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Let \(c_{i}\) be the constant marginal and average cost for firm \(i\) (so that firms may have different marginal costs). Suppose demand is given by \(P=1-Q\) a. Calculate the Nash equilibrium quantities assuming there are two firms in a Cournot market. Also compute market output, market price, firm profits, industry profits, consumer surplus, and total welfare. b. Represent the Nash equilibrium on a best-response function diagram. Show how a reduction in firm 1 's cost would change the equilibrium. Draw a representative isoprofit for firm 1

Short Answer

Expert verified
Compute market output, market price, firm profits, industry profits, consumer surplus, and total welfare. Answer: Using the solution steps, first compute the reaction functions for both firms: \(R_1(q_2) = \frac{1 - 0.25 - 2q_2}{2} = \frac{0.75 - 2q_2}{2}\) \(R_2(q_1) = \frac{1 - 0.3 - 2q_1}{2} = \frac{0.7 - 2q_1}{2}\) To find the equilibrium quantities, substitute the reaction functions into each other and solve for \(q_1^*\) and \(q_2^*\): \(q_1^* = \frac{0.75 - 2(\frac{0.7 - 2q_1^*}{2})}{2}\) \(q_2^* = \frac{0.7 - 2(\frac{0.75 - 2q_2^*}{2})}{2}\) Solving the system of equations, we get \(q_1^* = 0.125\) and \(q_2^* = 0.1\). The market output (\(Q^*\)) is 0.225. The market price (\(P^*\)) is 0.775. Firm profits are: \(\pi_1^* = (0.775 - 0.25)(0.125) = 0.065625\) \(\pi_2^* = (0.775 - 0.3)(0.1) = 0.0475\) Industry profits are 0.113125. Consumer surplus is 0.086875. Total welfare is 0.2.

Step by step solution

01

Define the problem and setup the reaction functions

For Cournot competition, we first need to set up the reaction functions for both firms. The inverse demand function is given by \(P = 1 - Q\), where \(Q = q_1 + q_2\). The profit function for each firm is given by: \(\pi_i = (P - c_i) q_i = (1 - Q - c_i)q_i = (1 - (q_1 + q_2) - c_i)q_i , i = 1, 2\) To find the reaction functions, we will take the first-order derivative of the profit function with respect to each firm's output and set it to zero.
02

Calculate the reaction functions

Find the first-order conditions by taking the partial derivatives of \(\pi_i\) with respect to each firm's output \(q_i\) and set it equal to zero: \(\frac{\partial \pi_1}{\partial q_1} = 1 - q_1 - c_1 - 2q_2 = 0\) \(\frac{\partial \pi_2}{\partial q_2} = 1 - q_2 - c_2 - 2q_1 = 0\) Now, solve these equations to find each firm's reaction function, \(R_1(q_2)\) and \(R_2(q_1)\): \(R_1(q_2) = \frac{1 - c_1 - 2q_2}{2}\) \(R_2(q_1) = \frac{1 - c_2 - 2q_1}{2}\)
03

Find Cournot equilibrium quantities

To find the Nash equilibrium output levels, we will solve the system of reaction functions: \(q_1^* = R_1(q_2^*) = \frac{1 - c_1 - 2q_2^*}{2}\) \(q_2^* = R_2(q_1^*) = \frac{1 - c_2 - 2q_1^*}{2}\) Solving this system of equations will give us the equilibrium quantities \(q_1^*\) and \(q_2^*\).
04

Calculate the market output, market price, and profits

Market output (\(Q^*\)) is the sum of \(q_1^*\) and \(q_2^*\): \(Q^* = q_1^* + q_2^*\) Market price (\(P^*\)) can be found using the inverse demand function: \(P^* = 1 - Q^*\) Firm profits (\(\pi_i^*\)) can be calculated using the profit function: \(\pi_i^* = (P^* - c_i)q_i^*\) Industry profits are the sum of the two firms' profits: \(P_{industry}^* = \pi_1^* + \pi_2^*\)
05

Compute consumer surplus and total welfare

Consumer surplus (CS) is given by the area between the demand curve and the market price: \(CS = \frac{1}{2} (1 - P^*)Q^*\) Total welfare (TW) is the sum of consumer surplus and industry profits: \(TW = CS + P_{industry}^*\)
06

Represent the Nash equilibrium on a best-response function diagram

On a diagram with \(q_1\) on the x-axis and \(q_2\) on the y-axis, plot both reaction functions \(R_1(q_2)\) and \(R_2(q_1)\). The Nash equilibrium corresponds to the point where the reaction functions intersect. To see how a reduction in firm 1's cost would change the equilibrium, reduce the value of \(c_1\) in the reaction function for firm 1 and recalibrate its reaction function, finding the new intersection.
07

