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Suppose 100 cars will be offered on the used-car market. Let 50 of them be good cars, cach worth \(\$ 10,000\) to a buyer, and let 50 be lemons, each worth only \(\$ 2,000\). a. Compute a buyer's maximum willingness to pay for a car if he or she cannot observe the car's quality. b. Suppose that there are enough buyers relative to sellers that competition among them leads cars to be sold at their maximum willingness to pay. What would the market equilibrium be if sellers value good cars at \(\$ 8,000 ?\) At \(\$ 6,000 ?\)

Short Answer

Expert verified
Answer: The buyer's maximum willingness to pay for a car without knowing its quality is $6,000. If sellers value good cars at $8,000, only lemons will be sold in the market. If sellers value good cars at $6,000, both types of cars will be sold at the maximum willingness to pay price of $6,000.

Step by step solution

01

Find the probability of getting a good car or a lemon

We have a total of 100 cars, with 50 good cars and 50 lemons. So, the probability of getting a good car is \(P(G) = \frac{50}{100} = 0.5\), and the probability of getting a lemon is \(P(L) = \frac{50}{100} = 0.5\).
02

Compute the buyer's maximum willingness to pay for a car

To find the maximum willingness to pay for a car, we will multiply the probabilities of getting each type of car by their worth to the buyer and sum the results: \(WTP = P(G)\times V(G)+P(L)\times V(L) = 0.5\times \$ 10,000 + 0.5\times \$ 2,000 = \$ 5,000 + \$ 1,000 = \$ 6,000.\) So, the buyer's maximum willingness to pay for a car without knowing its quality is \( \$ 6,000\).
03

Analyze the market equilibrium when sellers value good cars at \( \$ 8,000\)

In this case, the sellers value the good cars at \( \$ 8,000\). Since the buyers' maximum willingness to pay for a car (\( \$ 6,000\)) is less than the sellers' valuation for good cars, good cars will not be sold in the market. Only lemons will be sold at the buyers' maximum willingness to pay (\( \$ 6,000\)), which is higher than their valuation for lemons (\( \$ 2,000\)).
04

Analyze the market equilibrium when sellers value good cars at \( \$ 6,000\)

Now, the sellers value the good cars at \( \$ 6,000\), which is equal to the buyers' maximum willingness to pay for a car. In this case, both the good cars and lemons will be sold at the buyers' maximum willingness to pay (\( \$ 6,000\)), since it is higher than the valuation for both types of cars (good cars: \( \$ 10,000\), lemons: \( \$ 2,000\)). In conclusion, the market equilibrium will depend on the sellers' valuation for good cars. If sellers value good cars at \( \$ 8,000\), only lemons will be sold in the market. If sellers value good cars at \( \$ 6,000\), both types of cars will be sold at the maximum willingness to pay price of \( \$ 6,000\).

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Key Concepts

These are the key concepts you need to understand to accurately answer the question.

