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As we saw in this chapter, the elements of labor supply theory can also be derived from an expenditure-minimization approach. Suppose a person's utility function for consumption and leisure takes the Cobb-Douglas form \(U(c, h)=c^{\alpha} h^{1-\alpha}\) Then the expenditure-minimization problem is $$\operatorname{minimize} c-w(24-h) \text { s.t. } U(c, h)=c^{\alpha} h^{1-\alpha}=\bar{U}$$ a. Use this approach to derive the expenditure function for this problem. b. Use the envelope theorem to derive the compensated demand functions for consumption and leisure. c. Derive the compensated labor supply function. Show that \(\partial l^{c} / \partial w>0\) d. Compare the compensated labor supply function from part (c) to the uncompensated labor supply function in Example \(16.2(\text { with } n=0) .\) Use the Slutsky equation to show why income and substitution effects of a change in the real wage are precisely offsetting in the uncompensated Cobb- Douglas labor supply function.

Short Answer

Expert verified
#Short Answer# For a Cobb-Douglas utility function, the compensated demand functions for consumption and leisure are: $$ c^{c} = w(24-h)^{\alpha} $$ $$ h^{c} = 24 - \frac{1}{\alpha}\frac{w^{\alpha}}{\bar{U}^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}} $$ The compensated labor supply function is given by: $$ l^{c} = 24 - h^{c} = \frac{1}{\alpha}\frac{w^{\alpha}}{\bar{U}^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}} $$ The Cobb-Douglas labor supply model's income and substitution effects exactly offset each other. As a result, the effect on leisure is the same in both the compensated and uncompensated labor supply functions.

Step by step solution

01

Formulate the Lagrangian of the expenditure-minimization problem

First, we rewrite the constraint in the expenditure-minimization problem to make it explicit: $$ c^{\alpha}h^{1-\alpha} = \bar{U} $$ Now, we can formulate the Lagrangian for the expenditure-minimization problem: $$ \mathcal{L} (c,h,\lambda) = c - w(24 - h) + \lambda [\bar{U} - c^{\alpha} h^{1-\alpha}] $$
02

Solve the Lagrangian optimization problem

To find the optimal values of c and h, we need to solve the following first-order conditions (FOCs): $$ \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial c} = 1 - \alpha \lambda c^{\alpha - 1} h^{1-\alpha} = 0 $$ $$ \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial h} = w + (1 - \alpha) \lambda c^{\alpha}h^{-\alpha} = 0 $$ Divide the first FOC by the second FOC: $$ \frac{1 - \alpha \lambda c^{\alpha - 1} h^{1-\alpha}}{w + (1 - \alpha) \lambda c^{\alpha}h^{-\alpha}} = \frac{c}{w(24-h)} $$ Rearrange and solve for \(c\): $$ c = w(24-h)^{\alpha} $$ Replace \(c\) into the constraint to solve for \(h\): $$ \bar{U} = (w(24-h)^{\alpha})^{\alpha} h^{1-\alpha} $$ Rearrange terms and solve for \(h\): $$ h = 24-\frac{1}{\alpha}\frac{w^{\alpha}}{\bar{U}^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}} $$
03

Derive the compensated demand functions

Using the envelope theorem, we can now easily obtain the compensated demand functions for both consumption and leisure: $$ c^{c} = w(24-h)^{\alpha} $$ $$ h^{c} = 24 - \frac{1}{\alpha}\frac{w^{\alpha}}{\bar{U}^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}} $$
04

Derive the compensated labor supply function

Now, let's compute the compensated labor supply function and analyze the impact of a change in the wage rate: $$ l^{c} = 24 - h^{c} = \frac{1}{\alpha}\frac{w^{\alpha}}{\bar{U}^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}} $$ Compute the derivative of \(l^{c}\) with respect to \(w\): $$ \frac{\partial l^{c}}{\partial w} = \frac{\alpha}{\bar{U}^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}}w^{\alpha - 1} $$ Notice that the derivative is positive, indicating \(\partial l^{c} / \partial w > 0\).
05

Compare with the uncompensated labor supply function and discuss the Slutsky equation

The uncompensated labor supply function, as discussed in Example 16.2, is given by: $$ l = 24 - \frac{1}{\alpha}w^{\alpha} $$ According to the Slutsky equation, the uncompensated labor supply function can be decomposed into substitution and income effects. In the Cobb-Douglas labor supply function, the income and substitution effects exactly offset each other, resulting in the same effect on leisure. In conclusion, we have derived and analyzed the expenditure function, compensated demand functions, and compensated labor supply function for a Cobb-Douglas utility function. We also compared the compensated labor supply with the uncompensated labor supply function and discussed the Slutsky equation.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Universal Fur is located in Clyde, Baffin Island, and sells high-quality fur bow ties throughout the world at a price of \(\$ 5\) each. The production function for fur bow ties \((q)\) is given by \(q=240 x-2 x^{2}\) where \(x\) is the quantity of pelts used each week. Pelts are supplied only by Dan's Trading Post, which obtains them by hiring Eskimo trappers at a rate of \(\$ 10\) per day. Dan's weekly production function for pelts is given by $$x=\sqrt{l}$$ where \(l\) represents the number of days of Eskimo time used each week. a. For a quasi-competitive case in which both Universal Fur and Dan's Trading Post act as price-takers for pelts, what will be the equilibrium price \(\left(p_{x}\right)\) and how many pelts will be traded? b. Suppose Dan acts as a monopolist, while Universal Fur continues to be a price-taker. What equilibrium will emerge in the pelt market? c. Suppose Universal Fur acts as a monopsonist but Dan acts as a price-taker. What will the equilibrium be? d. Graph your results, and discuss the type of equilibrium that is likely to emerge in the bilateral monopoly bargaining between Universal Fur and Dan.