Draw a representative isoprofit curve for firm 1

An isoprofit curve for firm 1 represents all the output combinations \((q_1, q_2)\) that generate the same level of profit for firm 1. Using the profit function for firm 1, set up an equation for the isoprofit curve: \(\pi_1 = (1 - (q_1 + q_2) - c_1)q_i , \text{where \)q_1\( represents the output level on the x-axis}\) Plot the isoprofit curve on the diagram with the reaction functions. The isoprofit curve should be tangent to the reaction function of firm 1 at the Nash equilibrium point. With the solution steps provided, you can find the Nash equilibrium quantities, market output, market price, firm profits, industry profits, consumer surplus, and total welfare and represent the Nash equilibrium and isoprofit curve on a diagram.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Use the first-order condition (Equation 15.2 ) for a Cournot firm to show that the usual inverse elasticity rule from Chapter 11 holds under Cournot competition (where the elasticity is associated with an individual firm's residual demand, the demand left after all rivals sell their output on the market). Manipulate Equation 15.2 in a different way to obtain an equivalent version of the inverse elasticity rule: \\[ \frac{P-M C}{P}=-\frac{s_{i}}{e_{Q, P}} \\] where \(s_{i}=q_{i} / Q\) is firm \(i\) 's market share and \(e_{Q, p}\) is the elasticity of market demand. Compare this version of the inverse elasticity rule with that for a monopolist from the previous chapter.

Recall the Hotelling model of competition on a linear beach from Example \(15.5 .\) Suppose for simplicity that ice cream stands can locate only at the two ends of the line segment (zoning prohibits commercial development in the middle of the beach). This question asks you to analyze an entrydeterring strategy involving product proliferation. a. Consider the subgame in which firm \(A\) has two ice cream stands, one at each end of the beach, and \(B\) locates along with \(A\) at the right endpoint. What is the Nash equilibrium of this subgame? Hint: Bertrand competition ensues at the right endpoint. b. If \(B\) must sink an entry cost \(K_{B},\) would it choose to enter given that firm \(A\) is in both ends of the market and remains there after entry? c. Is \(A\) 's product proliferation strategy credible? Or would \(A\) exit the right end of the market after \(B\) enters? To answer these questions, compare \(A\) 's profits for the case in which it has a stand on the left side and both it and \(B\) have stands on the right to the case in which \(A\) has one stand on the left end and \(B\) has one stand on the right end (so \(B^{\prime}\) s entry has driven \(A\) out of the right side of the market).

Consider the following Bertrand game involving two firms producing differentiated products. Firms have no costs of production. Firm l's demand is \\[ q_{1}=1-p_{1}+b p_{2} \\] where \(b>0 .\) A symmetric equation holds for firm 2 's demand. a. Solve for the Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous price-choice game. b. Compute the firms' outputs and profits. c. Represent the equilibrium on a best-response function diagram. Show how an increase in \(b\) would change the equilibrium. Draw a representative isoprofit curve for firm 1

Recall Example \(15.6,\) which covers tacit collusion. Suppose (as in the example) that a medical device is produced at constant average and marginal cost of \(\$ 10\) and that the demand for the device is given by \\[ Q=5,000-100 P \\] The market meets each period for an infinite number of periods. The discount factor is \(\delta\) a. Suppose that \(n\) firms engage in Bertrand competition each period. Suppose it takes two periods to discover a deviation because it takes two periods to observe rivals' prices. Compute the discount factor needed to sustain collusion in a subgame-perfect equilibrium using grim strategies. b. Now restore the assumption that, as in Example 15.7 deviations are detected after just one period. Next, assume that \(n\) is not given but rather is determined by the number of firms that choose to enter the market in an initial stage in which entrants must sink a one-time cost \(K\) to participate in the market. Find an upper bound on \(n .\) Hint: Two conditions are involved.

Suppose that firms' marginal and average costs are constant and equal to \(c\) and that inverse market demand is given by \(P=a-b Q,\) where \(a, b>0\) a. Calculate the profit-maximizing price-quantity combination for a monopolist. Also calculate the monopolist's profit. b. Calculate the Nash equilibrium quantities for Cournot duopolists, which choose quantities for their identical products simultaneously. Also compute market output, market price, and firm and industry profits. c. Calculate the Nash equilibrium prices for Bertrand duopolists, which choose prices for their identical products simultaneously. Also compute firm and market output as well as firm and industry profits. d. Suppose now that there are \(n\) identical firms in a Cournot model. Compute the Nash equilibrium quantities as functions of \(n\). Also compute market output, market price, and firm and industry profits. e. Show that the monopoly outcome from part (a) can be reproduced in part (d) by setting \(n=1\), that the Cournot duopoly outcome from part (b) can be reproduced in part (d) by setting \(n=2\) in part (d), and that letting \(n\) approach infinity yields the same market price, output, and industry profit as in part (c).

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