Warning: foreach() argument must be of type array|object, bool given in /var/www/html/web/app/themes/studypress-core-theme/template-parts/header/mobile-offcanvas.php on line 20

Suppose there are only two individuals in society. Person \(A\) 's demand curve for mosquito control is given by \\[ q_{n}=100-p \\] for person \(\mathrm{B}\), the demand curve for mosquito control is given by \\[ q_{b}=200-p \\] a. Suppose mosquito control is a pure public good; that is, once it is produced, everyone benefits from it. What would be the optimal level of this activity if it could be produced at a constant marginal cost of \(\$ 120\) per unit? b. If mosquito control were left to the private market, how much might be produced? Does your answer depend on what each person assumes the other will do? c. If the government were to produce the optimal amount of mosquito control, how much will this cost? How should the tax bill for this amount be allocated between the individuals if they are to share it in proportion to benefits received from mosquito control?

Short Answer

Expert verified
Answer: The optimal level of mosquito control is 10 units. The tax bill should be allocated as follows: Person A would be responsible for $92.31, and Person B would be responsible for $1107.69.

Step by step solution

01

a. Optimal Level of Activity with Constant Marginal Cost

First, let's add up the individual demand curves for Person A and Person B to form the aggregate demand curve. \(Q_D = q_a + q_b = (100 - p) + (200 - p) =\) \( 300 - 2p\) The aggregate demand curve is given by: \(Q_D = 300 - 2p\) Since it is a pure public good, the optimal production occurs when the marginal benefit (MB) equals the marginal cost (MC): \(MB = 120\) To find the price where MB = MC, we can solve for p: \(Q_D = 300 - 2p\) \(300 - 2p = 120\) \(2p = 180\) \(p = 90\) Now, substitute the optimal price back into either individual demand curve to find the optimal quantity: \(q_a = 100 - p\) \(q_a = 100 - 90\) \(q_a = 10\) Both individuals benefit from the same quantity, so the optimal level of mosquito control is 10 units.
02

b. Private Market Outcome

In a private market, each individual would only consume mosquito control if their individual demand curves met the marginal cost of production. For Person A: \(q_a = 100 - p\) \(100 - p = 120\) \(p = -20\) Since the price cannot be negative, Person A would not consume any mosquito control in the private market. For Person B: \(q_b = 200 - p\) \(200 - p = 120\) \(p = 80\) Now, we have the quantity consumed by Person B as: \(q_b = 120\) However, since mosquito control is a public good, both individuals would benefit from it. The problem then is that both individuals may base their decision on how much the other person consumes. This uncertainty leads to the possibility of underproduction or overproduction of mosquito control.
03

c. Government Production Cost and Tax Bill Allocation

If the government were to produce the optimal amount of mosquito control (10 units) at a constant marginal cost of $120, the total production cost would be: \( Cost = 10 * 120 =\) \(1200\) Now, to allocate the tax bill proportionately to the benefits received by each individual, we can find the proportion of the contribution of each individual to the total benefit: Person A's contribution: \(Proportion_A = \frac{q_a}{q_a + q_b} =\) \(\frac{10}{10 + 120} =\) \(\frac{1}{13}\) Person B's contribution: \(Proportion_B = 1 - Proportion_A =\) \(\frac{12}{13}\) Now, we can allocate the tax bill accordingly: Tax Bill for Person A: \(Tax_A = Cost * Proportion_A =\) \(1200 * \frac{1}{13} =\) \(92.31\) Tax Bill for Person B: \(Tax_B = Cost * Proportion_B =\) \(1200 * \frac{12}{13} =\) \(1107.69\) Therefore, the tax bill should be allocated as follows: Person A would be responsible for \(92.31, and Person B would be responsible for \)1107.69.

Unlock Step-by-Step Solutions & Ace Your Exams!

  • Full Textbook Solutions

    Get detailed explanations and key concepts

  • Unlimited Al creation

    Al flashcards, explanations, exams and more...

  • Ads-free access

    To over 500 millions flashcards

  • Money-back guarantee

    We refund you if you fail your exam.

