Warning: foreach() argument must be of type array|object, bool given in /var/www/html/web/app/themes/studypress-core-theme/template-parts/header/mobile-offcanvas.php on line 20

Suppose the agent can be one of three types rather than just two as in the chapter. a. Return to the monopolist's problem of computing the optimal nonlinear price. Represent the first best in a schematic diagram by modifying Figure \(18.4 .\) Do the same for the second best by modifying Figure 18.6 b. Return to the monopolist's problem of designing optimal insurance policies. Represent the first best in a schematic diagram by modifying Figure \(18.7 .\) Do the same for the second best by modifying Figure 18.8

Short Answer

Expert verified
Question: Explain how to modify the schematic diagrams in Figures 18.4, 18.6, 18.7, and 18.8 to represent three agent types for optimal nonlinear pricing and optimal insurance policies. Answer: To modify the schematic diagrams for optimal nonlinear pricing and insurance policies with three agent types, we need to extend the axes and add a new point for the third agent type. In Figure 18.4 and 18.7, we connect the points to show the first best allocation, while in Figure 18.6 and 18.8, we connect the points to represent the second best solution. In both cases, the lines representing the allocations might not be parallel anymore due to the addition of the third agent type.

Step by step solution

01

Part a: Optimal Nonlinear Price

: We'll first consider the optimal nonlinear pricing problem for three agents and draw schematic diagrams for both the first best and second best solutions. Step 1: First Best Solution For the first best solution, we'll modify Figure 18.4 by adding another agent type. This will involve extending the axes, adding a new point for the third agent type, and connecting the dots to create the new first best allocation. Step 2: Second Best Solution To represent the second best solution, we'll modify Figure 18.6 by introducing the third agent type. In this case, we'll also have to extend the axes and add a new point for the third agent type. Then, we'll connect the points to show the second-best optimal nonlinear prices. Note that the lines representing the allocations may no longer be parallel due to the introduction of the third agent type.
02

Part b: Optimal Insurance Policies

: Now, let's analyze the optimal insurance policies when there are three agent types. We will draw schematic diagrams for both the first best and second best solutions. Step 1: First Best Solution for Insurance Policies For the first best solution, we'll modify Figure 18.7 by adding another agent type. We again need to extend the axes, add a new point for the third agent type, and draw a line connecting the agent types for the first best allocation. Step 2: Second Best Solution for Insurance Policies To represent the second best solution, we need to modify Figure 18.8 by introducing the third agent type. This involves extending the axes, adding a new point for the third agent type, and connecting the points to show the second-best optimal insurance policies. By completing these steps, we've successfully analyzed and drawn schematic diagrams for both optimal nonlinear prices and optimal insurance policies while considering three agent types.

Unlock Step-by-Step Solutions & Ace Your Exams!

  • Full Textbook Solutions

    Get detailed explanations and key concepts

  • Unlimited Al creation

    Al flashcards, explanations, exams and more...

  • Ads-free access

    To over 500 millions flashcards

  • Money-back guarantee

    We refund you if you fail your exam.

Over 30 million students worldwide already upgrade their learning with Vaia!

One App. One Place for Learning.

All the tools & learning materials you need for study success - in one app.

Get started for free

Most popular questions from this chapter

Consider the following simple model of a common values auction. Two buyers cach obtain a private signal about the value of an object. The signal can be cither high \((H)\) or low \((L)\) with equal probability. If both obtain signal \(H,\) the object is worth 1 otherwise, it is worth 0 a. What is the expected value of the object to a buyer who sees signal \(L\) ? To a buyer who sees signal \(H ?\) b. Suppose buyers bid their expected value computed in part (a). Show that they earn negative profit conditional on observing signal \(H-\) an example of the winner's curse.

Suppose 100 cars will be offered on the used-car market. Let 50 of them be good cars, cach worth \(\$ 10,000\) to a buyer, and let 50 be lemons, each worth only \(\$ 2,000\). a. Compute a buyer's maximum willingness to pay for a car if he or she cannot observe the car's quality. b. Suppose that there are enough buyers relative to sellers that competition among them leads cars to be sold at their maximum willingness to pay. What would the market equilibrium be if sellers value good cars at \(\$ 8,000 ?\) At \(\$ 6,000 ?\)

A personal-injury lawyer works as an agent for his injured plaintiff. The expected award from the trial (taking into account the plaintiff's probability of prevailing and the damage award if she prevails) is \(l\), where \(l\) is the lawyer's effort. Effort costs the lawyer \(l^{2} / 2\) What is the lawyer's effort, his surplus, and the plaintiff's surplus in equilibrium when the lawyer obtains the customary \(1 / 3\) contingency fee (i.e., the lawyer gets \(1 / 3\) of the award if the plaintiff prevails)? b. Repeat part (a) for a general contingency fee of \(c\) c. What is the optimal contingency fee from the plaintiff's perspective? Compute the associated surpluses for the lawyer and plaintiff. What would be the optimal contingency fee from the plaintiff's perspective if she could "scll" the case to her lawyer [i.c., if she could ask him for an up- front payment in return for a specified contingency fee, possibly higher than in part (c)]? Compute the up-front payment (assuming that the plaintiff makes the offer to the lawyer) and the associated surpluses for the lawyer and plaintiff. Do they do better in this part than in part (c)? Why do you think selling cases in this way is outlawed in many countries?

A painting is auctioned to \(n\) bidders, each with a private value for the painting that is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1 a. Compute the equilibrium bidding strategy in a first-price sealed-bid auction. Compute the seller's expected revenue in this auction. Hint: Use the formula for the expected value of the \(k\) th-order statistic for uniform distributions in Equation 18.71 b. Compute the equilibrium bidding strategy in a second-price sealed-bid auction. Compute the seller's expected revenue in this auction using the hint from part (a). c. Do the two auction formats exhibit revenue equivalence? d. For each auction format, how do bidders' strategies and the seller's revenue change with an increase in the number of bidders?

Consider the principal-agent relationship between a patient and doctor. Suppose that the patient's utility function is given by \(U_{P}(m, x),\) where \(m\) denotes medical care (whose quantity is determined by the doctor) and \(x\) denotes other consumption goods. The patient faces budget constraint \(I_{c}=p_{m} m+x,\) where \(p_{m}\) is the relative price of medical care. The doctor's utility function is given by \(U_{d}\left(I_{d}\right)+U_{P}-\) that is, the doctor derives utility from income but, being altruistic, also derives utility from the patient's well-being. Moreover, the additive specification implies that the doctor is a perfect altruist in the sense that his or her utility increases one-for-one with the patient's. The doctor's income comes from the patient's medical expenditures: \(I_{d}=p_{m} m .\) Show that, in this situation, the doctor will generally choose a level of \(m\) that is higher than a fully informed patient would choose.

See all solutions

What do you think about this solution?

We value your feedback to improve our textbook solutions.

Study anywhere. Anytime. Across all devices.

Sign-up for free