Willingness to Pay
In economics, willingness to pay (WTP) refers to the maximum amount an individual is prepared to spend to acquire a good or service. It is a crucial concept that reflects the consumer's subjective valuation of a product.
In the case of the used-car market example, calculating the WTP for a car involved considering that there are two types of cars with different valuations (good cars and lemons) but with no distinct way to identify them beforehand. Thus, the buyer's WTP represented an average, based on the probability of ending up with either type.
Understanding WTP is vital for businesses as it helps set prices that consumers are willing to pay, while also ensuring they do not exceed this threshold and drive consumers away. In competitive markets, WTP can also indicate the market-clearing price, where goods are sold at a price point that buyers are willing to pay and that sellers are willing to accept.
Adverse Selection
The concept of adverse selection arises when there is an asymmetry of information between buyers and sellers, leading to negative outcomes in transactions. Specifically, those who have more information about the true quality or nature of the product are able to exploit their knowledge at the expense of those who are less informed.
For the used car scenario, if sellers know the quality of the cars (good or lemons) and buyers do not, sellers may only offer lemons at the price of good cars, driving good cars out of the market. This is known as the 'market for lemons' problem, famously discussed by economist George Akerlof. Adverse selection in such markets results in only the least desirable goods being traded, as seen in our exercise where the market equilibrium ends up being at the price of lemons if the sellers value good cars higher than the buyers' WTP.
Probability in Economics
The application of probability in economics is crucial as it allows economists to understand and predict economic behaviors under uncertainty. Probabilities enable the calculation of expected values which inform decision-making in risk-laden situations, like investments or market transactions.
In the used-car market example, probabilities were used to determine the expected WTP by weighing the value of good cars and lemons against their likelihood of occurrence (a 50-50 chance for each type). Use of probability conveys the idea that economics isn't just about certainties; it's about managing and anticipating the unpredictable, thereby influencing market dynamics, pricing, and consumer behavior.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Consider the principal-agent relationship between a patient and doctor. Suppose that the patient's utility function is given by \(U_{P}(m, x),\) where \(m\) denotes medical care (whose quantity is determined by the doctor) and \(x\) denotes other consumption goods. The patient faces budget constraint \(I_{c}=p_{m} m+x,\) where \(p_{m}\) is the relative price of medical care. The doctor's utility function is given by \(U_{d}\left(I_{d}\right)+U_{P}-\) that is, the doctor derives utility from income but, being altruistic, also derives utility from the patient's well-being. Moreover, the additive specification implies that the doctor is a perfect altruist in the sense that his or her utility increases one-for-one with the patient's. The doctor's income comes from the patient's medical expenditures: \(I_{d}=p_{m} m .\) Show that, in this situation, the doctor will generally choose a level of \(m\) that is higher than a fully informed patient would choose.

Suppose the agent can be one of three types rather than just two as in the chapter. a. Return to the monopolist's problem of computing the optimal nonlinear price. Represent the first best in a schematic diagram by modifying Figure \(18.4 .\) Do the same for the second best by modifying Figure 18.6 b. Return to the monopolist's problem of designing optimal insurance policies. Represent the first best in a schematic diagram by modifying Figure \(18.7 .\) Do the same for the second best by modifying Figure 18.8

Suppose that left-handed people are more prone to injury than right-handed people. Iefties have an 80 percent chance of suffering an injury leading to a \(\$ 1,000\) loss (in terms of medical expenses and the monetary equivalent of pain and suffering) but righties have only a 20 percent chance of suffering such an injury. The population contains equal numbers of lefties and rightics. Individuals all have logarithmic utility-of-wealth functions and initial wealth of \(\$ 10,000\). Insurance is provided by a monopoly company. a. Compute the first best for the monopoly insurer (i.e., supposing it can observe the individual's dominant hand). b. Take as given that, in the second best, the monopolist prefers not to serve rightics at all and targets only leftics. Knowing this, compute the second- best menu of policies for the monopoly insurer. c. Use a spreadsheet program (such as the one on the website associated with Example 18.5 ) or other mathematical software to solve numerically the constrained optimization problem for the second best. Make sure to add constraints bounding the insurance payments for righties: \(0 \leq x_{R} \leq 1,000\). Establish that the constraint \(0 \leq x_{R}\) is binding and so righties are not served in the second best.

Suppose there is a \(50-50\) chance that an individual with logarithmic utility from wealth and with a current wealth of \(\$ 20,000\) will suffer a loss of \(\$ 10,000\) from a car accident. Insurance is competitively provided at actuarially fair rates. a. Compute the outcome if the individual buys full insurance. b. Compute the outcome if the individual buys only partial insurance covering half the loss. Show that the outcome in part (a) is preferred. c. Now suppose that individuals who buy the partial rather than the full insurance policy take more carc when driving, reducing the damage from loss from \(\$ 10,000\) to \(\$ 7,000\). What would be the actuarially fair price of the partial policy? Does the individual now prefer the full or the partial policy?

Consider the following simple model of a common values auction. Two buyers cach obtain a private signal about the value of an object. The signal can be cither high \((H)\) or low \((L)\) with equal probability. If both obtain signal \(H,\) the object is worth 1 otherwise, it is worth 0 a. What is the expected value of the object to a buyer who sees signal \(L\) ? To a buyer who sees signal \(H ?\) b. Suppose buyers bid their expected value computed in part (a). Show that they earn negative profit conditional on observing signal \(H-\) an example of the winner's curse.

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