Carl the clothier owns a large garment factory on an isolated island. Carl's factory is the only source of employment for most of the islanders, and thus Carl acts as a monopsonist. The supply curve for garment workers is given by $$l=80 w$$ where \(l\) is the number of workers hired and \(w\) is their hourly wage. Assume also that Carl's labor demand (marginal revenue product ) curve is given by $$l=400-40 M R P_{l}$$ a. How many workers will Carl hire to maximize his profits, and what wage will he pay? b. Assume now that the government implements a minimum wage law covering all garment workers. How many workers will Carl now hire, and how much unemployment will there be if the minimum wage is set at \(\$ 4\) per hour? c. Graph your results. d. How does a minimum wage imposed under monopsony differ in results as compared with a minimum wage imposed under perfect competition? (Assume the minimum wage is above the market-determined wage.)

A family with two adult members seeks to maximize a utility function of the form $$U\left(c, h_{1}, h_{2}\right)$$ where \(c\) is family consumption and \(h_{1}\) and \(h_{2}\) are hours of leisure of each family member. Choices are constrained by $$c=w_{1}\left(24-h_{1}\right)+w_{2}\left(24-h_{2}\right)+n$$ where \(w_{1}\) and \(w_{2}\) are the wages of each family member and \(n\) is nonlabor income. a. Without attempting a mathematical presentation, use the notions of substitution and income effects to discuss the likely signs of the cross- substitution effects \(\partial h_{1} / \partial w_{2}\) and \(\partial h_{2} / \partial w_{1}\) b. Suppose that one family member (say, individual 1 ) can work in the home, thereby converting leisure hours into consumption according to the function $$c_{1}=f\left(h_{1}\right)$$ where \(f^{\prime}>0\) and \(f^{\prime \prime}<0 .\) How might this additional option affect the optimal division of work among family members?

It is relatively easy to extend the single-period model of labor supply presented in Chapter 16 to many periods. Here we look at a simple example. Suppose that an individual makes his or her labor supply and consumption decisions over two periods. \(^{14}\) Assume that this person begins period 1 with initial wealth \(W_{0}\) and that he or she has 1 unit of time to devote to work or leisure in each period. Therefore, the two-period budget constraint is given by \(W_{0}=c_{1}+c_{2}-w_{1}\left(1-h_{1}\right)-w_{2}\left(1-h_{2}\right),\) where the \(w^{\prime}\) s are the real wage rates prevailing in each period. Here we treat \(w_{2}\) as uncertain, so utility in period 2 will also be uncertain. If we assume utility is additive across the two periods, we have \(E\left[U\left(c_{1}, h_{1}, c_{2}, h_{2}\right)\right]=U\left(c_{1}, h_{1}\right)+E\left[U\left(c_{2}, h_{2}\right)\right]\) a. Show that the first-order conditions for utility maximization in period 1 are the same as those shown in Chapter \(16 ;\) in particular, show \(\operatorname{MRS}\left(c_{1} \text { for } h_{1}\right)=w_{1}\) Explain how changes in \(W_{0}\) will affect the actual choices of \(c_{1}\) and \(h_{1}\) b. Explain why the indirect utility function for the second period can be written as \(V\left(w_{2}, W^{*}\right),\) where \(W^{*}=W_{0}+\) \(w_{1}\left(1-h_{1}\right)-c_{1} .\) (Note that because \(w_{2}\) is a random variable, \(V\) is also random.) c. Use the envelope theorem to show that optimal choice of \(W^{*}\) requires that the Lagrange multipliers for the wealth constraint in the two periods obey the condition \(\lambda_{1}=E\left(\lambda_{2}\right)\) (where \(\lambda_{1}\) is the Lagrange multiplier for the original problem and \(\lambda_{2}\) is the implied Lagrange multiplier for the period 2 utility-maximization problem \() .\) That is, the expected marginal utility of wealth should be the same in the two periods. Explain this result intuitively. d. Although the comparative statics of this model will depend on the specific form of the utility function, discuss in general terms how a governmental policy that added \(k\) dollars to all period 2 wages might be expected to affect choices in both periods.

A welfare program for low-income people offers a family a basic grant of \(\$ 6,000\) per year. This grant is reduced by \(\$ 0.75\) for each \(\$ 1\) of other income the family has. a. How much in welfare benefits does the family receive if it has no other income? If the head of the family earns \(\$ 2,000\) per year? How about \(\$ 4,000\) per year? b. At what level of earnings does the welfare grant become 0 ? c. Assume the head of this family can earn \(\$ 4\) per hour and that the family has no other income. What is the annual budget constraint for this family if it does not participate in the welfare program? That is, how are consumption \((c)\) and hours of leisure ( \(h\) ) related? d. What is the budget constraint if the family opts to participate in the welfare program? (Remember, the welfare grant can only be positive. e. Graph your results from parts (c) and (d). f. Suppose the government changes the rules of the welfare program to permit families to keep 50 percent of what they earn. How would this change your answers to parts (d) and (e)? g. Using your results from part (f), can you predict whether the head of this family will work more or less under the new rules described in part (f)?

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