Person A's tax share: \(Tax_A = \frac{q_{a}}{Total\,benefit} * Total\,Cost\) Person A's tax share: \(\frac{10}{20} * 1200\) Person A's tax share: \(600\) Person B's tax share: \(Tax_B = \frac{q_{b}}{Total\,benefit} * Total\,Cost\) Person B's tax share = \(\frac{10}{20} * 1200\) Person B's tax share = \(600\) So each individual should pay \(600\) in taxes to cover the cost of producing the optimal amount of mosquito control, which is proportional to the benefits they receive.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Suppose individuals face a probability of \(u\) that they will be unemployed next year. If they are unemployed they will receive unemployment benefits of \(b,\) whereas if they are employed they receive \(w(1-t),\) where \(t\) is the tax used to finance unemployment benefits. Unemployment benefits are constrained by the government budget constraint \\[ u b=t w(1-u) \\] a. Suppose the individual's utility function is given by \\[ U=\left(y_{i}\right)^{\delta} / \delta \\] where \(1-\delta\) is the degree of constant relative risk aversion. What would be the utility-maximizing choices for \(b\) and \(t ?\) b. How would the utility-maximizing choices for \(b\) and \(t\) respond to changes in the probability of unemployment, \(u ?\) c. How would \(b\) and \(t\) change in response to changes in the risk aversion parameter \(\delta ?\)

Suppose the oil industry in Utopia is perfectly competitive and that all firms draw oil from a single (and practically inexhaustible ) pool. Assume that each competitor believes that it can sell all the oil it can produce at a stable world price of \(\$ 10\) per barrel and that the cost of operating a well for 1 year is \(\$ 1,000\) Total output per year (Q) of the oil field is a function of the number of wells ( \(n\) ) operating in the field. In particular, \\[ Q=500 n-n^{2} \\] and the amount of oil produced by each well ( \(q\) ) is given by \\[ q=\frac{Q}{n}=500-n \\] a. Describe the equilibrium output and the equilibrium number of wells in this perfectly competitive case. Is there a divergence between private and social marginal cost in the industry? b. Suppose now that the government nationalizes the oil field. How many oil wells should it operate? What will total output be? What will the output per well be? c. As an alternative to nationalization, the Utopian government is considering an annual license fee per well to discourage overdrilling. How large should this license fee be if it is to prompt the industry to drill the optimal number of wells?

Suppose that there are \(n\) firms each producing the same good but with differing production functions. Output for each of these firms depends only on labor input, so the functions take the form \(q_{i}=f_{i}\left(l_{i}\right) .\) In its production activities each firm also produces some pollution, the amount of which is determined by a firm-specific function of labor input of the form \(g_{i}\left(l_{i}\right)\) a. Suppose that the government wishes to place a cap of amount \(K\) on total pollution. What is the efficient allocation of labor among firms? b. Will a uniform Pigovian tax on the output of each firm achieve the efficient allocation described in part (a)? c. Suppose that, instead of taxing output, the Pigovian tax is applied to each unit of pollution. How should this tax be set? Will the tax yield the efficient allocation described in part (a)? d. What are the implications of the problem for adopting pollution control strategies? (For more on this topic see the Extensions to this chapter.)

The analysis of public goods in this chapter exclusively used a model with only two individuals. The results are readily generalized to \(n\) persons-a generalization pursued in this problem. a. With \(n\) persons in an economy, what is the condition for efficient production of a public good? Explain how the characteristics of the public good are reflected in these conditions. b. What is the Nash equilibrium in the provision of this public good to \(n\) persons? Explain why this equilibrium is inefficient. Also explain why the underprovision of this public good is more severe than in the two-person cases studied in the chapter. c. How is the Lindahl solution generalized to \(n\) persons? Is the existence of a Lindahl equilibrium guaranteed in this more complex model?

A firm in a perfectly competitive industry has patented a new process for making widgets. The new process lowers the firm's average cost, meaning that this firm alone (although still a price taker) can earn real economic profits in the long run. a. If the market price is \(\$ 20\) per widget and the firm's marginal cost is given by \(M C=0.4 q\), where \(q\) is the daily widget production for the firm, how many widgets will the firm produce? b. Suppose a government study has found that the firm's new process is polluting the air and estimates the social marginal cost of widget production by this firm to be \(S M C=0.5 q .\) If the market price is still \(\$ 20,\) what is the socially optimal level of production for the firm? What should be the rate of a government-imposed excise tax to bring about this optimal level of production? c. Graph your results.

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