Over 30 million students worldwide already upgrade their learning with Vaia!

One App. One Place for Learning.

All the tools & learning materials you need for study success - in one app.

Get started for free

Most popular questions from this chapter

Suppose the oil industry in Utopia is perfectly competitive and that all firms draw oil from a single (and practically inexhaustible) pool. Assume that each competitor believes that it can sell all the oil it can produce at a stable world price of \(\$ 10\) per barrel and that the cost of operating a well for one year is \(\$ 1,000\) Total output per year (Q) of the oil field is a function of the number of wells ( \(n\) ) operating in the field. In particular, \\[ Q=500 n-n^{2} \\] and the amount of oil produced by each well ( \(q\) ) is given by \\[ q=\frac{Q}{n}=500-n \\] a. Describe the equilibrium output and the equilibrium number of wells in this perfectly competitive case. Is there a divergence between private and social marginal cost in the industry? b. Suppose now that the government nationalizes the oil field. How many oil wells should it operate? What will total output be? What will the output per well be? c. As an alternative to nationalization, the Utopian government is considering an annual license fee per well to discourage overdrilling. How large should this license fee be if it is to prompt the industry to drill the optimal number of wells?

Suppose individuals face a probability of \(u\) that they will be unemployed next year. If they are unemployed they will receive unemployment benefits of \(b,\) whereas if they are employed they receive \(w(1-t),\) where \(t\) is the tax used to finance unemployment benefits. Unemployment benefits are constrained by the government budget constraint \(u b=t w(1-u)\) a. Suppose the individual's utility function is given by \\[ U=\left(y_{i}\right)^{\delta} / \delta \\] where \(1-\delta\) is the degree of constant relative risk aversion. What would be the utility-maximizing choices for \(b\) and \(t ?\) b. How would the utility-maximizing choices for \(b\) and \(t\) respond to changes in the probability of unemployment, \(u\) ? c. How would \(b\) and \(t\) change in response to changes in the risk aversion parameter \(\delta\) ?

The analysis of public goods in this chapter exclusively used a model with only two individuals. The results are readily generalized to \(n\) persons-a generalization pursued in this problem. a. With \(n\) persons in an economy, what is the condition for efficient production of a public good? Explain how the characteristics of the public good are reflected in these conditions. b. What is the Nash equilibrium in the provision of this public good to \(n\) persons? Explain why this equilibrium is inefficient. Also explain why the underprovision of this public good is more severe than in the two-person cases studied in the chapter. c. How is the Lindahl solution generalized to \(n\) persons? Is the existence of a Lindahl equilibrium guaranteed in this more complex model?

There is considerable legal controversy about product safety. Two extreme positions might be termed caveat emptor (let the buyer beware) and caveat vendor (let the seller beware). Under the former scheme producers would have no responsibility for the safety of their products: Buyers would absorb all losses. Under the latter scheme this liability assignment would be reversed: Firms would be completely responsible under law for losses incurred from unsafe products. Using simple supply and demand analysis, discuss how the assignment of such liability might affect the allocation of resources. Would safer products be produced if firms were strictly liable under law? How do possible information asymmetries affect your results?

Suppose that there are \(n\) firms each producing the same good but with differing production functions. Output for each of these firms depends only on labor input, so the functions take the form \(q_{i}=f_{i}\left(l_{i}\right) .\) In its production activities each firm also produces some pollution, the amount of which is determined by a firm-specific function of labor input of the form \(g_{i}\left(l_{i}\right)\) a. Suppose that the government wishes to place a cap of amount \(K\) on total pollution. What is the efficient allocation of labor among firms? b. Will a uniform Pigovian tax on the output of each firm achieve the efficient allocation described in part (a)? c. Suppose that, instead of taxing output, the Pigovian tax is applied to each unit of pollution. How should this tax be set? Will the tax yield the efficient allocation described in part (a)? d. What are the implications of the problem for adopting pollution control strategies? (For more on this topic see the Extensions to this chapter.)

See all solutions

What do you think about this solution?

We value your feedback to improve our textbook solutions.

Study anywhere. Anytime. Across all devices.

Sign-up for free